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Abstract 
This dissertation aims to examine the institutional transitions of the Inner Asian groups in the Central 
Plain during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. Starting with an examination on the 
origin and development of Sinicization theory in the West and China, the first major chapter of this 
dissertation argues the Sinicization theory evolves in the intellectual history of modern times. This 
chapter, in one hand, offers a different explanation on the origin of the Sinicization theory in both China 
and the West, and their relationships. In the other hand, it incorporates Sinicization theory into the 
construction of the historical narrative of Chinese Nationality, and argues the theorization of Sinicization 
attempted by several scholars in the second half of 20th Century. The second and third major chapters 
build two case studies regarding the transition of the central and local institutions of the Inner Asian 
polities in the Central Plain, which are the succession system and the local administrative system. In the 
first case study, through applying the crown prince system, the Inner Asian rulers reached the 
centralization of authority, which was different from and even more centralized than the Han tradition. In 
the second case study, the polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties largely 
followed the Inner Asian political tradition and the Inner Asian groups also remained as units inside the 
polities. The two case studies show the transition of the institutions of the Inner Asian polity in the Central 
Plain. The transition is neither a one-way change from Inner Asian institutions to Han and Jin institutions 
nor a simple hybridity. For different institutions, here the succession system in the central government 
and the administrative system in the local level, the dynamics for the transition are also not the same. 
This dissertation approaches the Chinese history with articulating not only what these Inner Asian groups 
took from the Chinese tradition, but also what they contributed to the institutional changes in Chinese 
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REMAKING CHINESENESS: THE TRANSITION OF INNER ASIAN GROUPS IN 
THE CENTRAL PLAIN DURING THE SIXTEEN KINGDOMS PERIOD AND 
NORTHERN DYNASTIES 
Fangyi Cheng 
Victor H. Mair 
This dissertation aims to examine the institutional transitions of the Inner Asian groups in 
the Central Plain during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. Starting 
with an examination on the origin and development of Sinicization theory in the West 
and China, the first major chapter of this dissertation argues the Sinicization theory 
evolves in the intellectual history of modern times. This chapter, in one hand, offers a 
different explanation on the origin of the Sinicization theory in both China and the West, 
and their relationships. In the other hand, it incorporates Sinicization theory into the 
construction of the historical narrative of Chinese Nationality, and argues the theorization 
of Sinicization attempted by several scholars in the second half of 20th Century. The 
second and third major chapters build two case studies regarding the transition of the 
central and local institutions of the Inner Asian polities in the Central Plain, which are the 
succession system and the local administrative system. In the first case study, through 
applying the crown prince system, the Inner Asian rulers reached the centralization of 
authority, which was different from and even more centralized than the Han tradition. In 
the second case study, the polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern 
Dynasties largely followed the Inner Asian political tradition and the Inner Asian groups 
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also remained as units inside the polities. The two case studies show the transition of the 
institutions of the Inner Asian polity in the Central Plain. The transition is neither a one-
way change from Inner Asian institutions to Han and Jin institutions nor a simple 
hybridity. For different institutions, here the succession system in the central government 
and the administrative system in the local level, the dynamics for the transition are also 
not the same. This dissertation approaches the Chinese history with articulating not only 
what these Inner Asian groups took from the Chinese tradition, but also what they 
contributed to the institutional changes in Chinese history, which reshapes our 
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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
 
              The Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties are known for the 
invasions of Northern China by Inner Asian peoples, mainly from the Northern steppe 
zone, usually described in Chinese historical records as wuhu luanhua (Bϲ<Б, five hu 
disordering China), siyi luanhua (ģņ<Б, four yi disordering China), or yidi luanhua 
(ņ̲<Б, yi and di disordering China).1  The Sixteen Kingdoms period began with Liu 
Yuan’s (Ê˸) proclamation of the Han (̍) state in the year 304 CE, and ended with the 
unification of northern China by the Northern Wei in 439.2 This marked the beginning of 
the Northern Dynasties period (439 – 589), which lasted until the replacement of the 
Northern Zhou by the Sui, who later unified China. Nearly all the ruling groups of 
Northern China between 304 and 589 were Inner Asian, and non-Han peoples comprised 
more than half of the population of Northern China during the Sixteen Kingdoms 
period.3 As a period of division and fragmentation, the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern 
Dynasties have been the object of less scholarly attention, particularly in the Western 
academic world, than major dynasties like the Han and Tang, despite the pertinence of at 
least two significant aspects of the period to topics that have enjoyed broad interest in the 
field of Chinese studies. The first of these is the notion of Sinicization, relevant because 
of the general view that the Inner Asian ruling groups of this period, especially the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jin shu ɷʄ (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1996), vol.56, 1529-1534. 
2 Because of the complex implications of the word “China”, here “China” is mainly used as a geographic 
term to roughly refer to the territory of today’s People’s Republic of China. 
3 Wang Xiaowei, “Shiliuguo shiqi Zhongyuan Yi-Han renkou bili” Ûĩɵʐ#ìņ̍Küˍr, in 
Lishi jiaoxue ˁĀɖŭ, 1995, no.7, 15-18. 
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Xianbei, merged into the Chinese population.4 The second aspect, not unrelated, pertains 
to the "eventual" unification under the Sui that followed this period. Why was China 
unified after this period of division? Was it inevitable? What dynamic lay behind the 
integration? One of the answers for these questions is also related to the theory of 
Sinicization.  
            Although the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern dynasties are often treated 
as evidence for the validity of Sinicization theory, the notion of Sinicization has been 
challenged and hotly disputed in the Western academic world. The corresponding 
Chinese word for Sinicization is usually hanhua ̍Ù, but this translation is not optimal 
due to the mismatch between the “Han” of the Chinese word, which can refer also to Han 
Chinese or the Han ethnicity, and the “sino-/sini-” of “Sinicization,” which refers more 
broadly to China. The alternative huahua БÙ, which matches the English word more 
closely, is preferred by such scholars as Ping-ti Ho and Chen Yuan, the latter of whom 
uses huahua in the title of his book discussing the Sinicization of foreigners from the 
Western Regions (Xiyu пĳ) during the Yuan Dynasty.5  Although the character “hua 
Ù” inside the two terms had the meaning of civilizing non-Sinitic people since very early 
in Chinese context, neither term, however, carries the meaning of Sinicization before the 
beginning of the Republic of China in 1912. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Sinicization theory is very common in numerous works of Chinese and Japanese scholarship, such as Lü 
Simian, Liangjin Nanbeichao shi ɷáÚʏĀ (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chuban gongsi, 2009), 623-627; 
Kawamoto Yoshiaki ƲʔЃɳ, ‘‘Kozoku no kokka’’ ϲɥĦƃ, in Gi-Shin Nanbokuchō Zui-Tō jidai shi 
no kihon mondai ՚ɸáÚʏԙęɵTĀĶʔěԸ (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1997), 98–106. 
5 Ping-ti Ho, In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s “Reenvisioning the Qing”, The 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol.57, no.1 (Feb., 1998), p.152; Chen Yuan, Yuan Xiyuren huahua kao пĳ
KБÙϥ, Shanghai guji press, 2000. 
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    Since the 1940s, however, many Western scholars have questioned or outright rejected 
the Sinicization theory as a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”6 New 
approaches to Inner Asian rulers in China, such as "conquest dynasties" and "New Qing 
history," have been brought up in the Western academic world.7 Yet these approaches 
deal primarily with later dynasties, such as the Liao, Jin, Mongol, and Qing, and Qing 
history remains the chief battleground of the academic debate about Sinicization and 
other theories. In Mainland China and Taiwan, on the other hand, the theory of 
Sinicization is still embraced by a large number of scholars today,8 and the debate about 
the "New Qing History" has recently expanded into severe political attacks by mainland 
Chinese commentators condemning it as a “New Imperialist” approach to history.9 
Though the flames of war have yet to reach the study of the Sixteen Kingdoms and 
Northern Dynasties, questions concerning the theory of Sinicization will ultimately still 
have to be answered for this period as well. Can the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern 
Dynasties period yet serve as an example of Sinicization? If not, how can the transition of 
the Inner Asian ruling groups be described? A few scholars have already attempted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in 
Chinese History”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol.55, no.4 (Nov., 1996), 842. 
7 Karl A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, History of Chinese Society. Liao (907-1125), Philadelphia 1949; 
Jennifer Holmgren, “Northern Wei as a Conquest Dynasty: Current Perceptions, Past Scholarship”, Papers 
on Far Eastern History 40 (1989), 1-50; Albert Dien, “A New Look at the Xianbei and their Impact on 
Chinese Culture”, in George Kuwayama (ed.), Ancient Mortuary Traditions of China: Papers on Chinese 
Ceramic Funerary Sculptures (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 1991), 40-59.  
8 E.g. Ping-ti Ho and Chen Yuan, mentioned earlier; see also Jing-Shen Tao, The Jurchen in Twelfth-
century China: A Study of Sinicization, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967; Ch’i-Ch’ing Hsiao, 
Lun Yuandai Mengguren zhi hanhua ѡTКýK.̍Ù, Mengyuanshi xinyan КĀɠͻ, Taibei: 
Yunchen wenhua, 1994, p.221.   
9 Li Zhiting, “’New Qing History’: An Example of ‘New Imperialist’ History”, Contemporary Chinese 
Thought, 47:1 (2016), 5-12.  
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answers.10 More fundamental questions regarding the notion of Sinicization, meanwhile, 
go unasked and unanswered on both sides of the broader debate: when was Sinicization 
first conceived in the West and China? Do scholars who use the theory do so with the 
same understanding and definition? Is hanhua ̍Ù or huahua БÙ in the Chinese 
context the same as Sinicization in the Western context? More importantly, do mainland 
Chinese and Taiwanese scholars embrace the theory solely out of nationalism? If not, 
should Western academia reexamine the Sinicization theory accordingly? My dissertation 
will consider these questions. 
            Another key factor in discussing this period, which I will also deal with in my 
dissertation, is the tradition of “grand unification (dayitong Łπ)” in Chinese history. 
The Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties period was the first time in Chinese 
history that the Central Plain (Zhongyuan #ì) was conquered by Inner Asian peoples 
who ruled over both Han Chinese and Inner Asian subjects. China was fragmented during 
this period, but was subsequently unified by a northern regime in which the descendants 
of those Inner Asian rulers remained. In many interpretations, the Sixteen Kingdoms 
Period and Northern Dynasties are treated as a “detour” in Chinese history, with China 
ultimately returning to its “normal route of development” after the Northern Dynasties. 
The "detour" is seen as corresponding to the process of the Sinicization of Inner Asian 
groups, which in this interpretation yielded a solid social and intellectual foundation for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Chin-Yin Tseng, for instance, has drawn inspiration from the “New Qing History” in interpreting the 
material culture of the Tuoba Xianbei during the Northern Wei Pingcheng period (398-494 CE) by using 
the notion of “dual presence.” Tseng argues that the people and the agency of material forms in the Tuoba 
Northern Wei have two different identities for the Chinese people and Eurasian steppe people, suggesting a 
new angle from which to read material culture during the Northern dynasties. Chin-Yin Tseng, The Making 
of the Tuoba Northern Wei: Constructing material cultural expressions in Northern Wei Pingcheng Period 
(398-494 CE), BAR International Series 2567, 2013, 12-15. 
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the later unification of China. Another representative interpretation is the 
“Southernization theory” first advanced by Tang Zhangru, who argues that the whole 
empire was southernized from the mid-Tang onwards.11 In other words, although the 
Tang directly inherited the legacy of the Northern dynasties, this was gradually replaced 
by the influence of the Southern dynasties. Both interpretations emphasize the 
assimilation of Inner Asian ruling groups via the absorption of "Chineseness" during the 
period of division. In light of the increasing questioning and rejection of the theory of 
Sinicization theory mentioned earlier, however, these interpretations must also be 
reevaluated. Did people during this time foresee the re-unification of China? Was the 
unification inevitable, or could disunity have become the new “natural state” of China 
had things gone differently?  What was the dynamic behind the integration? These 
questions require a rethinking of the tradition of "grand unification" in Chinese history.  
            To address the questions from the two aspects mentioned above, my dissertation 
builds two case studies to reveal different strata in the transition of Inner Asian peoples. I 
examine the responses of Inner Asian rulers and community members during the 
transition, and consider how their responses may have varied according to their differing 
identities. Confronted with different options from the sedentary civilization, did they 
accept willingly and unquestioningly? Did they hesitate between different options, or just 
take one option unconsciously? What factors might have motivated their final decision?   
            Besides the introductory chapter, this dissertation comprises four other chapters. 
The second chapter, "The Evolution of Sinicization," traces the history and usage of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 See Tang Zhangru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi sanlun ՚ɷáÚʏĀԙęĀѡ (Wuhan: Wuhan 
daxue press, 1992), 486; Mou Fasong, “Luelun Tangdai de Nanchaohua qingxiang” ͗ѡęTͣáʏÙ
ċ, Zhongguoshi yanjiu #ĩĀͻΤ, 1996, no.2, 51-64. 
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theory of Sinicization in Eastern and Western scholarship, and will discuss the 
intellectual trends underlying the different ways in which the theory has been applied. As 
mentioned above, the earliest use of Sinicization seems to have been in the West, with 
such foundational sinologists as Paul Pelliot and Édouard Chavannes playing major roles, 
and with early reports about the assimilation of Kaifeng Jews in China lending apparent 
support to the idea.12 With the expanding influence of western Sinology in China, and the 
contemporary rise of nationalism, the theory of Sinicization was quickly picked up by 
early 20th century Chinese scholars such as Chen Yuan. Nationalism alone, however, 
cannot explain the popularity of the theory in the Chinese academic world: Chinese 
traditional concepts, such as the yi ņ/xia ľ dichotomy and the concept of tianxia (ł, 
All-under-Heaven) in Confucianism also played an important role, as did the Marxian 
and other views of social evolution, all of which were taken as evidence for the 
proposition that "barbarians" naturally would become – and would want to become – 
“Sinicized.” I follow this by discussing criticisms of Sinicization since the 1950s. I 
conclude by discussing to what extent the theory of Sinicization remains valid in the field 
of Chinese studies, and how it might best be applied or avoided in future research.  
            In each of the following three chapters, I build two case studies to examine the 
transition of Inner Asian groups in different layers. In the third chapter, also I discuss 
how Inner Asian rulers in Northern China adopted a vertical crown prince succession 
system after their migration into Northern China. I begin by examining the institution of 
crown princes as recorded in Chinese canonical texts in order to discuss the motivations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Donald Daniel Leslie, The Survival of the Chinese Jews: The Jewish Community of Kaifeng, Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1972, 103-108.  
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underlying the institution and the usual roles of crown princes in this context. A 
discussion of the succession system in the Inner Asian tradition follows: although the 
institution of the crown prince was to some extent new to Tuoba Xianbei rulers, it was 
the Tuoba Xianbei who officially adopted this system for themselves. Key questions to be 
discussed in this section include: Why did the Tuoba rulers accept and try to apply this 
new succession system? What advantages did the new system present to them? How did 
they come gradually to use this institution differently from the typical Chinese way? 
What influence did this new institution exert upon nomadic rulers and later dynasties?  
            The fourth chapter deals with the transition of the community structures of Inner 
Asian people. Nomadic groups were usually reorganized after migration to sedentary 
areas, either by the government or by themselves. In this chapter, I first examine the 
concepts of “tribes (bu ӧ)” and “clan (zu ɥ)” in the nomadic tradition during the 
Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties, based on materials from both received 
historical records and anthropological field work. Next, I discuss the concepts of 
“household (hu Ȫ)”, “village (cun ʛ)” and “county (li Ӯ)” in the Chinese tradition, and 
the strategy of the government to reorganize the nomadic people in Chinese territory. Of 
particular interest will be the question of how the nomadic groups were reorganized after 
entering the Central Plain, and whether this reorganization was entirely along Han 
Chinese lines or retained features of pastoral tradition. The relationship between hu and 
Han in local society is discussed and fleshed out using excavated inscriptions from 
Buddhist steles and epitaphs from the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern dynasties.  
8!
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            In final chapter, which is the concluding chapter, I consider the findings drawn 
from the case studies presented in the preceding chapters and discuss the ways in which 
these conclusions may be brought to bear in reconsidering the theory of Sinicization and 
the tradition of "Grand Unification." It is my hope that the discussion will shed new light 
on the content and role of nationalism in the construction of Chinese history and even the 







CHAPTER 2 The Evolution of “Sinicization” 
 
 Sinicization (alternatively known as Sinicisation, Sinofication, or Sinification) is 
usually interpreted as the process by which all non-Han or non-Sinitic people who 
entered the Chinese realm, no matter whether as conquerors or conquered, eventually 
were inevitably assimilated as Chinese.13 As an important concept used in the study of 
Chinese history, Sinicization theory is discussed not only in almost all topics related to 
the non-Sinitic groups in Chinese territory, but also is in the core of some debates, such 
as the those about the New Qing History and “Conquest Dynasties.” In these debates, 
Sinicization theory always is questioned, or even radically rejected, by many Western 
scholars and is treated as a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”14 To the 
contrary, the Sinicization theory is embraced by a large number of scholars from 
Mainland China and Taiwan, and the debate even leads to severe political criticism of the 
New Qing history by attacking it as the “New Imperialist” history.15 Behind these 
arguments and debates, perhaps because of its seemingly “obvious” character, scholars 
usually do not give a clear or consistent definition for Sinicization.  
Many questions about Sinicization still remain unasked. Among these questions 
are some that are basic and significant for the debate. When was Sinicization theory first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Here the definition of Sinicization is paraphrased from Evelyn Rawski’s article. In her article, she says 
“Sinicization—the thesis that all of the non-Han peoples who have entered the Chinese realm have 
eventually been assimilated into Chinese culture.” Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning 
the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 55, 
no.4 (Nov. 1996), 842. 
14 Evelyn S. Rawski, 1996, 842.  
15 Li Zhiting (2016) “New Qing History: An Example of 'New Imperialist' History," Contemporary Chinese 
Thought, 47:1, 5–12.  
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mentioned in the West and in China? Do all scholars use this theory with the same 
understanding and definition? Is Hanhua ˕Ù or Huahua ÞÙ in the Chinese context the 
same as Sinicization in Western context? More importantly, is nationalism the only 
reason for scholars from Mainland China and Taiwan to embrace the Sinicization theory? 
In other words, why is there emphasis on the significance of Sinicization in Chinese 
history? Have Western scholars offered a better interpretation than Sinicization? All these 
questions will be discussed in this chapter.  
 We begin with a chronological analysis of the application of Sinicization theory 
from the end of 19th century until the early 21st century. The analysis includes the 
contexts, definitions and contents of Sinicization theory. Next will be an examination of 
the variety of conceptualization behind the usages of the Sinicization theory. Following 
will be a discussion of ethnicity in early Medieval Chinese history.  
 
2.1 Early use of Sinicization in the Western Context 
 
 As a frequently used concept, the morphology of the word “Sinicization” is quite 
simple; the word is comprised of the root “Sinicize” and suffix “-ization." The root 
“Sinicize” means somebody or something modified under Chinese influence; the suffix “-
ization” denotes the process, act or result of something, in this case Sinicizing. Words 
with a similar combination are abundant in English, such as Romanization and 
Westernization. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, both Sinicize and 
11!
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Sinicization first appeared in The Athenaeum, a British literary magazine at the end of 
19th century, and they often are used to describe the Chinese influence on Japanese 
language and religion.16  
In the early 20th century, “Sinicization” first was used in academic articles to 
describe the Chinese impact on the languages and customs of cultures surrounding 
China.17 When W. Perceval Yetts discussed the communication between China and the 
West in 1926, he even used “Sinicization” to describe the intellectual history of Europe in 
the 17th and 18th century, writing: “Indiscriminate admiration for Chinese notions and 
things, or those supposedly Chinese, became the vogue. This Sinicization of intellectual 
Europe reached its acme during the eighteenth century, and it has influenced our arts to 
an extent hard to estimate.”18 Therefore, it is almost certain that in the beginning, the 
words “Sinicization” or “Sinicize” served as descriptive terms for Chinese influence, 
including Chinese notions, language, and material culture, on cultures outside of China. 
An example of this influence would be the language and religion in Japan, and art in 
Europe. In other words, when first used, Sinicization had no direct connection with ethnic 
identity, nor did it carry the connotations of universality (“all”) and meritability (“must”).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 In OED, 2nd edition (1989) OED Online version March 2016. Examples such as “1889 Athenæum 28 
Sept. 414/2, While the civilization of Japan becomes every year more and more Westernized, her language 
becomes more and more Sinicized.” “1898 Athenæum 26 Nov. 747/3, Shinto might have become a 
religious and ethical system, but its development was arrested by Sinicization and Buddhism.”  
17 William Elliot Griffis, Don C. Seitz and Homer Lea, "Japan and the United States," The North American 
Review, vol. 197, no. 691 (Jun. 1913), p. 729.  
18 W. Perceval Yetts, "Contact between China and the West," The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, 
vol. 48, no. 276 (Mar, 1926), p. 122. The term “Chinoiserie” was also probably first used in the 16th and 
17th Century.  
12!
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 As an alternative form of Sinicization, Sinification did not bear the same meaning. 
According to the OED, the word “Sinification” first appeared in 1900 with the same 
definition as Sinicization. In actuality, it had been in use already in 1899 with the 
meaning of “managed/administered by the Chinese instead of foreigners.” This was in 
reference to the process of the Chinese government and people gradually taking over the 
control of foreign settlements, railways and other organizations inside China.19 Further, 
when Noël Williamson talked about the gradual control of Tibet by the Chinese, he said 
“Events have been taking place of late which are likely to increase interest in this section 
of the Lohit valley. I refer to the Sinification of Tibet, and if reports in the public press be 
true, it is only a matter of months, not years, before the Rong, instead of forming a part of 
Tibet, will become a Chinese province.”20 From these early usages of Sinification, it is 
clear that Sinification referred to the political control or governance by the Chinese 
government or people.  
 Although Sinicization did not obtain the meaning of “becoming a Chinese by 
assimilation or acculturation,” work by a prominent Sinologist of the mid-19th century, 
Sir Henry Yule, already reflected a similar assumption, albeit without using the word 
"Sinicization." In the end of his “Dedication and Preface” in Cathay and the way thither: 
Being a collection of medieval notice of China, published in 1866, Yule said: 
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19 See “The Proposed Sinification of the Settlements,” The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & 
Consular Gazette (1870–1941) [Shanghai] 20 Mar 1899:474; Gilbert McIntosh, “The Christian Literature 
Society Moves Forward,” The Chinese Recorder (1912–1938) [Shanghai] 01 Dec 1923: 746. 
20 Noël Williamson, “The Lohit-Brahmaputra between Assam and South-Eastern Tibet, November, 1907, 
to January, 1908,” The Geographical Journal, vol. 34, no. 4 (Oct. 1909), p. 383. The Rong here could refer 
to the Rong-chu Valley.  
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The empire (refering to China) which has a history coeval with the 
oldest of Chaldæa (10–6 century BC) seems to be breaking up. It has 
often broken up before and been reconsolidated; it has often been 
conquered, and has either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its 
conquerors. But they derived what civilization they possessed from 
land which they invaded. The internal combustions that are now 
heaving the soil come in contact with new and alien elements of 
Western origin. Who can guess what shall come of that chemistry?21 
 
While talking about China’s fate after its contact with Western civilization, Yule looked 
back at Chinese history, and emphasized that the empire of China either had “thrown off 
the yoke or absorbed its conquerors” while being conquered. According to Yule, how did 
China absorb its conquerors? In the preliminary essays of the same book, he gave an 
example about the Khitan:  
The Khitan empire subsisted for two centuries, in Northern China and 
the adjoining regions of Tartary. The same curious process then took 
place which seems always to have followed the intrusion of Tartar 
conquerors into China, and singularly analogous to that which followed 
the establishment of the Roman emperors in Byzantium. The intruders 
themselves adopted Chinese manners, ceremonies, literature, and 
civilization, and gradually lost their energy and warlike character. It 
must have been during this period, ending with overthrow of the 
dynasty in 1123, and whilst this northern monarchy was the face which 
the Celestial Empire turned into Inner Asia, that the name of Khitan, 
Khitat, or Khitaï, became indissolubly associated with China.22 
 
Here, Yule interpreted the intruders as being “absorbed” and adopting “Chinese manners, 
ceremonies, literature and civilization” and eventually losing “their energy and warlike 
character." Later Yule also expressed a similar idea about the Jurchen in the Jin 
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21 Cathay and the way thither: Being a collection of medieval notice of China, translated and edited by 
Colonel Henry Yule, C.B., vol. I, “Dedication and Preface” vii–viii, London: Printed for the Hakluyt 
Society, M.DCC.LXVI. 1866.  
22 Ibid. pp. vii, xi, 147–148.  
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dynasty.23 How was “their energy and warlike character” related to the Khitan or Jurchen 
identity? Does losing them mean the Khitan and Jurchen were absorbed? Does this 
absorption equal assimilation by the Chinese and the loss of their original ethnicity? 
Henry Yule did not provide answers to these questions. Instead of constructing a 
sophisticated social theory, his “absorption theory” was closer to a description based on 
his impression from reading Chinese history than a serious consideration of ethnicity.24  
 This way of describing Chinese history was used in the works of the small 
community of early European Sinologists, such as Édouard Chavannes and Paul Pelliot.25 
In Haute Asie, when Pelliot mentioned the change of the Khitan people after they 
conquered China, he said  
Mais il en advent des Khitan comme de tous les nomads qui se fixaient 
en vainqueurs sur le sol de la Chine et que, par un choc en retour, la 
civilization chinoise conquérait bientôt. Au bout de quelques 
generations, les Khitan s’étaient policés, chinoisés.26 
  
The last sentence is translated as “After a number of generations the Khitan were 
civilized, Sinicized” by Witfogel and Feng. 
Here, Pelliot calls the acceptance of Chinese culture as “civilized and Sinicized,” 
which implies that he considered Inner Asian peoples like the Khitan and Jurchen to have 
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23 Ibid. p. 148.  
24 The general statement of “absorption theory” was in accordance with the Confucian idea that the 
superiority of “Chinese” culture and the foreigners/Barbarians can be and should be civilized. Meanwhile, 
it is also about the civil and military (wenzhi ɜҐ) theory. 
25 Later in 1915, the book Cathay and the way thither was reprinted with editing and annotating by another 
French sinologist Henri Cordier. In the end of his preface for the second edition, he expressed his gratitude 
to those friends who helped him, including Sir Aurel Stein, Ed. Chavannes and Paul Pelliot. In Cathay and 
the way thither: Being a collection of medieval notices of China, dedication and preface xiii, vol. 1, 1915.  
26 Paul Pelliot, Haute Asie, Paris 1931, 21–22.  
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been “uncivilized” before “la civilization chinoise conquérait bientôt.” After that, they 
became Chinese since they were absorbed into Chinese civilization. Compared to Henry 
Yule, this further statement gives a more explicit interpretation of the “absorption 
theory,” which served as the major target that Karl Witfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng argued 
against in their monumental 1949 work about the Liao Dynasty.27 From Yule’s 
description to Pelliot’s statement, absorption theory served as a depiction of Chinese 
history without further regard for the social history or ethnicity of those Inner Asian 
intruders inside China; in Pelliot’s writing, however, this “absorption” gradually became 
similar to “assimilation”. One reason for this should be that in the early stages of 
Sinology, anthropological and sociological theories had not been adopted to any 
significant degree. For a long time, philology remained the main method for approaching 
this issue, especially among European Sinologists such as Pelliot and Chavannes. 
 It is necessary to mention, however, that already in the early 20th century, 
anthropology had a role in China studies; this was led by Berthold Laufer, an 
anthropologist, who was educated in Germany and migrated to the U.S. in 1898. During 
1901–1904, he led the Jacob H. Schiff expedition to China and acquired a comprehensive 
ethnographic collection for the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH).28 In a 
letter to his mentor Franz Boas at AMNH written in 1903 during the expedition, Laufer 
says, "I shall conquer China. . . [for] the anthropologist. China, no longer the exclusive 
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27 Karl A. Witfogel and Feng Chia-Sheng, History of Chinese Society. Liao (907–1125), Philadelphia 1949, 
p. 4.  
28 Wang Jiqing ̾¥˺, “Berthold Laufer," in Zhongwai Dunhuang xuejia pingzhuan #Ŀɘ̢ŪƃѰd, 




domain of travelers and sinologues, both narrow-minded and one-sided in their 
standpoints and researches, China to all who have anthropological interests."29  
 Among the large number of publications by Laufer, one article published in 1917 
mentions the Lolo people of southwestern China who did not have family names before 
contact with the Chinese. He calls a group of Lolo “Sinicized Lolo” because they adopted 
Chinese surnames. 30 This is one of the earliest examples in which “Sinicize” is used 
directly to describe the ethnic groups living inside Chinese territory. By adopting Chinese 
surnames, the group of Lolo had been acculturated into Chinese. Laufer describes them 
as “Sinicized Lolo.” As an anthropologist, Laufer’s use of “Sinicized” starts to connect to 
the concept of ethnicity in anthropology and ethnology, and it clearly diverts the use of 
“Sinicize” and “Sinicization” into another context and field. Both orientations, i.e., 
Sinicization in Sinology and anthropology, have been projected in the contemporary 
Chinese intellectual world.  
 
2.2 Early use of Sinicization in China in the early 20th century 
 
 The Chinese word for Sinicization is usually the above-mentioned Hanhua ˕Ù. 
This translation is not optimal due to the confusion between the Han of the Chinese word, 
which can refer also to Han Chinese or the Han ethnicity, and the “sino-/sini-” of 
“Sinicization,” which refers more broadly to China. The alternative huahua ÞÙ, which 
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29 American Museum of Natural History: Laufer to Boas, 12 August, 1903.  
30 Berthold Laufer, "Totemic Traces among the Indo-Chinese," The Journal of American Folklore, vol. 30, 
no. 118 (Oct.–Dec. 1917), p. 417. 
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matches the English word more closely, is preferred by such scholars as Ping-ti Ho and 
Chen Yuan, the latter of whom uses huahua in the title of his book discussing the 
Sinicization of foreigners from the Western Regions (Xiyu пĳ) during the Yuan 
Dynasty.31 Although the character “hua Ù” in the two terms has had the meaning of 
“civilizing non-Sinitic people” since very early in a Chinese context, neither term carried 
the meaning of Sinicization before the beginning of the Republic of China in 1912. 
 Possibly the earliest use of Hanhua and Huahua in a Chinese text occurred in 
1923; the two words, however, appeared in very different contexts. Huahua was related to 
the European Sinology mentioned earlier, and Hanhua was influenced directly by 
Western explorers’ fieldwork in China.  
 
2.2.1 Huahua in early Chinese Context 
 As mentioned above, Huahua was used by Chen Yuan in his famous 1923 book, 
Yuan Xiyuren Huahua kao (пĳKÞÙϥ Research on the Sinicization of the People 
from Western Regions of Yuan Dynasty),32 and it was also possibly the first appearance of 
Huahua. Before delving into the meaning of Huahua, it is important to point out that Hua 
Þ and Yi ņ constitute the Chinese-barbarian dichotomy.33 In his book, Chen Yuan does 
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31 Ping-ti Ho, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski’s 'Reenvisioning the Qing,'" The 
Journal of Asian Studies, vol.57, no.1 (Feb. 1998), p. 152; Chen Yuan, Yuan Xiyuren Huahua kao пĳ
KÞÙϥ, Shanghai guji Press, 2000. 
32 Chen Yuan, 2000, p. 3.  
33 Wang Ke ̾̀, Zhongguo, Cong tianxia dao minzu guojia (, 	, China, From All 
under Heaven to Nation State), Taibei: Zhengda chubanshe, 2014, pp. 27–52. Although “Yi ņ” was often 
reconginized as foreigners or aliens instead of barbarians, the term “Yi” did bear the implication that the Yi 
people was less civilized comparing to the Hua people according to Wang’s analysis.  
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not give a clear definition of Huahua but only states that “as for the meaning of Huahua, 
its acquisition is judged by whether it may eventually be acquired, and if only Chinese 
have it. (ϸ?ÞÙ.Ș-¼VĈłȬАÞKȬ̵&ɞ)”34 Here, Chen discusses 
the content of Huahua; in other words, what people should learn from Chinese to be able 
to be considered as being Sinicized (Huahua). For Chen Yuan, the answer was 
Confucianism, Daoism, Chinese Buddhism, Chinese literature, art, rituals, customs, and 
female education.35 Then, what was the ultimate goal of Huahua? Chen did not present a 
clear answer, but he revealed some ideas about it in his writing. In his discussion about 
why he chose to study the people of the Western Regions instead of the Khitan, Jurchen 
or others, he says,  
Since the issue discussed in this volume is limited to the Western 
Region of the Yuan dynasty, therefore, Mongolians, Khitans and 
Jurchens are not included here. It is also because the Mongolians and so 
on were culturally naïve, and therefore their assimilation by Chinese 
was by no means surprising. As for countries like Japan, Korea, the 
Ryukyus, and Annam, they long ago adopted Sinitic written language 







Based on this statement, it is clear that Chen’s “Huahua” means “assimilated by 
Chinese (tonghua Huazu ĆÙÞɥ)." In other words, by learning any one or any 
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34 Chen Yuan, 2000, p. 3.  
35 Besides the practical knowledge, here the female’s education also includes the wifely submissions and 
virtues.  
36 Chen Yuan, 2000, p. 2.  
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combination of those unique Chinese cultural practices listed above, any people can be, 
and will be, “assimilated” by Chinese. In another place in Chen’s book, he also tries to 
differentiate “Huahua” from “guihua (ǦÙ, submission)” and “Huaxue (ÞŪ, learning 
from Chinese)." He says, 
And there are peoples in the Western Regions who have long been 
living in the Han habitations and submitted to China, yet from the 
aspect of Chinese culture nothing special about them could be 
commemorated. For example, in the geography section of The Book of 
Han, there is a prefecture named Qiuci State. Yan Shigu Ղƺý 
commented,“ because people from the Qiuci State who submitted to 
China dwelled here, so the place was named after it.”……Similar cases 
are numerous; from these we understand that the submissions of people 
from the Western Regions to China have been common ever since 
ancient times. Because they made no contributions to Chinese culture, 
nothing much about them was worth recording. And there are those 
who excel at Chinese language and have learned widely about Chinese 
classics, such as the Western Region monks in Biographies of Eminent 
Monks, who translated sutras; and Jesuit priests during the end of Ming 
and early Qing. Instead of “assimilating to Chinese”
Huahua ÞÙ), 









According to Chen Yuan, Hanhua was not equal to guihua because those people 
who submitted to Chinese rule had not necessarily learned Chinese cultural practices, nor 
did they make any contribution to Chinese culture. As for those Buddhist monks from the 
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37 Ibid., p. 3.  
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Western Regions and Jesuit missionaries in China, although they had learned the Chinese 
language and classics, they were not Sinicized (Huahua), because they still insisted on 
their own religion and did not practice those learned from China.  
In his first chapters, Chen Yuan also supplies three examples from pre-Yuan to 
show the implication of Huahua. One of the three people, Pu Shoucheng Лƒƀ, was a 
Song official with a great reputation, recorded in a gazetteer. Chen emphasizes, however, 
that being an important Song official did not mean that Pu was assimilated (Hanhua), and 
Pu was included in the book only because he was a very good Chinese poet.  
 As for the reason why Huahua was true for the people from the Western Regions, 
Chen Yuan states,  
The peoples of the Western Regions were, on the one hand, extensively 
influenced by Indian, Jewish, Greek and Arabic civilizations; on the 
other hand, they watched one slice of Chinese civilization (this refers to 
the Qara Khitan/Western Liao), no wonder they strongly desired to be 
personally on the scene. The Yuan army first unified the Western 
Regions, then conquered the Central Plain. Among the people of the 
Western Region, soldiers, captured personnel, and traders all flooded 
into the Central Plain. The constitution and civilization that they always 
wished to experience suddenly were unfolded before their eyes. 
Besides, in the Yuan dynasty, the Semu people were allowed to live 
freely among other people. Therefore, the constitution and civilization 
were spread through generations. As a result, many of the people from 
the Western Regions liked and believed ancient Chinese classics, the 
Book of Odes, Book of Documents, Book of Rites and the Book of Music. 
The purpose of this volume is precisely to commemorate such a 












According to Chen, the Western Regions people came to China, learned Chinese culture 
and participated in Chinese cultural performances mainly because they admired Chinese 
civilization, and the Mongol conquest created the possibility of travel for them. 
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, when Chen discussed the reason he chose not to study 
the Mongols, Khitan and Jurchen, saying that their assimilation (Huahua) by the Chinese 
was because their civilizations were primitive (youzhi ǇΚ), which is different from why 
Western Region people were assimilated. Both reasons, however, imply the 
sophistication of “Hua” culture.  
 Therefore, the definition of Huahua in the context of Chen Yuan’s book was that 
people who admired Chinese culture had been assimilated by coming to China, learning 
the language, performing some type of Chinese cultural practices, and even making some 
contributions to Chinese culture. They then can be considered as “Hua (Þ Chinese)." 
Because of these circumstances, most of the people discussed in Chen’s book were Yuan 
officials and well educated. After excluding the six females in the book who could not be 
officials in the Yuan government, of the other 127 people described by Chen Yuan,39 78 
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38 Ibid., p. 3.  
39 There are 168 cases discussed in Yuan Xiyuren Huahua kao under 6 different topics. 30 in the 
Confucianism chapter, 8 in the Buddhism and Daoism chapter, 51 in literature chapter, 32 in art chapter, 41 
in ritual and custom chapter, and 6 in female education chapter. After taking away the people discussed in 
other chapter, there are 138 people in total. There are 5 people included by mistake, so Chen Yuan actually 
has discussed 133 people in his book. In the conclusion, Chen Yuan has given the numbers, but there is a 
minor mistake. See Chen Yuan, 2000, p. 132. About the 5 people mistakenly included, see Hsiao Ch’i-
Ch’ing, Nei beiguo er wai Zhongguo ¦ÚĦϨĿ#Ħ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2007, p. 579.  
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(61.4%) were Yuan officials, and 55 (43.3%) belonged to families having held high 
official positions for generations. In other words, the lofty requirement of Chen’s Huahua 
set limitations on the people who could be considered as being assimilated (Huahua) by 
the Chinese. The limitations not only were on the number of people but also on their 
social status and family background.  
 In his famous rebuttal to Evelyn Rawski’s address, Ping-ti Ho implied a possible 
connection between the “Sinicization” or “Absorption” theory in French Sinology and the 
early usage of “Huahua ÞÙ” by Chen Yuan. Ho said that he suspected that “it was 
under Pelliot’s inspiration that Ch’en Yüan, president of the leading Catholic Fujen 
Univeristy, who was in close touch with French sinology with the help of research 
assistants, published his famous study of the Sinicization of Western and Central Asians 
during Mongol times in 1935.”40 Considering the influence and popularity of French 
Sinology during the early Republican era in China, Chen Yuan’s interest in Central Asian 
people during Mongol times might have been from following the research of European 
Sinology, especially French Sinology. 
The strong influence of French Sinology during that time also can be found in 
other records. For example, Fu Sinian ɟǃ claimed that the center of Sinology during 
that period was in Paris, and he wanted to bring the center back to China by building the 
Institute of History and Philology at the Academia Sinica. Chen Yuan also mentioned this 
concept. Another famous scholar, Chen Yinke, also emphasized the influence of Paul 
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40 Ping-ti Ho, 1998, p. 150. 
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Pelliot on his own research. 41 Ideas on Chen Yuan's definition of Huahua, however, 
cannot be found in contemporary French Sinology, especially Paul Pelliot’s work. So 
Chen Yuan’s concept of “Huahua ÞÙ” in his academic writing appears to have arisen 
from his own thinking based on textual sources and social background, which will be 
discussed below.  
   
2.2.2 Hanhua in Early Chinese Context 
 As for Hanhua, possibly the earliest two cases were related directly to the Western 
explorers’ fieldwork in Southwest China. Before coming to the context of its usage, it is 
necessary to point out that although the term Han refers to the largest nationality known 
as Han Chinese in modern China, Han had different implications in diverse periods in 
Chinese history. For example, in the Jin Dynasty, the Jurchen rulers called the former 
Liao people who were under their rule as Hanren ˕K or Yanren ̥K (People of the 
Yan [region]), but called the former Northern Song people inside Jin territory as Nanren 
áK.42 Therefore caution should be used when applying the term Hanhua in different 
dynasties.  
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41 Sang Bing, “Boxihe yu Zhongguo jindai xueshu jie eƻĖ#ĦӀTŪʕ͔," Lishi yanjiu (1997), 5, 
pp. 115–135. Jiang Tianshu, Chen Yinke xiansheng biannian shiji ԎƆȍ͎ϖǃ=ҵ, Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997, p. 50.  
42 Shao-yun Yang, “Fan and Han: The Origins and Uses of a Conceptual Dichotomy in Mid-Imperial China, 
ca. 500–1200," in Political Strategies of Identity Building in Non-Han Empires in China, ed. by Francesca 
Fiascheti and Julia Schneider, Harrassowitz Verlag,·Wiesbaden, 2014, pp. 9–36; Mark Elliot, “Hushuo: 
The Northern Other and the Naming of the Han Chinese," in Critical Han Studies: The History, 
Representation, and Identity of China’s Majority, ed. by Thomas S. Mullaney, James Leibold, Stéphane 
Gros and Eric Vanden Bussche, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012, pp. 173–190.  
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 The earliest possible instances of using Hanhua appear in Shun Pao ͓ȴ, an 
influential newspaper founded in 1872. The term was used to describe the Western 
explorers’ fieldwork in southwest China. In an article titled “Hanzu yu feihanzu (˕ɥ
Ԭ˕ɥ, Han Ethnic group and Non-Han Ethnic groups)” published in 1923, it reads, 
Westerners who traveled to the borderland of Dian (Yunnan) and Shu 
(Sichuan) returned and wrote books. In their books, they talked about 
the diversity of the ethnicity of these areas. While most ethnic groups 
were assimilated by Chinese, Tibetans were the hardest to assimilate. 
Not only were they exceptional in not changing with Han influence, but 
moreover, Chinese who entered Tibet had to follow their customs; only 
then could they remain peacefully. On one hand, it is because Tibetans 
have a tough personality; on the other hand, it is because of the power 
of religion. Because Tibetans commonly believed in Buddhism, it was 
easier for them to be Sinicized than for them to be Europeanized. If the 
Republic of China could finally be revitalized, there was no reason to 








Both “Hanhua” and “tonghua” (assimilation) appear in this article, and it is clear that 
Hanhua here meant assimilation by the Han people through following Han customs. The 
author also stated that these points about Hanhua came from “Xiren” (пK), or 
Westerners).  
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43 Laopu ϤĨ, “Hanzu yu feihanzu (part third)," in Shun Pao, March 27th, 1923, no.17988, p. 20.  
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In addition, there are other cases with similar contexts. One is from the contemporary 
United States ambassador’s speech after he travelled in southwestern China.44 The 
similarity between these cases is that they are about the relationship between Han and 
other ethnic groups in Southwestern China, namely the Chinese borderland, and the 
customs are considered as the most important ethnic characteristic. Here, the customs 
included the clothes, diet, housing and family structure in the case of the Miao ethnic 
group.45 This context of Hanhua was close to Berthold Laufer’s usage of “Sinicized” in 
his article about the Lolo people, also in southwestern China.46 Based on the connection 
with the Western explorers in the earliest cases, one may conclude that the concept of 
Hanhua in its early context was borrowed directly from the West; particularly from the 
Western anthropologists who did fieldwork in southwest China, such as Laufer. As 
mentioned above, Laufer’s use of “Sinicized” started to connect to the concept of 
ethnicity in anthropology and ethnology, and this might have been projected into the 
intellectual world of the Republic of China. 
 
2.3 Huahua and Hanhua in Constructing a National History of the Chinese 
Nationality (Zhonghua minzu #Þˑɥ) 
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44 “Mei gongshi youli xinan zhi ganxiang Ϟp̂êпá.țȖ," in Shun Pao, Jan. 21st, 1924, no.18286, 
p. 7; Liu Xiang »Ք, Miaozu zhuangkuang de gailue Іɥ̯²ͣʱ͗, in Jingbao fukan GȴÉ¹, 1924, 
no.17, pp. 3–4; Cheng Zhi ȥǾ, Minsu ˑw, no.67, p. 1.  
45 Liu Xiang, 1924, pp. 3–4.  
46 Berthold Laufer, 1917, p. 417. 
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 With the weakening of the Qing regime in its late period, there were two different 
ideas about how to rebuild the Chinese state. One of them was espoused by the 
revolutionaries, such as Zhang Taiyan έŃ̗, Zou Rong ӣƄ and Liu Shipei »ƺĵ. 
They wanted to construct Han nationalism in China. These revolutionaries considered the 
Manchu rulers to be barbaric invaders riding roughshod over the Han Chinese, so their 
regime needed to be overthrown.47 They still believed, however, that the Manchu had 
already been assimilated already by the Chinese. For instance, Zhang Taiyan said: 
Some may say if so then the Manchus are also minorities, and have 
already been slightly assimilated to us; why cannot they be considered 
the same as the Chinese. I answer: the reason that the assimilation of 
different nations is acceptable is because sovereignty is on our side and 
enables us to absorb them. The assimilation of the Manchu is not 
achieved by our pacifying and ruling, but because of their humiliating 
and overthrowing us. These two ways cannot be compared. It is like the 
example of marriage and plunder. If a woman is sent to us through 
marriage, then she will be assimilated by us; if they occupy our palace 
and beds through plundering, they also could be assimilated by us. It is 
absolutely clear, however, who is the enemy and who is a relative. I 
used to say the reason that we should drive the Manchus out is also 
because they overthrew our country and took away our sovereignty. If 
we defeated the enemy, and the Manchu Khan left Wanping and went 
to Huanglong Prefecture, then we can accept their submission and 
assimilation, and consider them the same as the Japanese and Thai 
people. Before our sovereignty was recovered, however, it could not be 








47 Ge Zhaoguang И, Hewei Zhongguo: jiangyu minzu wenhua yu lishi k&#Ħ: ͚ĳˑɥɜÙê








What Zhang emphasized was that the initiative of assimilation was more 
important than cultural assimilation itself. The sovereignty of the Han nation should have 
the power to control the process of assimilation. Even if the Manchu people had been 
assimilated culturally by the Chinese, they still should not have been treated as Chinese 
(Zhongguo #Ħ). Therefore, the Han Chinese could not accept them as rulers. This point 
of view was against the culturalism in classic Chinese thought. Joseph R. Levenson 
pointed out that “the civilization, not the nation, has a moral claim on man’s allegiance” 
in classic Chinese doctrine.49 In other words, as Hao Jing ӥϐ (1223–1275) from the 
Yuan Dynasty had said, “Those who can carry out the dao of China (Zhongguo #Ħ), 
are the rulers of China.” (ϴб#Ħ.ӓ¼#Ħ'6)50 From the revolutionaries’ 
perspective, however, this was even worse that those “barbaric” rulers who carried out 
the Chinese way, as Liu Shupei said,  
Alas, when barbarians entered our China, they occupied our earth, 
mountains and rivers, stole our young men, women and property. They 
borrowed for a long time and never returned, without realizing that 
these were not their belongings. How pathetic. The most pathetic of all 
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48 Zhang Taiyan, TaiyanwenjiŃ̗ɜӴ, vol. 1, in bielu section, Minguo Zhangshi congshu edition ˑĩέ
ˏûʄʔ.  
49 Joseph R. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate: The Problem of Intellectual Continuity, 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965, p. 102.  
50 Hao Jing ӥϐ, “Yu Songguo chengxiang lun benchao bingluan shuųĦͯѮʔʏ:9,” in 
Lingchuan wenji ԖƲɜԢ, vol. 38, pp. 6 (upper section) -11(lower section), (Beijing tushuguan guji 
zhenben congkan editionÚGħ9Պýήʔ¹). 
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was that they stole the wisest doctrine of our deceased emperors. Alas, 
the ethics and rites of barbarians were different from that of the central 
mainland. Their construction of ritual codes and production of music 
were, in fact the source of their weakness. Their abandonment of the 
barbarian customs and adherence to Chinese culture did not prove that 
they truly respected the doctrine of the sages. It was only a way of 
using Chinese law to deal with the Chinese land. They did this under 









Because those foreign rulers really did not understand the Chinese way, they just used 
Chinese methods to manipulate the Han Chinese people.  
 Toward the end of the Qing dynasty, the more urgent task became how to reunite 
all the people who formerly had been under the rule of the Qing government. Besides the 
political thought of the Chinese republic of five races (wuzu gonghe BɥĖ, the five 
races include Han, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan), historical research also 
reflects this political necessity.52 In 1910, Liang Qichao ʬďҜ (1873–1929) published 
an article “Zhongguoshi xulun (#ĦĀùѮ [Discussion of Chinese History])” about 
how researchers should deal with Chinese history. In the fifth section, on “race" 
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51 Liu Shupei, “Yudao pian՗ӓδ,” in, Rangshu Ɏʄ (Minguo Liushenchu xiansheng yishu edition ˑĩ
Ê͓õ͎Ӛʄʔ).  
52 Ge Zhaoguang, 2014, p. 78; Wang Ke, 2014, pp. 215–222.  
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(renzhong KΏ),53 he states that there are more than ten races in Chinese history. Six 
races are the most obvious and relevant ones; the Miao І, Han ˕, Tibetan ħ˧̮, 
Mongolian Кý, Xiongnu ØŐ and Tungus Ӎýɟ peoples.54 Meanwhile, Liang 
emphasizes that even though he has listed six races, it still was very hard to distinguish 
one from the other. He says,  
Different races and nations, however, were generated separately. Their 
population was amazingly great. Moreover, their mixed inhabitation 
has a long history. They intermarried with each other. Their ancestry 
also mingled together. Nowadays, if we intend to divide the boundary 
between some races or nations, it is not easy. Not to mention, the 
nomadic people who constantly migrated followed no customary 
pattern. If we, as people who live thousands of years after, try to 
identify the nomadic nations recorded in history with today’s nations 
one by one, it is either a silly deed or an absurd fallacy. Therefore, 
nowadays people use six nations to describe all the peoples who 
appeared in Chinese history, which cannot avoid the criticism for being 
arbitrary and carelessly omissive. 
 
̡ÄĄΜĄɥ, ĄϷ͎͠,  ɛ.ŀ, ˄ÿȃѪ6ӵƣɧ+, 
ŞśAӍ, ЯπͯԤPʹ;ȼʥɥʥΜ.¸͔ς,  =Мɰ




From this point, if the bloodlines of all these different races already had been 
mixed during the long history of China, the so-called Han race should not be accentuated 
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53 Here, based on the context, renzhong KΏ should be translated as to race. In the beginning of the 
renzhong section, Liang Qichao says that Western scholars divided the world population into five, three or 
seven kinds, which is not the ethnicity but race. Liang Qichao ʬďҜ, “Zhongguoshi xulun #ĦĀùѮ," 
in Yinbingshi heji Չ¯žąԢ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1988, vol.6, pp. 5–7. 
54 Liang Qichao ʬďҜ, 1988, pp. 5–7.  
55 Ibid.  
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since “even our Han race, was actually from the same ancestor? Or just arose separately? 
This is also an undecidable question. (èđ̍ɥ, ʤĆ·ɣ΄0, ȲĄϷ͎͠0, F
ʒϴɡŸ.ěԸ6)."56 Therefore, all these different peoples that Liang listed should be 
treated within Chinese history, as their own history was also a part of Chinese history. 
For this purpose, since the late 1920s, Huahua and Hanhua were adopted widely in the 
field of Chinese history but with a different context from the earliest ones discussed 
above.  
After the early appearance of Huahua and Hanhua, other scholars repeatedly used 
both terms. Huahua still was employed mainly for research on the people from the 
Western Regions in different dynasties. Such publications included: Tangdai Huahua 
Fanhu kao ęTÞÙОϲϥ by Feng Chengjun ®Ȱӹ first published in 1929; Tangdai 
Chang’an yu Xiyu wenming ęTӾŲпĳɜɯ by Xiang Da ċһ first published in 
1933; and Suitang Xiyuren Huahua kao ԙęпĳKÞÙϥ edited by He Jianmin k
ˑ and including Kuwabara Jitsuzou's ʪìԛН and Feng Chengjun’s articles published 
in 1936.57 Meanwhile, Hanhua mainly was used for the Inner Asian groups who built 
regimes in Northern China, such as those described in Nüzhen Hanhua kaolue ŏͳ˕Ù
ϥ͗ by Song Wenbing ųɜ̘ first published in 1934 and Liaoren Hanhua kao ҺK˕
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56 ibid.  
57 Feng Chengjun ®Ȱӹ, “Tangdai Huahua Fanhu kao ęTÞÙОϲϥ,” in Suitang shidai Xiyuren 
Huahua kao ԙęɭTпĳKÞÙϥ, edited by He Jianmin kˑ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1939, pp. 
127–171; Xiang Da ċһ, Tangdai Chang’an yu Xiyu wenming ęTӾŲпĳɜɯ, Shijiazhuang: 
Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001; Suitang shidai Xiyuren Huahua kao ԙęɭTпĳKÞÙϥ, edited by He 
Jianmin kˑ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1939.  
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Ùϥ by Mao Wen ˎ˚ in 1935.58 It is also necessary to point out that in these works, 
both Hanhua and Huahua were used frequently and were interchangeable.59  
 In Feng Chengjun’s article, he begins his argument by stating that all the 
nationalities with a long history are “zazhong ʘΏ (mixed/hybrid nation)” and so were 
the “Hanzhong ˕Ώ."60 Apparently his point followed Liang Qichao’s idea about the 
“Hanzhong ˕Ώ.”61 Then, Feng gave his description and definition of Huahua. Unlike 
Chen Yuan, he did not emphasize the superiority of the unique Chinese culture, but the 
“Han nation (Hanzhong ˕Ώ),” stating that:  
Xianbei, which was discussed below [in this article], had already been 
Sinicized in the Tang dynasty. Except for a small number of people 
with the surnames from the north of Daizhou (TƳ), Xianbei people 
were in fact no different from other Tang people. From this aspect, the 
extent to which Yuan Zhen Ο was a Chinese was no less than 
today’s so-called Han (˕) people. On the other hand, the 
differentiation between today’s so called Manchu people and Han 
people could in fact be ignored. The Han ethnic group is like a vast 
ocean, while Xianbei, Turks, Khitan, Jurchen, Mongol, and Manchu are 
like streams. Since all these rivers run into the sea, how can we 






58 Song Wenbing ųɜ̘, “Nüzhen Hanhua kaolue ŏͳ˕Ùϥ͗,” in Suitang shidai Xiyuren Huahua kao 
ԙęɭTпĳKÞÙϥ, edited by He Jianmin kˑ, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1939, pp. 172–194; Mao 
Wen ˎ˚, “Liaoren Hanhua kao ҺK˕Ùϥ,” in Guoxue lunheng ĦŪѮж, 1935, vol.6, pp. 23–43.  
59 The term Hanhua also has been used a few times in Chen Yuan’s book.  
60 Here, although Feng uses the “zhong Ώ” similar to Liang Qichao’s “renzhong KΏ," in Feng’s context, 
the “zhong” is closer to nation or ethnicity; the people who share the same “zhong” also share history and 
culture in Feng’s writing. So I use “nation” to translate Feng’s zhong.  






Feng’s description of “Huahua” here accentuated the superiority of the “Han 
nation,” which absorbed all the other small ethnic groups as an ocean absorbs all the 
small rivers and makes them indistinguishable inside the ocean. It is more or less like the 
“absorption theory” in French Sinology mentioned above, and this type of description 
appeared in later Chinese historical writing again and again. As for Feng’s definition of 
Huahua, he also talked about the cultural practice as Chen Yuan had done, but he did not 
establish such high requirements as Chen. He said, “when the ancient people in our 
country judged if a person was Hua or Yi, it was decided based on whether this person 
practiced rituals and possessed moral codes.”63 And for the Tang Dynasty, he stated, “as 
for the characteristics of Han people in the Tang Dynasty, it is not about the blood 
relationship, but ethnic characteristics. People who share ethnic characteristics are Han 
even though they are of different races. People who don’t share ethnic characteristics are 
considered as Yi and Di even if they are Han.”64 Here the common ethnic characteristics 
(zhongxing Ώȅ), means “commonality of thoughts, emotions and interests,” and the 
chief ethnic characteristics of Han Chinese are “loyalty and filial piety,”65 which, 
according to Feng, were considered to be the foundation of Chinese society. Therefore, 
for Feng, the requirement of Hanhua was not as high as Chen, but they still shared part of 
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62 Ibid., p.132.  
63 Ibid., p. 135. The Chinese is “đĦýKщK.ɴčÞņèV Kʊɦ΀Wΐʝ&ɞ.” 
64 Ibid. The Chinese is “ęT˕K.̮ǰĭЯϒϨĭΏȅĆΏȅϦЩǛΏF&˕KĆ
ΏȅϦЩ˕KFщĆņ̲.” 
65 Ibid. The Chinese is “ȃȖțȒÀƂͯĆѷ̙6” and “˕Ώ.ΏȅÿVǿŧ>ťʱ..” 
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the definition. Feng emphasized the “code of ritual and ethics (΀Wΐʝ),” but for Chen 
Yuan, the code of ethics was not unique to Chinese people; so he stressed the significance 
of those special cultural practices by Chinese people including ritual, Chinese literature, 
art, religion and so forth.  
 While Feng focused on the “Hanhua” of the commoners of the non-Sinitic groups 
in Chinese history, similar arguments have been made for the ruling classes during the 
Khitan Liao and Jurchen Jin Dynasties. In Song Wenbing’s article dealing with the 
“Hanhua” of the Jurchens, he first stated the reason for Hanhua,  
From ancient times to the present, there has been a natural law for two 
or more than two nations to assimilate each other. The minority were 
assimilated by the majority. The ones with relatively low culture were 
assimilated by the ones with relatively high culture. Such has become 
the general rule of social evolution. The population of Jurchen was 
much less than that of the Song people, and they were more uncivilized 
than the Song people. Therefore, the former was assimilated by the 
latter with a higher culture. Such has become a convention in social 







According to Song, it was natural law in the social evolution/development that a minority 
will be assimilated by a majority, and people with low culture will be assimilated by 
those with high culture. Therefore, it was unavoidable that the Jurchen were assimilated 
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66 Song Wenbing, 1939, p. 173.  
34!
!
by the people of Song. The Hanhua discussed by Song Wenbing includes the institutions, 
customs, literature and other aspects of civilization.  
By directly adopting the term Hanhua into the argument about the Jurchen, 
however, this term cannot fit fully in the context of the Jin Dynasty. First, the Jurchen in 
the Jin Dynasty were the ruling class; even though they were a minority, their social rank 
should have had an impact on the Hanhua. In Song Wenbing’s argument, he even 
compares the population of the Jurchen to the Song, and it is unclear if the Song refers to 
the Southern Song population or original Northern Song population. Certainly, different 
populations in two different states did not mean necessarily that the one with the larger 
population would assimilate the other since these were two separate states with different 
regimes.  
Meanwhile, as mentioned above, the term “Han” had different meanings during 
different periods. When Song Wenbing used “Hanhua,” the “Han” he was referring to 
would have been the concept of the Han nation in the Republic era. It is anachronistic, 
however, to use “Hanhua” for the Jurchen of the Jin Dynasty. These problems also can be 
found in other researchers' discussions of the Hanhua of other dynasties, such as the Liao 
Dynasty.  
 The content of Hanhua in Mao Wen’s article about the Hanhua of the Khitan 
people in the Liao Dynasty is similar to Song Wenbing’s. He argues this topic from four 
aspects—the Hanhua of the emperors, imperial concubines, other Khitan clans and the 
Liao institutions. So in his argument, Hanhua included respecting Confucianism, 
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appointing Han officials/literati, studying Confucian classics, learning and speaking 
Chinese, creating language, building cities, marrying Han people, using the Han political 
system, wearing Han style clothes, applying Han law, and so forth. By stating these facts, 
he concluded that “in the Liao Dynasty, emperors, empresses and imperial concubines, 
officials and commoners, decrees, regulations and insitutions, all of them had attained 
Hanhua.”67 In the discussion at the end of his article, Mao said, 
The Chinese nation is, in fact, a flexible colossus. After the Han people 
and Liao people came into contact with each other, the Liao people 
were assimilated by the Han like iron being melted by a furnace. This is 
for certain, but the fact that the fire in the furnace also has changed 
constantly should be remembered. Moreover, the Liao people rose from 
the North, and the nations in the northwest and northeast all were 
dominated by them. Their Hanhua also made Chinese civilization 







Mao's metaphor compared the Han to a furnace. To some extent, this is similar to 
Feng Chengjun’s comparison of the Han nation to an ocean and other ethnic groups to the 
rivers. The concept of Chinese Nationality (Zhonghua minzu #Þˑɥ) in this quotation, 
however, makes Mao’s argument slightly different from Feng Chengjun’s. The Han 
nation in Feng’s context kept absorbing other ethnic groups without changing itself. In 
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67 Mao Wen, 1935, pp. 23–43. The Chinese is “ʊҺTƽ̾ĈŒ϶ƴէǕ¢έÃǓɦ˕
Ù.” 
68 Fire in the furnace refers to Han civilization, and here Mao gives an example that Buddhism was 
introduced to the Liao from Han territory, which is a kind of transformed “fire."  
69 Mao Wen, 1935, pp. 23-43. 
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Mao’s context, however, during the course of Chinese history, the so-called “Chinese 
Nationality” had absorbed all the other ethnic groups around China by melting them into 
China. This made them indistinguishable so they became part of the Chinese Nationality; 
and unlike the Han, the “Chinese Nationality” itself also had changed from time to time. 
Mao also made a further statement that “Chinese civilization (Huaxia wenming Þľɜ
ɯ)” had been transmitted to the ethnic groups in northwest and northeast China through 
the Hanhua of the Khitan people.  
 
2.4 Nationalism behind the Huahua and Hanhua Theory 
 
 One important reason that Evelyn S. Rawski rejected the Sinicization theory was 
that she considered it a “Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”70 This point can 
be justified to some degree since some hint of nationalist influence can be found in the 
early usages of Hanhua and Huahua.  
 As discussed above, famous Chinese historians, such as Chen Yuan and Fu Sinian, 
felt a sense of competition with the European Sinologists and tried to bring the “center of 
Sinology” back to China. Moreover, when Chen Yuan wrote his book about the Huahua 
of the people from Western Regions during the Yuan Dynasty, he also emphasized the 
superiority of Chinese culture by admiring which Chinese cultural practices those people 
chose to learn. Chen also stated that “this book was written during the time when the 
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70 Evelyn S. Rawski, “Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period 
in Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 55, no. 4 (Nov. 1996), 842.  
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Chinese were despised the most, and when people advocated complete westernization, I, 
therefore wrote a book like this.”71 So by arguing for the assimilation of the people from 
the west by the superior and admirable Chinese culture, Chen tried to make the readers 
proud of being Chinese and of their own culture. This is precisely the reason he used 
Huahua instead of Hanhua in his book and chose people from the Western Regions 
instead of Northern zone for his subject matter.  
 As for the early cases of using Hanhua, anxieties over losing the borderlands of 
the Republic of China can be found in many places. In one of the earliest examples, the 
Hanhua of Tibet are discussed because the author worried that Tibet might be 
Europeanized (Ouhua ʸÙ) and seek support from Europe. So the author wanted the 
Republic of China to become more powerful and have more influence on Tibet by way of 
Hanhua.72 This idea was the same as Sun Yat-sen’s interpretation of nationalism in the 
Three People’s Principles (sanmin zhuyi ˑ'-) in early 1920s.73 Meanwhile, in a 
1935 article, Mao Wen argued that the Khitan people had become an indistinguishable 
part of “Chinese Nationality.” He emphasized that Chinese civilization had been 
transmitted to northwest and northeast China by the Khitan people. Therefore, in the end 
of the article, he claimed, 
Who says that the Northeastern people would finally end up as 
barbarians? Among the descendants of Jishou,74 there were those who 
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71 Chen Yuan, 2000, p. 5. The Chinese is “ʽ9З?#ĦйKʇͱқ.ɭñ}ʊK'ǟͪпÙ.
ɨɓ юőʽ.” 
72 Laopu, 1923, p. 20. 
73 Wang Ke, 2014, p. 226.  
74 Jishou is ancestor of the Khitan people according to Liaoshi. Liaoshi, juan 32, 378.   
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From this statement, it is clear that what really concerns Mao Wen is that northeastern 
China, which was occupied and controlled by the Japanese at that time, might be lost to 
the barbarians (Yidi ņ̲). By arguing that the ancestor of the Northeastern ethnic groups 
was the Khitan people who already had become part of the Chinese Nationality, their 
descendants along with their territory should also be part of China and no longer 
controlled by the Japanese.  
 With the gradually more severe threat of the Japanese against China in the 1930s, 
and in response to Japanese politicians and scholars theory of “preserving China” or 
“carving up China," 76 the unity of “Chinese Nationality (Zhonghua minzu #Þˑɥ)" 
was more and more accentuated. The construction of a history for Chinese Nationality 
became significant and urgent.77  
In 1931, after the Mukden Incident on September 18, the government of the 
Republic of China made a course in the General History of China mandatory for college 
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75 Mao Wen, 1935, p. 43. 
76 The Japanese thinkers claim that as the leader of East Asia, they have the responsibility to protect East 
Asians from the Western states. Either “preserving China” or “carving up China” would need the help of 
the Japanese, which would involve military occupation and “supporting” the local ethnic groups to build 
“their own” nation-state, such as the Manchukuo state. Ge Zhaoguang, 2014, pp. 82–84. 
77 Before the Japanese threat becoming more serious, there were other ideas of dealing with the different 
ethnic groups inside China and in Chinese history. Ge Zhaoguang, 2014, pp. 91–97.  
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students.78 With the beginning of the full-scale invasion of China by the Japanese was 
marked by the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July of 1937, Gu Jiegang ԽՀ½ published 
an article titled “The Chinese Nation is one (Zhonghua minzu shi yige #Þˑɥɴ
"),” which was supported by many Chinese scholars.79 In this article, he began with the 
statement of “All the people of Chinese belong to the Chinese Nation --- within the 
Chinese Nation we should no longer differentiate any other nationalities --- from now on 
everybody should exercise caution on using these two characters: minzu (ˑɥ, 
nationality)."80 Then he continued to argue that all the different cultures inside China 
were the culture of “Chinese Nationality,” and so were the people inside China.81 By 
means of this theory, Gu wished to unite all the people inside China to fight against the 
Japanese. During this time, several works regarding general Chinese history and ethnic 
history also were published; one of the most famous was the Outline of National History 
(Guoshi dagang, ĦĀŁό) finished in 1939 and published in 1940 by Qian Mu Ӻ΢.  
 Although Qian’s book was a general history about China, the Inner Asian peoples 
did not play an important role in his book. For example, he only spent one chapter on the 
Liao and Jin Dynasties, and their relationship with the Song, but three chapters on the 
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78 Li Mumiao ʚʑœ, Guoshi dashi Qian Mu jiaoshou zhuanlue ĦĀŁƺӺ΢ɖȿd͗, Yangzhi 
wenhua press, 1995, p. 77.  
79 Zhou Wenjiu ēɜ̿, “Cong yige dao duoyuan yiti: guanyu Zhongguo minzu lilun fazhan de shixueshi 
kaocha (Q"Âŀj: ?#Ħˑɥ͇ѮôƤͣĀŪĀϥƋ)," in Journal of Peking University 
(Philosophy and Social Science), 2007, vol. 44, no.4, pp. 102–110; Ge Zaoguang, 2014, pp. 104–109.  
80 Gu Jiegang ԽՀ½, “Zhonghua minzu shi yige #Þˑɥɴ"," in Kunming: Shiyi bao ͨȴ, Feb. 
13, 1939. The Chinese is “µɴ#ĦKөɴ#Þˑɥ ——ĭ#Þˑɥ.¦ȦXϑѳ¨ʢ·L,ˑɥ 
——QPVĈŁƃǎǧ͕΅p͏Ӂˑ ɥ>ť.”  
81 Ibid.  
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Song Dynasty. For the Inner Asian peoples in the Outline of National History, for 
instance, when he discussed the Northern Dynasties, he said, 
At the time, China invited the barbaric groups of five Hu people into 
the heartland. Since then, these barbarian groups have been influenced 
by Chinese traditional culture. Therefore, although these people seized 
the opportunity to revolt, they already had been sharing the same 
powerful current of culture with the Chinese. Such a powerful current 
of culture irrigated the vitality of their life, and thus permeated their life. 
The division, upsurge, alternation and revitalization of these barbarians 








So the argument is that those Inner Asian groups were “nurtured” by Chinese traditional 
culture and are included into the Chinese Nationality through the process of “Hanhua," 
which Qian mentioned a number of times in his book. Without giving a clear definition, 
the Hanhua in Qian’s context is similar to Mao Wen and Song Wenbing’s mentioned 
earlier. According to Qian Mu, the transformations inside and brought about by the Inner 
Asian peoples are all just fluctuations inside Chinese society, which is similar to Gu 
Jiegang’s argument.  
 
2.5 Besides Nationalism, What Else? 
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82 Qian Mu Ӻ΢, Guoshi dagang (ĦĀŁό), Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1991, p. 19.  
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 From the end of the Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republican Era, the 
theoretical structure of the history of Chinese Nationality gradually was built. Later on, a 
number of scholars made adjustments to the interpretation of Chinese Nationality, but the 
base of this theoretical framework continues even into the 21st Century.83 For example, 
instead of emphasizing the Han people, some scholars paid more attention to the elements 
brought by other people inside Chinese civilization. When Chen Yinke ԎƆȍ argues 
about the success of the Tang empire, he states that “With the barbarian blood of valor 
and vigor was injected into the decadent body of Central Plains culture, moribund 
conventions were removed and a new vitality was reborn. By developing and carrying 
forward [the new vitality], then [the Tang] was able to distinctively create an 
unprecedented prosperity.”84 In this statement, the “Barbarian blood of valor and vigor” 
refers to the nomadic people and culture during the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern 
Dynasties. In his research on this period, besides Hanhua, he also uses another term 
“Huhua (ϲÙ barbarianization)” to describe how the Han people in Northern China were 
affected by nomadic culture. Young-tsu Wong also put the Huhua together with Hanhua 
and Yanghua (˪Ù foreignization) in his article discussing the multi-ethnic China. Later 
in Mainland China, the main theory about the Chinese Nationality is the “Plurality and 
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83 See Chen Yinke, “Li Tang shizu zhi tuice houji” ʚęˏɥ.Ʉ̀ǳё, Jinming guan conggao erbian 
ӱɯՈûΡ>σ, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980, p. 303; Young-tsu Wong ˙Ў΄, Lun duominzu 
Zhongguo de wenhua jiaorong Ѯŀˑɥ#ĦͣɜÙEЬ, in Huren Hanhua yu Hanren huhua ϲK˕Ù
˕KϲÙ, edited by Young-tsu Wong and Lin Guanqun ʣ«ϟ, Yijia: Guoli Zhongzheng daxue 
Taiwan renwen yanjiu zhongxin, 2006, pp. 1–40; Fei Xiaotong ғŧӍ, “Plurality and Unity in the 
Configuration of the Chinese People," The Tanner lectures on human values, delivered at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Nov.15 and 17, 1988. Chinese version of this lecture is in Zhonghua minzu 
duoyuan yiti geju (#ÞˑɥŀjʧƢ), edited by Fei Xiaotong, Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue 
chubanshe, 1999, pp. 3–39; Yao Congwu ŚQđ, “Guoshi kuoda yanmian de yige kanfa (ĦĀȯŁǘϔ
ͣ"ͱ˦)," in Dongbei shi luncong ÚĀѮ, vol.1, Taipei: Zhongzheng shuju, 1959, pp. 1–26. 
84 Chen Yinke, 1980, p.303. 
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Unity (duoyuan yiti ŀj)” theory by Fei Xiaotong ғŧӍ, who argues that plural 
nationalities (minzu ˑɥ) form the unity of Chinese Nationality both in historical and 
modern China. Yao Congwu ŚQđ also discusses the Chinese Nationality in the context 
of Chinese history. In an article regarding the expansion and continuity of Chinese 
history published in 1957, he mainly emphasizes the significance of Confucianism.85 Yao 
went to Taiwan in 1949 where he continued his teaching and research. One of his 
students is Jing-shen Tao ԗɸ͎, who has done the research on the Sinicization of the 
Jurchen people in Jin Dynasty. In all these and earlier researches, the stable base of this 
theoretical framework of the Chinese Nationality includes that all the peoples inside 
China belong to Chinese Nationality; the hybrid Chinese Nationality is also a changing 
historical entity defined by different peoples from different dynasties. So the category of 
“Chinese Nationality” can unite (or eliminate differences between) all the historical and 
present peoples inside the Republic of China and People’s Republic of China to form an 
egalitarian identity as a member of “Chinese Nationality." The Hanhua theory, in Mao 
Wen's, Song Wenbing's and Qian Mu’s contexts discussed above, has played a significant 
role in the formation of Chinese Nationality during the historical development. 
Subsequently, later scholars both in Mainland China and Taiwan continuously adopted 
Hanhua, some scholars attempting to assign it a more accurate and new interpretation 
based on different social theories.  
 When Yao Congwu described the expansion and continuity of Chinese history, he 
interpreted it as a process of the peoples from the borderland accepting the Confucianism 
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of the Central Plain.86 He also accentuated the Great Harmony (datong ŁĆ) of 
Confucianism in Chinese history. So Young-tsu Wong summarized the Hanhua in Yao’s 
context as specifically referring to Confucianization (Ruhua Ù).87 Based on Yao’s 
discussion about the Hanhua of the Khitan, Jurchen and Mongols in the Liao, Jin and 
Yuan Dynasties, however, the meaning of Hanhua was more than just Confucianization.88 
Ping-ti Ho’s interpretation of “Sinicization” also was considered as Confucianization by 
some scholars89 because he argued that the essential dynamic of Sinicization ultimately 
was derived from the “man-centered Sinitic religion with ancestor worship as its core,” 
which was fundamentally different from the Western religions.90 Ho also emphasized 
“the open-mindedness and large-heartedness of Chinese” as another reason for the 
success of Sinicization in ancient China.91 These two characteristics, however, should not 
be considered merely as Confucian ideology, and Ho himself actually differentiated 
between Confucianization and Sinicization in his writing.92  
 After 1949, scholars from Mainland China tried to put Hanhua in the context of 
Marxism. They interpreted Hanhua with the Marxist theory about the stages of history. 
Concerning about barbarian invasion and conquest in history, Frederick Engels stated that, 
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86 Yao Congwu, 1959, pp. 6–7; Lu Hubin äϲǫ, “Yao Congwu xiansheng dui Zhongguoshi shang 
Hanhua wenti de yanjiu ŚQđ͎Ɛ#ĦĀ˕ÙԆՁͣͻΤ," in Shiyun ĀϪ, no.1, Sep. 1995, pp. 
297–298.  
87 Young-tsu Wong, 2006, p. 30.  
88 Lu Hubin, 1995, pp. 245–313.  
89 Qi Meiqin ΃Ϟ͊, “Guanyu shinian lai Hanhua jiqi xiangguan wenti yanjiu de kaocha ?Ûǃʞ˕Ù
ò ͯԆՁͻΤͣϥƋ," in Xiyu yanjiu пĳͻΤ, 2006, no.2, p. 104.  
90 Ping-ti Ho, 1998, pp. 151–152.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ping-Ti Ho, "The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History," The Journal of Asian Studies, 
vol. 26, no. 2 (Feb. 1967), p. 193. In his article, he says “Despite its inevitable cost, the Manchu policy of 
systematic Sinicization and Confucianization served dynastic interests extremely well.” 
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Every conquest by a more barbarian people disturbs of course the 
economic development and destroys numerous productive forces. But 
in the immense majority of cases where the conquest is permanent, the 
more barbarian conqueror has to adapt himself to the higher “economic 
situation” as it emerges from the conquest; he is assimilated by the 
vanquished, and, in most cases, he even has to adopt their language.93  
 
In standard Chinese Marxist historiography, China had entered into the stage of 
feudalism from the Western Zhou period (ca. 1046-771 BCE) and stayed in that stage 
until the First Opium War (1840).94 The population of the Central Plain is usually in a 
“higher economic situation” than the people from the borderland, who usually are 
considered as fixed in the stage of slave society or even “primitive communism.” In this 
context, some scholars from Mainland China interpret Hanhua as “Feudalization” of the 
people from the borderland who either had gone to the Central Plain or interacted with 
people from the Central Plain.95  
 There were also scholars trying to define Sinicization from the social scientific 
aspect, such as Jing-shen Tao, who, as mentioned above, was a student of Yao Congwu 
before he enrolled in the Ph.D. program at Indiana University. In his book The Jurchen in 
Twelfth-century China: A Study of Sinicization, he considered Sinicization equal to 
assimilation. About assimilation, he states, 
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93 Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring. Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, trans. by Emile Burns, 
New York: International Publishers, 1894, pp. 208–209 
94 There are different opinions on this topic. The point here is cited from Zhongguo tongshi jianbian #Ħ
ӍĀγϖ by Fan Wenlan Ћɜ̒, which is one of the representative works of Chinese Marxism 
historiography. See Fan Wenlan, Zhongguo tongshi jianbian (revised version), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
vol.1, 1964, pp. 13–14.  
95 Tang Zhangru ęӾŮ, “Tuobazu de Hanhua guocheng ȶҠɥͣ˕ÙҽΗ," in Lishi jiaoxue êĀɖŪ, 
1956, no.1, pp. 21–29; Zhang Jingsong ǟÏʡ, “Ping Wanyan Liang de Hanhua gaige ѰŴՂIͣ˕Ùɑ
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The term assimilation is used in this study in the sense of F. C. 
Anthony Wallace’s statement that ‘in assimilation, the subordinate 
group attempts to abandon its existing inadequate culture by entering 
into the society of the dominant group and accepting its culture, almost 
in toto (retaining only token vestiges of their distinctive culture traits).’ 
The term so defined includes both acculturation and integration. The 
concept of Sinicization is employed in this study in the same sense as 
assimilation.96  
 
According to Tao, Sinicization means assimilation, which implies that the dominant 
group in a society assimilates the subordinate group. Tao’s use of Sinicization and 
assimilation is one reason that some scholars criticized his book, since in the Jin Dynasty, 
the Jurchen was the politically and militarily dominant group.97 Later, in the Chinese 
edition of his book and in his response to a book review by John Dardess, Tao translated 
and interpreted the “dominant group” as the culturally dominant group,98 which was not 
the same as in the original context of referring to Anthony Wallace. With this 
modification, his definition of Sinicization became similar to Song Wenbing’s discussion 
of the Jurchen’s Sinicization—people with “higher” culture will be assimilated by the 
people with “lower” culture.99 Tao’s definition also was adopted by Hsiao Ch’i-Ch’ing
Дďǌ in his discussion of the Sinicization of Yuan Mongols.100  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Jing-shen Tao, The Jurchen in Twelfth-century China: A Study of Sinicization. (Seattle: Univeristy of 
Washington Press, 1976) p. xiii.  
97 John Dardess, review of The Jurchen in Twelfth-century China: A Study of Sinicization, The Journal of 
Asian Studies, vol.37, no.2, Feb. 1978, pp. 329–330; also reviewed by Ruth Dunnell in Sung Studies 
Newsletter, no.13 (1977), pp. 77–81.  
98 Jing-Shen Tao, Nüzhen shilun ŏͳĀѮ, Taipei: Shihuo chubanshe, 1978, p. 4; Jing-shen Tao, “A Reply 
to Professor John Dardess," The Journal of Asian Studies, vol.38, no.2, Feb. 1979, pp. 441–442.  
99 Song Wenbing, 1939, p. 173. 
100 Hsiao Ch’i-Ch’ing, “Lun Yuandai Mengguren de Hanhua ѮTКýKͣ˕Ù," in Mengyuanshi 
xinyan КĀɠͻ, Taipei: Yunchen wenhua, 1994, p. 221.  
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 The three different types of interpretation of the Sinicization/Hanhua theory, 
however, were not successful. In their works, Yao Congwu and Ping-ti Ho interpret 
Sinicization/Hanhua as Confucianization, but Confucianization itself cannot cover the 
content of Sinicization/Hanhua in their writing, as discussed above. The interpretation of 
Feudalization also was questionable because the adoption of the stages of Chinese history 
in Marxism was problematic, especially the concept of Feudalism.101 Jing-shen Tao’s 
interpretation of Sinicization, using theories from social science, also incurred much 
criticism in the Western academic world, especially in the United States.102  
The main reason for the unsuccessful interpretation of Hanhua/Sinicization with 
different theories, was that these scholars’ understanding and use of Hanhua/Sinicization 
still fell in the basic framework of the history of Chinese Nationality, constructed since 
the end of the Qing Dynasty. Since the historical narrative of Chinese Nationality still 
was dominant in both places, this was common for scholars in Mainland China and 
Taiwan like Tang Zhangru and Yao Congwu. As for Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho, 
although they both had received their doctoral education in the United States, and Tao’s 
book about the Jurchen’s Sinicization and Ping-ti Ho’s rebuttal first were written and 
published in English, their usage of Sinicization still should be understood as Hanhua in 
the context of the history of Chinese Nationalism. It is clear from this that Tao included 
political centralization, political institution, intermarriage and changing of surname, 
literature and art, and religion as the content of “Sinicization.” This is similar to the 
writing of earlier scholars, such as Song Wenbing and Mao Wen. Even Tao occasionally 
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101 Feng Tianyu ®ł͋, Fengjian kaolun ƓǙϥѮ, Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 2006.  
102 See n. 91.  
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uses a phrase like “the fusion of Chinese and Jurchen cultures” and “Sino-Jurchen 
synthesis” without giving an explicit explanation; but actually he reinforces on the 
theoretical frame of Chinese Nationality.103 That is also why Ho, in the beginning of his 
rebuttal to Rawski’s speech, stated:  
To reduce the potential for misunderstanding, I should state explicitly 
that Chinese civilization certainly changes over time, in part because of 
internal developments and in part because contacts with the very 
peoples who become sinicized also expand the content of what it can 
mean to be Chinese. While there are certain elements of Chinese 
thinking and behavior that have an extremely long historical pedigree, 
Chinese culture takes on distinctive characteristics in different 
historical periods as the culture is itself transformed.104 
 
In Ho’s explanation, Chinese civilization and Chinese culture changed over time through 
internal development and contact with “Sinicized” people. Those people had expanded 
the content of being Chinese. It is clear that Ho’s argument was the same as the basic 
theoretical framework about Chinese Nationality. Therefore, in his argument, the Manchu 
identification should not have excluded other forms of identity and been included in the 
Chinese Nationality; in other words, one can be Manchu and Chinese at the same time.105 
Apparently, in Ho’s context, Chinese represented not only Han Chinese but the entirety 
of Chinese Nationality. Therefore, at the end of his rebuttal, he mentioned his preference 
for the word "Huahua" instead of "Hanhua."  
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104 Ping-Ti Ho, 1998, p. 125 
105 Ibid.  
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 The attempts to theorize a definition for Hanhua/Sinicization were not successful. 
Hanhua/Sinicization should not be considered as “feudalization” or “assimilation," and it 
is also more than “Confucianization." How then should the Hanhua theory in the context 
of Chinese Nationality be understood and interpreted? At this point, we should return to 
the Hanhua theory itself to seek the answer.  
 
2.6 Culturalism behind Hanhua Theory106 
 
 Although the Hanhua theory seems to be applied differently by historians, who 
also have made distinct interpretations of Hanhua, there are still some common 
characteristics in their discussions of Hanhua. First of all, the content of Hanhua in the 
context of Chinese Nationality is always broad and vague. In the earliest case, Chen Yuan 
emphasized the significance of culture in the process of Huahua. Then when Mao Wen 
and Song Wenbing argued about the Hanhua of the Khitan and Jurchen, Hanhua included 
respecting Confucianism, hiring Han officials/literati, studying Confucian classics, 
learning and speaking Chinese, creating language, building cities, marrying Han people, 
using the Han political system, wearing Han-style clothes, applying Han law, practicing 
ritual according to the Classics, learning Chinese literature and art, and so forth. In Jing-
shen Tao’s argument, he also included political centralization, political institutions, 
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106 Both Ping-ti Ho's and Jing-shen Tao’s arguments about Sinicization should be understood as the Hanhua 
in the context of Chinese Nationality. So I will use the term "Hanhua" referring to Hanhua and Sinicization 
both in the context of Chinese Nationality. Later some scholars from the United States understood and used 
the term "Sinicization" differently, such as John R. Shepherd. I will be specific about the term when 
discussing them. John R. Shepherd, “Rethinking Sinicization: Processes of Acculturation and 
Assimilation," in State, Market and Ethnic Groups Contextualized, Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, 
Academia Sinica, 2003, pp. 133–150, p. 133 
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intermarriage and changing of surname, literature and art, and religion as the substance of 
“Sinicization." Many topics were included in the Hanhua theory, and the boundary of 
Hanhua’s content is unclear. All the different aspects of Hanhua, however, generally can 
be summarized as learning and adopting so-called “Chinese culture.” Here the concept of 
“Chinese culture” also was vague and had different characteristics depending on the 
period.107  
 Why was Chinese culture, nevertheless, so significant in the process of Hanhua? 
It was because these scholars held the notion that culture as the main standard to 
differentiate Chinese from non-Chinese always existed in pre-modern China. For instance, 
in his 1939 article, Feng Chengjun states that “when the ancient people in our country 
judged if a person was Hua or Yi, it was decided basing on if this person practiced the 
ritual and moral code;”108 in other words, anybody can become Chinese by learning and 
practicing the Chinese “ritual and ethical code." In 1940, when Chen Yinke discussed the 
Barbarization and Sinicization (Hanhua) in the Northern Dynasties, he said,  
In sum, in the history of Northern Dynasties questions between Hu and 
Han without exception are in fact questions between barbarization and 
Sinicization, rather than the division between races of Hu (ϲ) and Han 
(˕). In other words, it is more related to culture than to race. Such is 
what was called “provide education for all people without 
discrimination (youjiao wulei ʊɖɦθ).”  
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107 The word “Chinese” in “Chinese culture” is vague. Such questions as when the word “Chinese” can be 
adopted into the culture in the Chinese territory, and what culture particularly can be considered as 
“Chinese” culture, all need to be discussed. Different scholars may give different answers for these 
questions. For instance, Qian Mu and Ge Zhaoguang give a different description of Chinese culture in both 
of their works. Qian Mu, Zhongguo wenhua shi daolun #ĦɜÙĀƑѮ, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1994; 
Ge Zhaoguang, 2014, pp. 112–115.  








In this statement, Chen Yinke more specifically points out that in the Northern Dynasties, 
culture was more important than race, and the Hu-Han dichotomy was based on culture. 
Qian Mu and other scholars applied this point to all the dynasties in pre-modern China,110 
and Joseph R. Levenson111 later called this way of interpreting Chineseness as 
culturalism. Therefore, through contact with and learning Chinese culture, which was the 
main subject matter of Hanhua, non-Chinese people could become Chinese.  
 The discussion about Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality also implies 
the cultural superiority of Han. In Song Wenbing’s article about the Hanhua of the 
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109 Chen Yinke, Suitang zhidu yuanyuan lue lungao ԙęÃǓ˻̅͗ѮΡ, Taiwan: Commercial Press, 
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important for the argument in this chapter is that this interpretation is hold by many researcher till today. 
See Hoyt Cleveland Tillman, “Proto-Nationalism in Twelfth-century China? The Case of Ch’en Liang,” 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 39.2 (1979), 403–428; Ge Zhaoguang, 2014, 126–133; Yuri Pines, 
“Beasts or Humans: Pre-imperial Origins of the ‘Sino-Barbarian’ Dichotomy,” in Reuven Amitai and 
Michal Biran eds., Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World (Leiden: Brill, 
2004), 59–102; Paul R. Goldin, “Steppe Nomads as a Philosophical Problem in Classical China,” in Paula 
L.W. Sabloff, ed., Mapping Mongolia: Situating Mongolia in the World from Geologic Time to the Present, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 2011), 228–234; 
Shao-yun Yang, Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical and Philosophical Uses of the Yi-Di in Mid-
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Jurchen people, he specifically pointes out that Han culture was relatively high culture, 
and the Jurchen culture was relatively low culture, which was the main reason that they 
were “Sinicized (Hanhua)."112 There were also other metaphors mentioned above 
implying that Han cultural superiority; such as comparing Han culture to the ocean and a 
furnace; and likening other cultures, such as the Khitan, Xianbei and Jurchen, to small 
rivers merging into the ocean and iron melting in the furnace. So the non-Sinitic peoples 
were Sinicized because Chinese culture was better than their own. They inevitably were 
attracted to or involved in the process of Hanhua, even when the non-Sinitic peoples were 
the ruling class.  
Han cultural superiority was also an important part of the cultural interpretation of 
Chineseness, such as the existence of “bestiality” in Chunqiu discourse argued by Yuri 
Pines.113 One more important aspect of Hanhua discourse is that in most cases, it was not 
important to the researchers if those “Sinicized” people considered themselves as 
“Chinese." What was more important to them was that the people had contact with and 
learned Chinese culture, which already fulfilled the requirement of Hanhua in the context 
of Chinese Nationality. So Hanhua also can be considered as a Sino-centric interpretation 
of Chinese history.  
 As an historical interpretation by modern scholars, the Hanhua theory contains a 
cultural interpretation of Chinese history. As a significant part in the discourse on 
Chinese Nationality, Hanhua theory, on one the hand, provides a method to construct the 
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113 Yuri Pines, 2004, 63–69.  
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“historical myth” of the continuity of Chinese history in terms of culture regardless of 
dynastic change. On the other hand, however, because of the role of Hanhua theory in 
constructing the history of the Chinese Nationality problem, it can be argued that China 
as the Chinese Nationality was not held together as a modern nation-state, but still mainly 
is bonded by cultural identity brought from the culturalism rooted in traditional China 




 The research on the different contexts and interpretations of Hanhua theory 
provides an opportunity to engage in some criticism of Hanhua in the Western academic 
world. As mentioned above, since the1920s, Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese 
Nationality has flourished in China. Later it appeared in the West through the works of 
Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho. The basic conclusion of Hanhua theory, that the Chinese 
absorbed the non-Chinese regardless of their status as rulers or not, a belief that already 
was held by the early European Sinologists, received both acceptance and criticism in 
Western academic writing.114 The criticism about Hanhua or Sinicization usually targeted 
the Chinese scholars discussed above,115 so Hanhua instead of Sinicization would be 
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114 For reacceptance, such as Wolfram Eberhard states that “The Manchus . . . did not return to their old 
home country and did not try to reform unto a new unity under their own rulers. They simply became 
Chinese.” See Wolfram Eberhard, China’s Minorities: Yesterday and Today. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 
Publishing, 1982), 34.  
115 Evelyn Rawski targeted Ping-ti Ho in her speech (Evelyn S. Rawski, 1996). Pamela Crossley thought 
that the “Sinicizationists” in the West also got this idea from their previous “Chinese mentors (Pamela 
Crossley, “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China,” in vol.11, no.1, June 1990, 4–5). Peter Bol's 
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employed in this discussion by me. Among these criticisms, however, scholars have 
different opinions, even understanding of the Hanhua theory.  
 In 1973, John W. Dardess wrote that Sinicization “involved not only the loss of 
national or linguistic identity but also a most un-Confucian denial of the facts of ancestry. 
In the Yuan period, it carried an additional burden of the loss of caste as well.” Therefore, 
he used “Confucianization” to replace “Sinicization,” and Confucianization only means 
"the adoption by outsiders, even Chinese outsiders, of a certain system of ethical and 
political behavior."116  
Later, Peter Bol noticed that the term Sinicization/Hanhua covered topics 
including the political process and ethnic transformation, and obscured the distinctions 
between them. So he tried to distinguish “the adoption of the institutions and value 
structures of imperial government” from “the social transformation of the Jurchens as an 
ethnic group originally distinct from the Hans.”117 Further, he restricted Sinicization to 
refer to the adoption of Han customs (Hanren fengsu ˕KՄw) by non-Han peoples.118 
He used “civilization (wen ɜ, shangwen Ɯɜ, wenzhi ɜˢ)” to indicate the shift in 
cultural practices of the Jurchen people.119  
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understanding of Sinicization also came from scholars like Jing-shen Tao, Yao Congwu, Jin Yüfu and so 
forth (Peter Bol, "Seeking Common Ground–Han Literati Under Jurchen Rule," in Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies, vol.47, no.2(Dec. 1987), p. 483, no.67). Mark Elliot’s so-called “Sinicization school” also 
mainly was comprised of Chinese scholars, such as Meng Sen Ũʭ and Ping-ti Ho (Mark C. Elliott, The 
Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2001, 
p. 27). 
116 John W. Dardess, Conquerors and Confucians: Aspects of Political Change in Late Yuan China (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 3 
117 Peter Bol, 1987, pp. 483–484.  
118 Ibid., 1987, pp. 485–486.  
119 Ibid.  
54!
!
Both Dardess and Bol noticed the broad and vague content covered by Hanhua, 
and therefore try to split it and give distinct terms for different parts of Hanhua’s 
content.120 As discussed above, Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality covers 
many topics, and thus it fails to distinguish between different aspects such as politics and 
customs within the transition of the non-Chinese people. Therefore, as Dardess and Bol 
suggest, Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese Nationality has problematic analytic 
value, and should be applied with caution and clear restriction to its content.  
 In Evelyn Rawski and Pamela Crossley’s discussions of Hanhua, both define it as 
people being assimilated by Chinese culture. Mark Elliot, however, describes it as people 
being assimilated by the Chinese.121 Although “Chinese culture” is highlighted in both 
Rawski’s and Crossley’s definitions of Hanhua, their understanding of Hanhua is 
basically the same as Elliot’s, and even as Dardess and Bol’s. In Rawski’s and Crossley’s 
papers, they try to track the implications and assumptions behind Hanhua theory. Rawski 
consideres Hanhua “a twentieth-century Han nationalist interpretation of China's past.”122 
Compared to Rawski, Crossley’s analysis is more detailed and provocative. She states:  
The barest implications of "sinicization" were that Chinese culture was 
somehow autochthonous, rigid and exclusive, and in contact with other 
worlds either obliterated or was obliterated. Secondarily, it was implied 
that through nothing much more subtle than the sheer charisma of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
120 There are other cases in which scholars also tried to apply Sinicization differently. For instance, based 
on his field work in Taiwan, John R. Shepherd stated “use Sinicization as a descriptive term to refer to the 
"process of acculturation in which a non-Chinese group adopts elements of the Chinese culture with which 
it is in contact.” For him, “. . .why the group adopts Chinese cultural elements, which elements it adopts 
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also made some suggestions on the usage of “Sinicization” in her book review for Jing-shen Tao.  
121 Evelyn S. Rawski, 1996, p. 842; Pamela Crossley, 1990, p. 2; Mark C. Elliott, 2001, p. 27. 
122 Evelyn S. Rawski, 1996, p. 842. 
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Chinese culture, peoples were attracted to China and its society from 
elsewhere and, no great obstacle withstanding, were consumed in the 
flames of Hanhua.123 
 
As discussed above, the Hanhua theory has been adopted in the construction of 
the history of Chinese Nationality since the early 20th century. Therefore, Rawski’s 
comment is reasonable although Ping-ti Ho tried to argue that the Hanhua theory 
originated with the European Sinologists. Rawski’s criticism would be more sensible if 
she had used “Chinese nationalist” instead of “Han nationalist.” This is because Hanhua 
mainly is applied to construct the history of Chinese Nationality rather than Han ethnicity 
to unite all the peoples inside China. These “Chinese nationalist” scholars usually argue 
the hybridity of Han people, and even try to dispute the existence of Han ethnicity.124  
Meanwhile, as argued above, the implication of Hanhua theory is more than 
nationalism; in other words, nationalism alone will not be enough to interpret Hanhua in 
the context of Chinese Nationality. With more detailed analysis, Crossley’s discussion of 
Hanhua, however, introduces more controversy. Although, according to Crossley, “the 
sheer charisma of Chinese culture” implied by Hanhua was more or less demonstrated by 
the Han cultural superiority argued earlier, the Hanhua theory itself still will not lead 
necessarily to an “autochthonous, rigid and exclusive” use of Chinese culture. On the 
contrary, as mentioned above, Hanhua in the context of Chinese Nationality tried to be 
inclusive and flexible, and to connect different peoples with different cultural 
backgrounds inside Chinese territory. As Ping-ti Ho suggests, culturalism behind Hanhua 
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124 Such as Liang Qichao and Gu Jiegang’s arguments mentioned earlier in this chapter. Liang Qichao, 
1988, pp. 5–7; Gu Jiegang, 1939. 
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theory would not “obliterate” the other patterns of culture and forms of identity inside the 
Chinese Nationality.125  
 Crossley also suggests that some Chinese scholars, who use the terms like 
tonghua ĆÙ (assimilation), xianghua ċÙ (submission and civilization) and ronghe Ь
ą (fusion), should not be considered Sinicizationists since they give more definitive 
expression to cultural exchange in Chinese history.126 Chen Yinke and Xiang Da are 
listed as the examples because of their discussion about “alien exploitation of Chinese 
political instruments and Central and Inner Asian impact upon the cultural traditions of 
the Northern Qi, Sui and Tang regimes."127 As a matter of fact, in many works about 
Chinese Nationality by Chinese scholars discussed above, terms like tonghua and 
xianghua are interchangeable with Hanhua; ronghe, however, is a different term to 
express the process of Hanhua.  
Chen Yinke also used the term Hanhua in his works as mentioned above, and his 
Hanhua theory should likewise be understood in the context of Chinese Nationality. He 
paid special attention to the influence of “barbarian” culture in the Tang empire, 
especially inside the ruling group. For instance, he put forth the famous theory of 
“Guanlong group (Guanlong jituan ԄԜԢī)” and “Guanzhong-based policy 
(Guanzhong benwei zhengce Ԅ#ʔgɒβ)." According to this theory, the Xianbei 
generals from the Six Frontier Towns of Northern Wei played the major role in the 
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125 Ping-ti Ho, 1998, p. 125. Mark Elliot has noticed this point by Ping-ti Ho, and he stated that Ho’s point 
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Western Wei, Northern Zhou, Sui, and Tang dynasties.128 When Chen argued about the 
success of the Tang empire, he stated that “With the barbarian blood of valor and vigor 
injected into the decadent body of Central Plains' culture, moribund conventions were 
removed and a new vitality was reborn. By developing and carrying forward [the new 
vitality], then [the Tang] was able to distinctively create an unprecedented prosperity.”129 
In this statement, the “Barbarian blood of valor and vigor” refers to the Inner Asian 
peoples and cultures during the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties. In his 
research, besides the Hanhua, Chen also made another argument for “barbarization 
(Huhua ϲÙ),” describing how the Han people in Northern China were affected by 
nomadic culture.130 Chen Yinke’s argument about the Hanhua and Huhua, however, 
should be understood in the context of the history of Chinese Nationality. The culturalism 
brought up in Chen’s argument is the key to understanding both Hanhua and Huhua.  
 Although Hanhua theory plays an important role in maintaining the concept of 
Chinese Nationality, it has limited and problematic analytic value. By applying the 
Sinicization or Hanhua theory to every dynasty, the historical interpretation becomes a 
deterministic narrative. As a reaction to the flourishing of Hanhua theory in China and its 
adoption by some Western scholars, with misinterpretations and criticism about Hanhua, 
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128 Chen Yinke, Tangdai zhengzhishi shulungao ęTɒˢĀӇѡΡ (Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 
1994), 54.  
129 Chen Yinke, “Li Tang shizu zhi tuice houji” ʚęˏɥ.Ʉ̀ǳё, Jinming guan conggao erbian ӱɯ
ՈûΡ>σ, Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1980, p. 303.  
130 Influenced by Chen Yinke’s research, later scholars started to pay attention to other nomadic aspects in 
the Northern Dynasties, such as the origin of the fubing ǐ military system, which involved a network of 
militia who usually were given tracts of farmland. See Kawamoto Yoshiaki ƲʔЃɳ, ‘‘Kozoku no 
kokka’’ ϲɥĦƃ, in Gi-Shin Nanbokuchō Zui-Tō jidai shi no kihon mondai ՚ɸáÚʏԙęɵTĀ
ĶʔěԸ (Tokyo: Kyūko shoin, 1997), 107–114. Gu Jiguang, Fubing zhidu kaoshi ǐÃǓϥӭ 
(Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe), 1962. 
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the ethnicity of the non-Chinese peoples in Chinese history is emphasized more and more 
in the works of Western scholars as represented by the New Qing historians. This 
research, however, does not explain why and how the non-Chinese peoples adopted 
Chinese culture after entering the Central Plain.  
Hanhua theory often makes scholars focus on the result of the transition of the 
non-Chinese people and neglect the process of the transition. Therefore, in the following 
chapters, I present two case studies to explore the process of the transition of non-
Chinese people. I will offer answers to a series of questions: How should we interpret the 
transition of the Inner Asian peoples who entered the Central Plain—as the ruling group 
or as commoners? How and why did they choose to adopt or refuse some customs and 
institutions from Chinese tradition? What did they bring into the Chinese entity? These 
two cases are about the transition of the succession system and local organization of the 
non-Chinese peoples from the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties, which is a 











 In the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties, for the first time in 
Chinese history since the Zhou Dynasty, the Central Plain was occupied and ruled by 
peoples from Inner Asia. Many scholars consider this period as a classic model for 
Hanhua theory. One main reason is that the rulers from Inner Asia all claimed they had 
succeeded legitimately from the Jin or Han Dynasty based on the Five Phases theory.131 
This claim also was followed with other measures, such as adopting Chinese political 
institutions into their own polities, one of the main arguments in Hanhua theory, to 
support the statement of legitimacy. As a significant part of the political system, the 
institution for succession not only regulated the transition of supreme power, but also 
demonstrated the power distribution in the court. This succession system, more 
specifically, the crown prince system, in the central governments is discussed in this 
chapter.  
In comparison to the succession system of the Inner Asian polities, the crown 
prince system was a distinctive type of succession, which commonly was applied during 
the Han and Jin Dynasties. Later, after the Inner Asian peoples had built regimes in 
northern China, the crown prince system also was adopted by them. In this chapter, the 
assessment of the two different succession traditions in Inner Asian and China raise 
several questions. A discussion of the adoption of the crown prince system in the Sixteen 
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131 Besides the Five Phases theory, the chenwei Ѿϊ,which are apocryphal texts of prophecy, also were 
used by the rulers to justify their rule. Chen Yong has listed some examples in his research. Some scholars 
argue that the appearance of the term “wuhu Bϲ” during the Sixteen Kingdoms period is associated with 
chenwei. Luo Xin argues the widespread chenwei justification could happen only after the legitimacy 
problem had been solved by the Five Phases theory. This assumption, however, is not necessarily true since 
the chenwei justification can support itself, and sometimes it could be accepted more easily by commoners. 
See Luo Xin ϗɠ, “Shiliuguo beichao de wude liyun wenti ÛĦÚʏͣBǻêҿԆՁ,” Zhongguoshi 
yanjiu #ĦĀͻΤ, 2004, no.3, 47–56; Chen Yong ԎÑ, “Cong wuzhu dao wuhu: wuhu chengwei 
tanyuan QB'ÂBϲ: BϲΓѼɂ̅,” Lishi yanjiu êĀͻΤ, 2014, no.4, 21–35. 
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Kingdoms and Northern Dynasties will help to answer these questions. The succession 
system of the nomadic groups in Western Eurasia also will be compared with adoption of 
crown prince system by the Inner Asian peoples in northern China. 
 
3.1 Two Succession Traditions  
 
 Unlike the founder of a dynasty both in China and Inner Asia, who usually would 
have had charismatic qualifications for leadership, the descendants of the founders 
needed to have a different way to legitimize their own enthronement. A succession 
system is applied to serve this purpose. The succession traditions in the Inner Asian 
polities, such as the Xiongnu, and in the Central Plain, the Han Dynasties, will be 
described to show the differences between them. Then discussion will focus on the 
succession system during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties.  
 
3.1.1 Succession Traditions in Inner Asia 
 In the Inner Asian tradition, the succession system functioned on two different 
social levels, the tribal level and supratribal level. Although the latter is the main subject 
of this chapter, the tribal policy can be considered as a microcosm of a supratribal polity; 
in addition to the succession system, its institutions, practices and even myth of origin 
and so forth are all integrated into the supratribal polity. In the tribal level, the chief 
usually is elected. Sometimes this happens peacefully. At other times, however, this is 
based on the principle of tanistry, which emphasizes murder and warfare during the 
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succession. This type of succession plays a significant role in Turkish, Mongolian, and 
Manchu politics.132 After a chief’s death, , the chieftaincy does not automatically pass 
down according to any principle of seniority, but rather through election to the most 
competent member from the chiefly house. This power transition can be either patrilineal 
or lateral. In patrilineal succession, the chieftaincy would go to the son from the father. In 
a lateral succession, on the other hand, the chieftaincy passes to the deceased chief’s 
eldest brother, and eventually to the next generation after passing on to the youngest 
brother of the deceased . Therefore, these two contradictory ways of succession can 
justify any result from the election.133  
 Although the electoral principles also applied to the supratribal level, the 
succession process of the supratribal polity is less straightforward than on the tribal level. 
First, there is a distinction between the founder and his descendants and their paths to 
power.134 The founder convinces his competitors through mythical or real competition 
with them of his suitability. The mythical aspect usually is not part of the process of the 
power transition of his descendants. The successors also are elected,135 sometimes 
peacefully and sometimes based on tanistric principles. In addition to the election, 
however, first all the candidates and other elite members consider whether the supratribal 
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132 Joseph F. Fletcher borrows this term tanistry from the history of Ireland, and was the first to use it in 
Inner Asian history. Joseph F. Fletcher, “The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives,” Harvard 
Journal of Asiatic Studies 46, Cambridge, MA, 1986, 19. 
133 Joseph Fletcher, 1986, 17.  
134 Denis Sinor, The Making of a Great Khan, Altaica Berolinensia, The Concept of Sovereignty in the 
Altaic World, Permanent International Altaistic Conference (34th Meeting), Berlin 21–26 July 1991, ed. B. 
Kellner Heinkele, Asiatische Forschungen 126. Wiesbaden, 1993, p.256. 
135 According to Denis Sinor’s research, both the founder and their successors were “elected,” and he even 
compares the election of khan to the election of the Holy Roman Emperor and the President of the United 
States, who were elected by the German Electors and the Electoral College. Denis Sinor, 1993, p .256. 
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political structure should be continued. So at the ruler’s death, the supratribal polity 
might disintegrate, as occurred in the Southern and Northern Xiongnu, and Western and 
Eastern Türkic Empires. Then one of the candidates could increase his authority by 
reuniting the tribe with violence or whatever means necessary.136 Between the death of 
the old ruler and enthronement of the new one, one or more regents usually are appointed 
to enforce the integration of the state, which is fragmented because of the succession 
struggle. In Mongol tradition, the regent could be the ruler’s principal wife, the youngest 
son of the principal wife or senior male in the ruling lineage.137  
 Similar to the tribal level, the supratribal succession can be either patrilineal or 
lateral but usually within the founder’s lineage.138 Taking the Xiongnu Empire as an 
example, in the early period, it was mainly patrilineal succession. The lateral system, 
however, played a major role later; in the second half of the Xiongnu Empire, there was a 
hybrid system of patrilineal and lateral.139  
During the process of succession, the position of leadership is contested, and 
usually the most competent candidate would be the winner of the contest, The winner 
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136 Joseph Fletcher, 1986, 24.  
137 Ibid.   
138 Some scholars err in thinking that the Inner Asian succession institution implied lateral succession as 
contradictory with the primogeniture in the Han Dynasty, and even consider the records about the 
patrilineal succession in the Xiongnu Empire unreliable. See Chen Linguo Ԏ͉Ħ, Zhonggu beifang minzu 
shi tan #ýÚɢˑɥĀɂ, Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 2010, 6; Li Ping ʚ¶, Beiwei Pingcheng shiqi 
Ú՚ǂĲɭʐ, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000, 6.  
139 Joseph Fletcher, “Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire,” in Eucharisterion: 
Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak (Harvard Ukrainian Studies 3/4), ed. I. Ševčenko and F. E. Sysyn. 
Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University, 1979–1980, 240; Wu Mu ʾ˜, 
Xiongnu chanyu jicheng zhidu tubian de tantao ØŐà?ϓȰÃǓΦøͣɂѬ, Neimenggu daxue xuebao, 
2004, no.1, vol.36, 11–16; Li Mingren ʚɯM, Zhongguo gudai junzhu jichengzhi zhi yanjiu #ĦýTČ
'ϓȰÃ.ͻΤ, Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2013, 17–34.  
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would be recognized and supported in the meeting for the election. Meanwhile, besides 
the capability of the candidates, there are several elements that can impact on the result of 
the election; for instance, the endorsement or designation of the former ruler is important. 
The influence of the former ruler is not only from his own prestige, but also from 
political measures he may have applied to secure his preferred successor.  
In the Xiongnu Empire, the eldest son of the Chanyu à? usually had 10,000 
cavalrymen and controlled the eastern part of the empire.140 Then he usually became the 
successor of the Chanyu because of his significant role in the political structure. On 
occasion, however, the Chanyu himself could be threatened by his preferred and powerful 
candidate. In the early period of the Xiongnu Empire, the transition of the supreme power 
was comparatively peaceful by following the former Chanyu’s choice. It is partly because 
the Xiongnu ruler “obtained his booty peacefully from the Chinese government” brought 
by the Heqin Ėу policy of the Han Dynasty, “so a peaceful system of succession served 
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140 In the Biography of Xiongnu in Shiji and Hanshu, the term “taizi ŃŤ” appears several times. But it 
usually refers to the eldest son of the Chanyu, and is often associated with the diplomatic practice of 
sending Chanyu’s eldest son as hostage to the neighboring states when Xiongnu was not powerful enough. 
One of the examples is Modu (©Ե). He was kept as a hostage by the Yuezhi (ʉˏ) as Chanyu’s eldest 
son (taizi). This identity, however, could not secure his role as a successor to the Chanyu, so he chose to 
kill his father so as to be able to replace him. Later, in a conversation between the Han envoy Yang Xin ʮ
y and the Chanyu, Yang asked for Chanyu’s “eldest son (taizi)” as hostage if the Xiongnu wanted to make 
peace with the Han by marriage. Chanyu disagree, and said “Now you want to go back to the ancient 
tradition to make my eldest son as hostage, it is not far away from failure. (P*ʹóýUđŃŤ̚ҍ
̟ǉͷ.)” It shows that sending the eldest son as hostage is the “ancient” diplomatic method of the 
Xiongnu. Through the diplomatic activity of the Xiongnu, the Xiongnu court might have gotten to know 
about the crown prince system among the Han. Shiji Āё, juan 110, 2913; Hanshu ̍ʄ, juan 94, 3773; 
Tomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China 221 BC to AD 1757, Cambridge, MA, 
Oxford, UK : Basil Blackwell, c1989.p.42.  
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the Xiongnu best.”141 It is also because the successor’s role as the Left Wise King 
increased his own prestige and secured an advantageous position in the contest.   
 The Inner Asian succession tradition usually requires an election to legitimize a 
new the ruler. Therefore, an Inner Asian ruler’s leadership requires approval from a 
relatively small group of electors, and this usually is based on the electors’ own interest. 
It is reasonable to argue that the decisive factor during the power transition is consensus 
rather than violence. The installation of a great khan by military proclamation seldom 
occurred.142  In the peaceful or tanistric process of succession involving almost all 
members of ruling class,143 the successor needed to prove himself the best- candidate. 
The qualifications of the candidate can be enhanced by the designation of the former ruler 
and also the designee’s prominence in the government. 
 
3.1.2 Succession Traditions in Han Dynasty 
 In the Han Dynasty, one of the emperor’s sons traditionally ascend to the throne 
at the death of the emperor. During his lifetime, the emperor usually appointed one of 
them as the heir apparent, entitled “crown prince” (Taizi ŃŤ or Huangtaizi ͥŃŤ). 
The crown prince often was the eldest son of the empress. There was a strict distinction 
between the emperor’s principal wife, who was his empress, and his other concubines.144 
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141 Joseph Fletcher, 1979–1980, 240. The Heqin policy refers to the Han government marrying princesses 
to the Chanyu to build marriage alliance with the Xiongnu.  
142 ibid.  
143 Joseph Fletcher pointed out that the succession struggle in nomadic politics tends to involve everybody, 
which can politicize the society and personalize the monarchy, and it “reinforced the continuance of 
ecologically unnecessary supratribal polities.” Joseph Fletcher, 1979–1980, 240; Joseph Fletcher, 1986, 24.  
144 T’ung–tsu Ch’ü, Han Social Structure, Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 1972, 13.  
65!
!
This succession principle can be traced to the Zhou Dynasty145 and was followed by later 
major dynasties. Among the twenty crown princes of the Han Dynasty, twelve of them 
were the eldest sons of empresses; although four were adopted by empresses as they had 
borne no sons.146  
When the empress had neither a son nor adopted son, the crown prince was 
chosen from the sons of the emperor’s concubines. Five among the twenty crown princes 
were the sons of concubines in the Han Dynasty.147 On that occasion, according to 
Gongyang zhuan Ϝ, “Sons of concubines are ranked by nobility and not seniority;” 
and “the son is noble because the mother is noble; the mother is noble because the son is 
noble.”148 In practice, however, the crown prince could be the eldest one, such as Liu 
Rong Êʲ, the first crown prince of Emperor Jingdi ̍ɻƽ. Meanwhile, “nobility” (gui 
ґ) was associated with the personal attachment of the emperor to his concubines and 
their sons; this was true of the first crown prince of Emperor Zhangdi ̍έƽ, who was 
appointed because of his mother. If the emperor had no son, the heir apparent would be 
chosen from the imperial lineage.149 Since the crown prince was appointed mostly by the 
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145 For example, in Gongyang zhuan Ϝ, when talking about picking the heir apparent for the kings, it 
is said “while sons of the legal wife are ranked by seniority and not worthiness, sons of concubines are 
ranked by nobility and not seniority. (άŢ
ӉӖVӾVҏάŤVґVӾ)” In the Zhou 
Dynasty, the eldest son of the king from the principal wife was called “zongzi ŶŤ.” The translation is 
from Harry Miller, The Gongyang Commentary on The Spring and Autumn Annals: A full translation, New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, 8. For more detail of the succession system in the Zhou Dynasty, see 
T’ung-tsu Ch’ü ͶĆ΄, Zhongguo fengjian shehui #ĦƓǙ΁c, Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 
2005, 92.   
146 Su Xin Ѕӷ, Handai huangtaizi zhidu kaoshu ˕TͥŃŤÃǓϥӇ. Master’s thesis, Jilin University, 
2007, 6–11.   
147 Ibid.  
148 Harry Miller, 2015, 8.  
149 There were three crown princes who were not the sons of the former emperors, but other members of the 
imperial lineage. Su Xin, 2007, 6–11; T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, 2005, 98-99.  
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birthright, as soon as he was appointed, the position could not be changed even by the 
emperor. When Emperor Gaozu, Liu Bang Êӡ, and Emperor Yuandi both wanted to 
remove their crown prince and appoint a new one,  the officials strongly objected, and 
eventually both emperors gave up the idea.150  
 A crown prince in the Han Dynasty received special treatment in many ways. 
First of all, a ceremony was performed to demonstrate the new status of the heir apparent 
to the nobles, officials, commoners, and also his imperial ancestors. The proceedings 
accompanying the celebration included granting amnesty and bestowing wealth or rank 
on nobility.151 After the ceremony, the crown prince received all the trappings appropriate 
for  the heir apparent—a palace, royal clothing, a special carriage, and the rituals he was 
allowed to conduct. Also changed was the now formal greeting offered to him by his 
brothers and other nobles.152 Besides participating in special rituals, the crown prince’s 
main responsibility was to be educated and trained by the mentors (fu ) appointed by 
the emperor.153 As Jia Yi ҕѻ from the Western Han argued,  
The fate of all under heaven depends on the crown prince. The virtue of 
the crown prince lies in early education and picking the right 
attendants ……  So I say picking the right attendants and early 
education are most urgent. If the education was applied and the 
attendants were righteous, the crown prince will be righteous. If the 
crown prince is righteous, all under heaven will be settled firmly. 
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150 T’ung-tsu Ch’ü, 2005, 92.  
151 Su Xin, 2007, 30–59.  
152 Ibid.  
153 There was a Grand Mentor (taifu Ń) and Junior Mentor (shaofu ƚ) for the crown prince in the 







According to Jia Yi, the purpose of education for the crown prince was moral cultivation. 
Through this education, the crown prince was expected to become a “virtuous (shan Ĝ)” 
and “righteous (zheng ʼ)” person, which is significant for “all under heaven (tianxia ł
)”. For this purpose, he was schooled in the Confucian classics, such as Shangshu Ɯʄ, 
Chunqiu ɲΎ, Analects and so forth.155 The crown prince also received instruction in 
legal matters to make him aware the “method (shu г)” of being an emperor besides 
being virtuous.156  
 According to Zuozhuan Ƶ, the crown prince had another responsibility of 
being the temporary “inspector of the state (jianguo ͬĩ)” or “soother of the troops 
(fujun ɇҥ) if the emperor went to war.157 During the Han Dynasty, however, there was 
no case of the crown prince having to assume this role, as the Han emperors had little 
opportunity to personally go to war. The exception was the founder of the Western Han, 
Emperor Gaozu ̍Ֆ΄. There were only four  crown princes in the Han Dynasty who 
were  replaced as heir apparent by their brothers. 
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154 Hanshu, juan 48, 2251. 
155 Su Xin, 2007, 30–59.  
156 Ibid.  
157 In Zuozhuan Ƶ, the second year of Mingong Ԃ, it is recorded that “When the ruler goes for a war, 
he (crown prince) guards the state; and if another be appointed to guard it, he attends upon his father. When 
he attends upon him, he is called ‘Soother of the troops;’ when he stays behind on guard, he is called 
‘Inspector of the State’ (ČбÄűʊűÄǷǷʂɇҥűʂͬĩ).” The translation is based on The 
Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen translated by James Legge, 1872, with my own revising.  
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 The focus of the succession institution during the Han Dynasty was the crown 
prince, who was usually the eldest son of the empress and was appointed during the 
emperor’s lifetime. The qualification of the crown prince as the legitimate successor was 
largely decided by his birth instead of his ability. The personal attachment of the emperor 
sometimes played an important role when he could select his successor from the 
concubines’ sons. The crown prince system, however, largely restricted the emperor’s 
power on choosing his successor. By following the system, the emperor’s appointment 
actually was not decisive since the crown prince usually qualified by his birth. The major 
responsibility of being the crown prince during the Han Dynasty was being educated and 
trained to be a “virtuous” future emperor, although he had little chances to practice his 
skill of ruling and administrating by serving the government as “inspector of the state” or 
anything else. The restriction of the crown prince’s role inside the government, which 
prevented the potential conflict between him and the emperor, and also obviated any 
mistakes made by the heir apparent, was actually a way of protection.   
 
3.1.3 Questions Proposed 
 The above discussion shows the major differences, mainly in the qualification of 
the successor and his role in the government, between the Inner Asian and the Han 
Dynasty succession traditions. When the Inner Asian rulers built up their own states 
during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties, they also confronted these 
differences. It is important to understand how these two conflicting customs were 




3.2 Crown Princes during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period 
 
 The name of the Sixteen Kingdoms period derives from the book Spring and 
Autumn Annals of the Sixteen Kingdoms (Shiliuguo Chunqiu ÛĩɲΎ) by Cui Hong 
Ư՟ (478-525); the author included sixteen polities in his book, and its title was adopted 
as the name of this period. According to Cui Hong, after the collapse of the Western Jin, 
there was no ruler in the Central Plain (Zhongyuan #ì), i.e., the lower area of the 
Yellow River,158 and a number of polities were formed during this time. The territory 
covered by the polities included in Cui Hong’s book, however, was much larger than the 
so-called Central Plain. The territory included Gansu, Inner Mongolia and part of Sichuan 
area, such as Western Liang, Northern Liang, Southern Liang, Xia and Cheng Shu 
regimes. During this period, however, there were definitely more than the sixteen polities 
listed in Cui Hong’s book. The main reason he selected these sixteen polities is, as he 
said,  
Since the Yongning ˓ů Reign period of Jin, although wars were 
started everywhere, and many royalty were set up by themselves, but 






158 Hanyu dacidian ̍њŁї¢, vol. 1, p. 600.  
159 Weishu ՚9, juan 67, 1503. Here “jianbang Ǚӡ” and “mingshi ĕˏ” share the same meaning.  
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Apparently, “building their own states” was the main rationale for including 
polities for his book.160 In these “warring states” described by Cui Hong,161 building a 
new state includes activities such as using the title of “emperor (huangdi ͥƽ),” starting 
a new reign title, reestablishing the calendar, and setting up a whole imperial family by 
bestowing new titles on family members— the emperor’s mother became dowager 
empress, his principal wife, the empress, all his sons and daughters, princes and 
princesses. Meanwhile, during this time, the heir apparent, who usually was the eldest 
son of the empress, was also appointed.  
 Seven polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms period located in the Central Plain—
Former Zhao, Later Zhao, Ran Wei (§՚), Former Yan, Former Qin, Later Yan and 
Later Qin—are analyzed below. In these Central Plain kingdoms during this period, there 
were 27 heirs apparent appointed.  
 








If the father 
was the 





160 It has been pointed out, however, that “building their own states” was not the only or decisive standard. 
Another significant factor for Cui Hong to pick these polities is the historical records written mostly during 
the time these polities still existed, and Cui Hong finished the Spring and Autumn of the Sixteen Kingdoms 
by following those records to a large extent. Hu Hong ϲբ, “Shiliuguo de Huaxiahua: shishi yu shixiang 
zhijian ÛĦͣÞľÙ: ĀżĀͯ.ԇ,” Zhongguoshi yanjiu #ĦĀͻΤ, 2015, no.1, 135–162. 
161 By calling these polities “warring states,” he compared them to the states during the Warring States 
period, and also considered his writing the history of the sixteen kingdoms for the Northern Wei is the same 
as Sima Tan ăՒѺ and Sima Qian ăՒҼ writing the Warring State Period history for Western Han court. 
162 All the information in this table is from Jinshu, Shiliuguo Chunqiu and Zizhi tongjian.  
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Huyan Ĕǘ163  
Empress 
Huyan’s 
eldest son.  
Liu Yi »
) 
No, Liu Yi’s 
father was Liu 
Yuan, and he 
was appointed 
by Liu Cong 
»ϯ, fourth 
son of Liu 
Yuan.  
No, Liu Yi’s 
mother was 
Empress Dan 
à of Liu 













Yes, but Liu 
Cong had four 
empresses.164   
Uncertain, 









Yes, Liu Can.  Yes, Empress 










Yes, Liu Yao 
»ʁ. 
Yes, Empress 













163 Empress Huyan probably passed away in the first year after Liu Yuan’s enthronement. Later, Liu 
Yuan’s empress was from the Dan à family. 
164 In a conversation between Liu Can and Guo Yi Ө̷, Guo Yi called Liu Can “Gaozu Emperor’s shisun 
Ŧ (grandson of Gaozu Emperor by his son’s empress), emperor’s ditong Ţϒ (son of the emperor by 
his empress). (Ֆ΄.Ŧ, '.Ţϒ)” Jinshu, juan 102, 2669.  
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ͺǝ is from Cheng 
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No, Shi Yan’s 
father was Shi 
Bin ͺɝ, 
brother of the 
emperor, Shi 
Zun ͺӗ.  












was from Dong 
Й family. 
Uncertain, 






























165 Shi Hong was appointed because the eldest son of Shi Le, Shi Xing ͺ was dead. Jinshu, juan 105, 
2739.  
166 Shi Hu changed his empress after the changing of crown prince.  
167 Empress Liu was the daughter of Liu Yao »ʁ. So one reason that Shi Shi was picked as heir apparent 
is the nobility of his mother. Jinshu, juan 107, 2785.  
168 Ran Min was the adopted grandson of Shi Hu, and was given the family name Shi ͺ. He changed back 
















Fu Chang  
ЊЄ 
Yes, Fu Jian 
Њ. 









Yes, Fu Jian 
Њ.  








Yes, Fu Jian 
Њķ. 
Uncertain, 









Yes, Fu Pi Њ
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Deng Њ͟.  








Uncertain.  Uncertain.  




169 Empress Qiang was respected as Dowager Empress Qiang after Fu Sheng’s enthronement. Jinshu, juan 
112, 2872.  
170 Fu Chang was killed during a battle with Huan Wen ʫ̆, so Fu Sheng was appointed. Jinshu, juan 112, 
2872.  
171 Fu Yi passed away in 388 CE according to Zizhi tongjian. Zizhi tongjian, juan 107, 3384.  
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173 Yao Chang’s Empress was from the She Ш family. Jinshu, juan 116, 2967.  
174 Murong Bao was the son of former Empress Duan, who used to be Murong Cui’s principal wife, but she 
was killed before Murong Chui’s enthronement. She was bestowed the title of Empress Chengzhao ȥɳ 
after Murong Chui’s enthronement, while the later Empress Duan was also appointed.  Zizhi tongjian, juan 
107, 3383.  
175 Gao Pengcheng was recorded in Zizhi tongjian, but it was recorded as Gao Peng in Jinshu. Jinshu, juan 
124, 3108; Zizhi tongjian, juan 114, 3605.  
176 Gao Yuan was from Goguryeo, so Gao Ֆ was his original family name. He was bestowed with the 
family name Murong by Murong Bao. Gao Yuan was also the adopted son of Murong Bao. Jinshu, juan 
124, 3108.  
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The appointment of crown princes during the Sixteen Kingdoms period followed 
the crown prince system of the Han tradition to a large extent. In the seven kingdoms, 
among the 27 heir apparents who were appointed during the emperors’ lifetime, 24 were 
the sons of the emperors and appointed by their fathers. Some of them already were 
considered heirs apparent (Ť, heir apparent) before their fathers’ enthronement 
because their fathers were kings or dukes and had needed a legitimate successor, such as 
Shi Hong (son of Shi Le) and Murong Jun (son of Murong Huang). Of the three heirs 
apparent who were not the sons of the emperors, Liu Yi »), son of Liu Yuan »˻, was 
the a younger brother (huangtaidi ͥŃǞ) chosen by Liu Cong »ϯ, brother of Liu Yi. 
Shi Yan ͺв, the son of Shi Bin ͺɝ, was appointed as crown prince by Shi Zun, 
brother of Shi Bing, Fu Yi Њȡ, the son of Fu Pi Њ, was appointed as crown younger 
brother by Fu Yi’s brother Fu Deng Њ͟.  
All three cases, however, can be understood in terms of Han succession tradition. 
Liu Yi was appointed as the crown younger brother by Liu Cong mainly because Liu Yi 
was the eldest son of Liu Yuan’s principal wife, Empress Dan, which made him the 
legitimate successor after Liu He.177 Fu Yi was appointed as the crown younger brother 
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177 In an article by Chen Yong ԎÑ, he argues that the reason that Liu Yi was appointed as Liu Cong’s 
successor is because Liu Cong tried to unite the Di ː people to gain their military support. This argument, 
however, is not well based for several reasons. First of all, Chen’s argument heavily relies on his different 
reading of a historical record. In the biography of Liu Yuan at Jinshu, there is a record about “Di chief 
great Chanyu Zheng (Diqiu da chanyu zheng ːӬŁà?Ǻ).” Meanwhile, the same record appears in 
Zizhi tongjian as “Di chief Dan Zheng (Diqiu dan zheng ːӬàǺ),” and Chen considers Zizhi tongjian’s 
record is the right one so the Di chief shared the same family name with Liu Yi’s mother Empress Dan and 
may possibly be the father of Empress Dan, even though Zizhi tongjian was compiled much later than 
Jinshu. There was also no other example of Di people obtaining the family name of Dan à. Second, there 
was no direct evidence showing the relationship between the Di and Qiang people and Liu Yi, and the 
15,000 people killed during the cancellation of Liu Yi’s identity as heir apparent could be Liu Yi’s 
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by Fu Deng since Fu Yi was the oldest of the surviving sons of Fu Pi, the former emperor. 
Shi Zun ͺӗ probably had no son, and that is why he promised Ran Min (§Ԉ/Shi Min 
ͺԈ) to be his heir apparent before his rebellion. Shi Zun, however, eventually appointed 
his nephew, Shi Yan ͺв, son of his brother Shi Bin ͺɝ, as the crown prince. This was 
probably because Ran Min (Shi Min) was the adopted grandson of Shi Hu, and Shi Zun 
wanted to keep the imperial power within his family lineage.  
 Of the 24 crown princes who were appointed by their fathers as emperors, 14 
were evidently the sons of contemporary empresses. Six were eldest sons; and of the 
remaining eight, their birth position was uncertain due to lack of evidence. It is possible 
that four of them were sons of the contemporary empresses. Apparently, only 2 of the 24 
were not the sons of contemporary empresses: Shi Hong, son of Shi Le, and Yao Xing, 
son of Yao Chang. They possibly were appointed because Empresses Liu and She Ш had 
no son,178 and both Shi Hong and Yao Xing were the eldest sons among the surviving 
sons of Shi Le and Yao Chang. It is also necessary to point out that there were 4 cases in 
which the heir apparent was changed under the same emperor. Murong Ye ȜƄɺ and 
Fu Chang ЊЄ died from illness and wounds. Liu Yi, Liu Cong’s younger brother, was 
replaced by Liu Cong’s son Liu Can. Shi Hu changed his crown prince twice, as the first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
guardians and troops, rather than the Di and Qiang people. In a conversation between Liu Yi and his 
officials, it was mentioned that he could easily receive the support of 20,000 soldiers. Finally, the rebellion 
of Di and Qiang people actually did not cause the collapse of the Former Zhao Kingdom. Later During Liu 
Yao’s reign, he again conquered and united the Qiang people. Chen Yong, Hanzhao shi lungao: Xiongnu 
Tuge jianguo de zhengzhizhi kaocha ˕ҚĀѮΡ: ØŐƦĄǙĦͣɒˢĀϥƋ, Beijing: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, 2009, 163–188; Jinshu, juan 102, 2675.  
178 Empress Liu might have no more sons to be choose, since Shi Xing ͺ, the eldest son of Shi Le, could 
be her son, and was considered as the heir apparent by Shi Le. But Shi Xing passed away later, which made 
Shi Hong, the second eldest son of Shi Le, became the heir apparent.  
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two were sentenced to death by him. By appointing a new crown prince, Shi Hu 
appointed a new empress at the same time to follow the Han tradition.  
 In sum, almost all the rulers appointed their heir apparents, mostly known as 
crown prince, along with their enthronement or later. All the heirs apparent were chosen 
from the imperial family, and the eldest sons of the empresses usually were the primary 
choice. When the empress had no son, the heir apparent was picked among the sons of 
consorts. Here the sons of concubines were mainly ranked by seniority, such as Shi Hong 
and Yao Xing. When the emperor had no son, the heir apparent was picked from the 
imperial lineage, and nephews, adopted sons or grandsons were always excluded by the 
emperors, such as Liu Yao, Shi Hu and Shi Min/Ran Min. In addition, some emperors 
also appointed the mentors, guardians and preceptors to educate and assist their heirs 
apparent by following the Western Jin institution.179 For instance, Liu Yi as the crown 
younger brother had his own Grand Mentor (taifu Ń), the Grand Preceptor (taishi Ń
ƺ) and Grand Guardian (taibao Ńx).180 Shi Hu also appointed two officials as the 
Grand Mentor (taifu Ń) and Junior Mentor (shaofu ƚ) for Shi Shi, and specifically 
asked them to educated him and make him change.181 All this shows that in the seven 
kingdoms during the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the principles of the Han succession 
system were followed by the rulers to a large extent.  
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179 As mentioned earlier, in the Han Dynasty, the educators for the crown prince were only the Grand 
Mentor (taifu Ń) and Junior Mentor (shaofu ƚ), although in Jia Yi’s article, there were three dukes 
(sangong ) and three junior counselors (sanshao ƚ) of the heir apparent mentioned. Later in the 
Western Jin dynasty, other officials like the Grand Preceptor (taishi Ńƿ), Grand Guardian (taibao Ńx), 
Junior Preceptor (shaoshi ƚƿ) and Junior Guardian (shaobao ƚx) were added for the heir apparent. 
Jinshu, juan 24, Book of Officials, 742.  




3.2.1 Heirs Apparent Who Did Not Succeed to the Throne  
  By following the Han tradition, the succession system in these seven kingdoms, 
however, did not work very well. For the eleven of the 27 heirs apparent who succeeded 
to the throne, four were soon deposed or killed by their competitors at the imperial courts, 
and one was soon killed by an enemy from another kingdom.182 Therefore, only six of the 
heirs apparent successfully succeeded to the throne and ruled for more than one year. 
Both Fu Sheng and Murong Bao were deposed almost two years after their enthronement 
by imperial family members, Fu Jian and Lan Han Р˖. A third heir, Yao Hong, 
surrendered to the Eastern Jin after a military defeat.183 Among the 27 heirs apparent, 
however, the remaining sixteen were banished or died either before or shortly after 
enthronement. Of these, six were deposed or killed by their enemies from other 
kingdoms,184 thirteen were deposed by competitors from the imperial court, and three 
died from disease or battle wounds from battle before their enthronement.185  
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181 Jinshu, juan 107, 2785.   
182 The four heir apparents were Liu He, Liu Can, Shi Hong and Shi Shi. They separately held the throne 
for less than three months, two months, less than one year and 33 days. Shi Hong was pushed to succeed to 
the throne by Shi Hu, and the imperial power actually was controlled by Shi Hu. Fu Chong was the one 
soon killed by Qifu Qiangui (5^;Ǧ).  
183 The other three were Murong Jun, Murong Wei and Yao Xing.  
184 The six were Liu Xi, Ran Zhi, Fu Hong, Fu Ning, Fu Chong and Fu Xuan. 
185 The three were Murong Ye, Fu Chang and Fu Yi.  
79!
!
Fate of Heirs Apparent 
Sucessfully succeeded and 
ruled 
Deposed or died before 
enthronement 





 Based on the numbers mentioned above, and compared to the 38 rulers who 
appeared in the seven kingdoms,186 during Sixteen Kingdoms period, succession in these 
kingdoms was such that the majority of the heirs apparent were banished or passed away 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Here the rulers include the “legitimate” rulers for each kingdom and the usurpers, such as Lan Han, 
according to the historical records.  
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before their enthronement. Those who managed to ascend to the throne lost power soon 
afterwards.. Therefore, the succession system in these seven kingdoms did not 
successfully secure the transition of power. That there were various reasons for the failure 
of the heir apparent certainly was a major factor. The constant war between different 
kingdoms during this period created an insecure environment for the stable power 
transition. In these circumstances, the heir apparent, as well as the emperor, often were 
deposed or killed after the collapse of a kingdom. Liu Xi »̤, Ran Zhi §ɼ, Fu Hong 
Њŵ, Fu Ning Њů, Fu Chong ЊƮ, Fu Xuan ЊŽ and Yao Hong are examples. The 
challenges to the heirs apparent from inside the ruling class in these kingdoms, however, 
also had a negative effect on the heir apparent succession system.  
 
3.2.2 Strong Competitors 
 Even though the Han succession system was applied by the seven kingdoms, the 
heirs apparent still faced challenges from other imperial clan male members who 
considered themselves legitimate or even more qualified successors. For instance, after 
Shi Hu assisted his uncle Shi Le to the throne by military means, he was disappointed 




During the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the “Great Chanyu” led all Yi ņ peoples 
including the Xianbei ՞ß, Di ː and Qiang ϝ, and others.187 The core of the military 
power, the five units of Xiongnu (Xiongnu wubu ØŐBӧ) in the Former Zhao, and the 
Jiehu (Jiehu Ϡϲ) in the Later Zhao, were omitted as they were led directly by the 
emperors.188 In the Former Zhao and Later Zhao, the position of Great Chanyu usually 
was taken by the crown prince, and Shi Hu ͺС’s disappointment actually implied his 
willingness to be the successor of Shi Le ͺÒ. He complained to his son, and said,  
 
The one who accomplished the achievement of Great Zhao is I. People 
all actually expected me to be the Great Chanyu, but [Shi Le] granted to 
that maidservant’s kid. I couldn’t sleep or eat whenever I thought about 





After Shi Hu successfully usurped the emperorship, he bestowed the post of Great 
Chanyu on his crown prince, Shi Xuan, just as Shi Le had done.190 Ran Min is another 
example of usurpation. He was disappointed after Shi Zun appointed his nephew Shi Yan 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
187 In Jinshu, juan 104, 2730, it says “with Great Chanyu suppressing and pacifying the hundred barbarians 
(yi Dachanyu zhenfu baiman VŁĝ?Ӷɇ͢Ю).”  
188 Chen Yong, 2009, 130–145; 189–203.  
189 Jinshu, juan 106, 2762. 
190 Jinshu, juan 106, 2769.  
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as the heir apparent, even though Ran Min was the adopted son of Shi Hu, and he also 
considered himself as the better candidate for heir apparent.191  
 Considering themselves as legitimate successors, these imperial clan members 
were allowed to compete with the heir apparent appointed by the emperor because of 
their political and military power. In the polities like the Former and Later Han, the royal 
family members often were granted certain military authority, which served to 
decentralize the military. Some of the nobles were sent to local cities to serve as military 
governors.192 For example, after Liu Cong’s enthronement, he placed each of his 
seventeen sons in command of a troop of 2000 soldiers.193 Some of Shi Le’s sons, such as 
Shi Hongͺŵ and Shi Kanͺĸ, led armies in local cities.194 With this distribution of 
military power, some imperial clan members showed their martial capability and 
accumulated their military experience. For example, Liu Cong »ϯ and Liu Yao »ʁ
led an army of 50,000 troups to plunder Luoyang.195 Shi Hu and Ran Min were also very 
experienced generals. With their military achievements, the emperor bestowed a high 
rank and official post on them,196 thus giving them a marked advantage in competition 
with other possible heirs apparent.  
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191 Jinshu, juan 107, 2790.  
192 Michio Tanigawa ѿƲӓԠ, Suitang diguo xingcheng shilun ԙęƽĦǨȥĀѮ, translated by Li 
Jicang ʚ˱ˠ, Shanghai: Shanghai guji press, 2004, 1-16. Michio Tanigawa focuses on the Northern Wei 
Dynasty, and Chen Yong extended this idea of decentralization of military power to the Former Han period. 
Chen Yong, 2009, 11-16.  
193 Jinshu, juan 102, 2665.  
194 Shi Le specifically pointed out those sons in the local cities who should play an important role during 
the period of imperial power transition if the heir apparent was in danger.  Jinshu, juan 105 2751. 
195 Jinshu, juan 101, 2658-2659.  
196 Before Liu Yuan’s death, Liu Cong held the posts of Great Sima (da Sima ŁăՒ), Great Chanyu (da 




3.2.3 Powerful Assistant Ministers 
 Some court officials warned the emperor about dangerous situations among the 
heirs apparent. For instance, Cheng Xia ΗӒ and Xu Guang Ǵ advised Shi Le to 
remove Shi Hu from power, or even kill him, to secure Shi Hong’s role as heir apparent. 
The emperor, Shi Le, answered that,  
The tianxia has not yet been pacified, and the disasters of war were not 
over. Daya (Shi Hong’s style name) is still young, and should have 
powerful assistants appointed [for him]. Zhongshan (Shi Hu, King of 
Zhongshan) is a meritorious general in founding the kingdom, and is as 
close to me as Lu to Wei.197 So I assign him with the tasks of Yi Yin 
and Huo Guang. How can it become what you said? It must be because 
you are worried that in future days of assisting the young lord, you 
would not be able to monopolize the power of the emperor’s maternal 







Shi Le’s words show that he, however, did not consider the powerful royal clan member 
Shi Hu as a danger to his chosen successor. He did, nonetheless, think that they would 
make powerful assistants (qiangfu ǣұ) to support his successor in the future because of 
the ongoing warfare., The emperor compared Shi Hu to Yi Yin \Ơ and Huo Guang ԩ
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Min also held high rank official posts to control civil and military affairs. Jinshu, juan 101, 2652; juan 102, 
2658-2659; juan 106, 2762; juan 107, 2788-2789.  
197 Lu ՝ was feudal state of Duke Zhou, and Wei å is for Duke Zhou’s younger brother Kang Shu ǖõ.  
198 Jinshu, juan 105, 2752.  
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, who were also assistant ministers during the Shang and Han adding Cheng Xia, as the 
crown prince’s uncle (his mother’s brother), to the group. Meanwhile, in his last decree, 
Shi Le reminded Shi Hu to “think over Duke Zhou and Huo Guang, and not become the 
subject of critics in the future.”199  
All three, Yi Yin, Due Zhou and Huo Guang, are famous for being faithful 
assistant ministers, but also became controversial because of some of their actions. Yi 
Yin and Huo Guang were known as bad examples for restricting or replacing the 
emperor.200 In the Shang Dynasty, while assisting Tai Jia Ń͒, the Shang ruler, Yi Yin 
punished him because of mistakes he made during his rule and because he ignored Yi 
Yin’s advice. After confining Tai Jia  to the Tong ʩ Palace for three years to reflect on 
his mistakes, Yi Yin let Tai Jia rule again.201 In the Western Zhou Dynasty, after King 
Wu of Zhou’s death, Duke Zhou assisted King Wu’s son, King Cheng of Zhou. Some 
materials show that Duke Zhou also made himself king while assisting King Cheng.202 
Huo Guang was from the Western Han Dynasty. When he was serving as the main 
assistant minister,  he deposed Prince He Ҕ as emperor, and exiled him from the capital. 
Afterwards, he installed Liu Bingyi »͝Ʒ, who then was a commoner, as the new 
emperor, later Emperor Xuan Ž.203 When Shi Le brought up the three ministers, he tried 
to praise their faithfulness and loyalty to the imperial family in keeping the ruling house 
in power. 
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199 Jinshu, juan 105, 2751. 
200 Jinshu, juan 8, 36.  
201 Shiji, juan 3, 99.  
202 Gu Jiegang ԻԷÇ, Zhougong zhizheng chengwang ēĴɒΝ̾, Wenshi, vol.23, 1984.  
203 Hanshu, juan 68, 2937-2947.  
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Shi Le, however, also put his heir apparent, Shi Hong, in danger by claiming that 
Shi Hu’s role was as significant as the three ministers. Although Shi Hu did not depose 
Shi Hong after the death of Shi Le, he took control of the court. Eventually he deposed 
and killed Shi Hong by claiming Hong was not competent enough to succeed to imperial 
power.204 When Liu Yuan and Shi Hu made similar arrangements for assistant ministers 
for their crown prince Liu He, so that he might also share this idea about powerful 
assistants with Shi Le, it did not work out as they had assumed.205  
A rare example of a powerful assistant minister serving a young and 
inexperienced emperor is Murong Ke ȜƄȍ, who was the younger brother of Murong 
Jun. He supported Jun’s young son, Murong Wei, until his death. It is said that Murong 
Ke “acted as Duke Zhou” (xing Zhougong shi бē=)” in the Jinshu.206 Due to its 
rareness, a comparison was made to Duke Zhou and Yi Yin from the Confucian 
perspective by Murong Sheng. He argued that Murong Ke was better than they had been, 
because Duke Zhou and Yi Yin intervened too often in the emperor’s affairs and 
influenced the emperor’s own decision. By stating this point, Murong Sheng warned his 




204 Jinshu, juan 105 2753-2756.  
205 Liu Yuan’s arrangement is mentioned earlier. About Shi Hu’s case, refer to Jinshu, juan 107, 2786-2792.  
206 Jinshu, juan 111, 2847.  
207 Jinshu, juan 124, 3101.  
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3.2.4 Election Criteria 
 At the same time, the inexperienced young heir apparent was also not favored by 
the ruling group, whose opinions also played an important role during the succession 
process. The enthronement of Shi Zun ͺӗ is a typical example.208 After Shi Hu’s death, 
his crown prince, Shi Shi ͺ, succeeded with the help of Empress Liu » and Zhang 
Chai ǟ҂, who probably was the foster father of Empress Liu.209 Because Shi Shi was 
too young, Empress Liu and Zhang Chai seized imperial power, and Zhang Chai’s role 
was like “Huo Guang assisting the Han.”210 Other members in the ruling group, however, 
were not pleased with the arrangement and refused to follow the orders of Liu and Zhang. 
Then the ruling elite, including Shi Hu’s generals and sons, Yao YizhongŚǜZ, who 
was the father of Yao Chang ŚЄ, later Emperor of Later Qin, Fu HongЊˬ, Shi Min 
(Ran Min) ͺԈ, Liu Ning »ů, Shi Luan ͺա, Shi Wu ͺÝ, Shi RongͺЎ, Wang Tie 
̾ӻ, and Duan Qin ˆÕ, agreed to enthrone Shi Zun, Shi Hu’s older son, probably 
through election. They persuaded Shi Zun by stating, 
Your majesty is not just older but more virtuous. The former emperor 
also was well disposed to your majesty. But because his bewilderment 
and confusion in his last years, he was misled by Zhang Chai. Now the 
confrontation with Shangbai is lasting, and the capital’s defense is 
weak. If we denounce the guilt of Zhang Chai, and beat the drums for a 
punitive expedition against him, who would not change sides, open the 
gate and welcome your majesty? 
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208 The other typical example was Murong Yun ȜƄ@ (Gao Yun Ֆ@). He was elected by the generals to 
succeed Murong Xi ȜƄ̤. He, however, felt insecure and worried about his throne because he knew he 
did not control the major military power. So he kept many guards as subordinates to protect him, but 
eventually was killed by them. Jinshu, juan 124, 3112-3113.  
209 Empress Liu was Liu Yao’s »ʁ  daughter who was only 12 years old when she was captured by Zhang 
Chai. Zhang sent her to Shi Hu, who favored her and appointed her as Empress Liu. Jinshu, juan 107, 2758.  







After Shi Zun and his supporters gained control of the capital, in the name of 
Empress Liu, Shi Zun sent out the decree, in which he said, 
The successor is very young, and he was appointed because of the 
personal grace from the former emperor. The imperial undertaking is 
the heaviest one, which cannot be taken upon (by the successor). 




From the above two statements it is clear that age was a significant factor in 
deposing and enthroning rulers. Shi Zun was older and Shi Shi younger; their ages were 
an advantage and disadvantage during the competition. Before Shi Hu appointed Shi Shi 
as his crown prince, his official, Cao Mo ʅЏ, already had told Shi Hu that “The 
undertaking of tianxia is too heavy, so it is improper to appoint the young one (as heir 
apparent).”213 Similar points can be also found in other cases of imperial power transition. 
For instance, in Fu Deng’s Њ͟ and Murong Xi ȜƄ̤’s enthronement, the young 
candidates also were excluded by the ruling group.  
 In the historical record, the preference for the older candidate sometimes was 
justified by a similar case from that in one of the Confucian classics, Spring and 
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211 Jinshu, juan 107, 2788.  
212 Jinshu, juan 107, 2788.  
213 The Chinese is “łӯźάƚ.” Jinshu, juan 107, 2785.  
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Autumn.214 In the year 621 BCE after the death of Duke Xiang о of Jin ɷ, his 
successor Duke Ling ̕ was young, and the Jin, mainly the leading officials such as 
Zhao Dun ҚͰ, wanted to select older ruler especially because of their constant war with 
the Qin Α and Di ̲.215 Ironically, even though this case was used to justify the 
preference for older candidates during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period, Duke Ling still 
succeeded on the insistence of his mother Mu Ying΢ţ.216 Although the older age was 
emphasized in these cases, the criteria in the decisions was actually not seniority but the 
competence and strength that came with seniority. Before Shi Zun was elected as the 
successor, he was one of the three major assistant ministers appointed by Shi Hu. Later 
he was excluded from imperial power by Zhang Chai and Empress Liu. Besides his high 
rank, he also had military experience. Eventually he was appointed as Great General 
(Dajiangjun ŁƔª) to defend the west of Later Zhao Kingdom.217 The other successors, 
probably chosen also through elections, such as Liu Yao »ʁ, Fu Deng and Murong Xi, 
also held important posts and had military experiences.  
 Besides the age element emphasized above, these examples also illustrate the 
direct confrontation with the former emperor’s will about the heir apparent. The former 
emperor, Shi Hu, was accused of being bewildered and confused in his last years, and he 
was misled by Zhang Chai. His appointment of Shi Shi as crown prince was criticized as 
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214 Jinshu, juan 115, 2948.  
215 Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu, 1990, 550-552.  
216 Ibid.  
217 According to Jinshu, Shi Hu appointed Shi Zun as Great General, and appointed him to lead the garrison 
“guanyou (ā right side of the pass).” Here the pass should refer to the Tongguan ̑ pass. Jinshu, juan 
107, 2786.  
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a “personal favor” (si’en ΍Ȍ). The personal favor suggests the appointment of an heir 
apparent by Shi Hu based on his personal relationship with Zhang Chai rather than for the 
good of the regime. This criticism implies the appointment of the heir apparent should 
not be made based on the personal preference of the emperor but should be based on the 
opinions of the whole ruling group. The ruling class not only included the emperor and 
other powerful male elites, but also female members, such as the empress and dowager 
empress were included.218 Their opinion on the successor was sometimes revealed 
through election. This point can be used to object to any heir apparent appointed by the 
emperor if the majority of the ruling class disagreed.  
 
3.2.5 Securing Heirs Apparent 
 Because of all these disadvantages, the heirs apparent appointed by the emperors 
often lost out to their competitors. The crown prince of Liu Yuan, Liu He, is a good 
example to demonstrate the disadvantages of the heir apparent during the competition. 
After his father Liu Yuan’s death and his enthronement, Liu He found himself in a 
dangerous situation. He felt threatened by his three brothers, who controlled almost all 
the troops of the kingdom, especially Liu Cong. He then tried to obtain military power by 
attacking his brothers, and killed two of them. Liu Cong, however, eventually defeated 
Liu He, and became the next emperor.219 To secure the heir apparent’s position and 
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218 In some cases, the empress’s and dowager empress’s opinions were decisive. For instance, against other 
people’s opinion, the dowager empress supported Murong Xi to replace the crown prince Murong Ding. 
Jinshu, juan 124, 3105.  
219 Jinshu, juan 101. 
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stabilize the transition after the emperor’s death, some emperors applied certain measures 
to enhance the competitiveness of their heirs apparent.  
 
3.2.5.1 Participating in the management of state affairs 
 Before being appointed as the crown prince, some candidates already had held 
other posts and titles. For instance, Liu He was the Commander-in-chief (Dasima ŁăՒ) 
and King of Liang ʬ.220 After being appointed as heir apparent, some special 
arrangements were made by some emperors. After Shi Le appointed the crown prince Shi 
Hong, his official Xu Guang Ǵ suggested to him that,  
The crown prince is kindhearted, filial, gentle and respectful, and the 
King of Zhongshan (Shi Hu) is heroic, violent and deceitful. If your 
majesty passed away in one day, I am afraid that the state would be in 
danger. So it is necessary to gradually remove the authority and power 





With this knowledge, Shi Le asked the crown prince Shi Hong to take care of certain 
state affairs by consulting with an official, Yan Zhen Ԩ. Only major military affairs 
and important sentences had to be reported to the emperor. This arrangement allowed Shi 
Hong to strip away Shi Hu’s political power as the Director of the Department of State 
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220 The translations of official titles are all from Charles Hucker’s work. See Charles O. Hucker, A 
Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985.  
221 Jinshu, juan 105, 2752. 
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Affairs (Shangshu ling Ɯ9U), and he became more powerful than the prime 
minister.222  
Similar arrangements also can be found in other cases. After becoming crown 
prince, Liu Can »λ was made prime minister and Great Chanyu, and managed state 
affairs.223 Shi Hu’s crown princes, Shi Sui and Shi Xuan, Yao Xing’s crown prince Yao 
Hong, and Murong Cui’s heir apparent Murong Bao also played similar roles in the 
government.224 This position is similar to the “Inspector of the State (jianguo ͬĩ)” that 
also appeared in the Northern Wei dynasty(see below). Similar to the Inspector of the 
State in the Han Dynasty, when the emperor left the kingdom for war or any other reason, 
the crown princes sometimes stayed in the capital to manage state affairs.225  
 Martial ability and military experience was a contrasty aspect in gaining an 
advantage as the heir apparent during the transition process. As argued earlier, in this 
period, the royal family members, including the heir apparent usually were granted 
certain military powers as a way to decentralize the military. Meanwhile, the heirs 
apparent were sometimes sent into battle to gain experience. In one case, when Yao 
Chang wanted to lead troops to attack Fu Jian’s general Dou Chong Ψ° by himself, his 
official Yi WeiƠϊ said,  
The crown prince’s reputation for purity and honesty is famous near 
and far. But his resourcefulness and astuteness in leading the troops are 
not known by the people. So it is necessary to send the crown prince to 
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223 Jinshu, juan 102, 2665-2666, 2675.  
224 Jinshu, juan 106, 2762, 2771; juan 118, 2991; juan 123, 3087.  
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lead by himself, which can gradually spread his power, and guard 




Yao Chang followed Yin Wei’s advice and sent Yao Xing into battle. Murong Cui sent 
his sons, including the crown prince Murong Bao, to go on an expedition against 
Northern Wei.227 Similar cases, however, did not often occur, since the heir apparent’s 
safety also was significant for the regime. Fu Jian’s Њ first crown prince Fu Chang Њ
В died in battle; and his second option, Fu Sheng Њ͎, was considered not as good as 
Fu Chang.228  
 
3.2.6 Threats to the Emperor 
 When an heir apparent was weak, he needed the emperor’s protection. The 
existence of the emperor as his father is justification for his position as the crown prince, 
and the arrangement made by the emperor could secure his enthronement to some extent. 
If he became powerful, such an heir apparent who manages state affairs, and has military 
experience, however, he could be beyond the emperor’s control. He might seek to 
eliminate all the threats to his role as heir apparent by himself. For instance, when Yao 
Chang left the capital Chang’an for war against Fu Deng, his crown prince Yao Xing 
stayed behind to manage state affairs. When Yao Chang was seriously ill and asked Yao 
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227 Jinshu, juan 123, 3089.  
228 Jinshu, juan 112, 2871-2872.  
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Xing to leave Chang’an to meet him, Yao Xing killed five powerful generals before he 
left because all these generals had their own troops and were a potential threat to Yao 
Xing’s succession. The elimination of these important military figures might well have 
caused severe damage to the military strength of Later Qin and distrust among the ruling 
group. Yao Chang was furious about it but could do nothing.229  
Sometimes a powerful crown prince could even become a serious threat to the 
emperor himself. Shi Hu’s first crown prince, Shi Sui ͺӜ, is a good example. Shi Sui 
was authorized to manage state affairs, including choosing officials and performing 
rituals. As usual, only the major military affairs and important sentences were reported to 
the emperor.230 Two supreme leaders in one regime unavoidably caused conflict. In the 
beginning, Shi Sui reported everything to his father out of respect and fear. Shi Hu 
blamed him for presenting him with issues that were too minor. Then when Shi Sui 
omitted a report, Shi Hu was so furious at his crown prince he was punished physically. 
Soon Shi Sui hated the emperor. He tried to do what Modu (©Ծ) of the Xiongnu Empire 
did to his father, for which see above.231 Shi Hu eventually discovered Shi Sui’s plan and 
sentenced him to death.  
 Because of the possibility of threats by a powerful heir apparent, the restriction of 
crown prince’s power became another issue for the emperor. In the Han and Jin dynasties, 
the identity of a crown prince was shown in everything related to the heir apparent 
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including his palace, clothes, carriage, etc. .232 When Murong Jun’s ȜƄv official Shen 
Yin ͓ϳ pointed out that the crown prince Murong Ye did not enjoy privileges over 
other officials and princes, especially in apparel and accessories, Murong Jun refused to 
accept Shen Yin’s suggestion, claiming that such privileges would influence the authority 
of the emperor.233 To preserve and restrict the power of the crown prince at the same time, 
the usual method was to balance the power of the crown prince by raising up a competitor 
for him from the other princes.  
After sentencing his first crown prince, Shi Sui, to death, Shi Hu realized the 
problem of the existence of a powerful heir apparent. The second crown prince was Shi 
Xuan ͺŽ, and he enjoyed the same powers over state affairs as Shi Sui once had. This 
time, however, Shi Xuan had to share the power with his brother Shi Tao ͺԲ. They 
dealt with state affairs by turns, and Shi Hu also made sure that Shi Tao received the 
same treatment as Shi Xuan.234  
Maybe because of his own experience as an heir apparent, Yao Xing also made 
similar arrangements for his crown prince, Yao Hong Ś˥, by appointing another son, 
Yao Bi ŚǤ, as the the Director of the Department of State Affairs. Thus, he set him up 
to compete with Yao Hong.235 Although in these cases the emperors intended to restrict 
and balance the power of the crown princes by making such arrangements, the fierce 
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232 As for the privilege of the crown prince with regard to apparel and vehicle, refer to the Treatises of 
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juan 25, 761, 765-767.   
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competition that resulted between the rival princes might not have been expected by the 
emperor. Shi Tao was eventually killed by Shi Xuan, and Shi Xuan was sentenced to 
death by Shi Hu because of the murder.236 Yao Bi also made several attempts to kill the 
crown prince, and he was forced to commit suicide by Yao Xing before the emperor’s 
death.237 This arrangement of promoting another son to compete with the crown prince 
could endanger the heir apparent. The emperor might be willing to take the risk since 
whatever the result of the competition, the winner was still one of his sons.  
 
3.2.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 During the Sixteen Kingdoms period, although the Han crown prince system was 
nominally applied by the rulers in the seven states located on the Central Plain, the Inner 
Asian ruler many times manipulated the system by choosing the heir apparent first, and 
then appointing his mother as empress to follow the crown prince system. In doing so, 
one of the functions of crown prince system, that is to restrict the emperor’s power on 
choosing his successor, disappeared. To some extent, the emperor monopolized the 
power of choosing and appointing the crown prince.  
The crown prince system, however, did not dominate the actual succession in this 
period. The decentralization of military power among the ruling elite brought potential 
powerful rivals to compete against the heir apparent. The emperor needed these rivals, 
some of whom were appointed as the assistant ministers, in wartime. This rival service 
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was a disadvantage for the heir apparent, especially when he was young and 
inexperienced. To deal with this situation, some emperors intentionally arranged for their 
heirs apparent to manage state affairs as a representative of the emperor, and of course 
they sent them to the front lines whenever possible. If the heir apparent was too powerful, 
however, he could present a severe threat to the emperor himself. In that case, some 
emperors promoted another son to share the power with and compete against the crown 
prince.  
 The Han crown prince system aimed to stabilize the transition of power. To 
achieve stability, an heir apparent was appointed before the death of the emperor based 
on the birthright of the eldest son of the empress. A consequence was the possible low 
quality of the heir apparent/crown prince, who might be not the best one, or even a 
suitable one.  
Therefore, the Han system emphasized the education of the crown prince. Once 
the position of heir apparent was secured, even the emperor could not change it. The heir 
apparent usually did participate in the management of civil state affairs in order to avoid 
conflict with the emperor. In the seven kingdoms, discussed above, without changing the 
power structure inside the ruling class, bestowing the title of crown prince did not change 
the actual succession. Compared to the Han Dynasty, the emperor’s role was more 
decisive in the choosing and appointing the heir apparent.  
The Inner Asian tradition, however, still had great impact on the succession of 
these kingdoms. The idea of election tradition in the power transition is found in several 
97!
!
occasions; and the competence, experience and power of the candidate played a decisive 
role in the election.238 Some Inner Asian rulers adjusted this crown prince system by 
having their heir apparent in charge of state affairs, which can be considered a remnant of 
the Inner Asian tradition, such as the Xiongnu tradition of appointing the eldest son as the 
Left Wise King discussed earlier in this chapter.  
 
3.3  Institution of the Crown Prince in the Northern Dynasties 
 
 Unlike the Former and Later Zhao, and Former and Later Qin, which were 
established inside the Central Plain, the Northern Wei started outside the Central Plain 
and gradually moved from north to south. According to the historical record, the 
institution of crown prince was new to the Tuoba Xianbei, and they adopted it  at the 
suggestion of Cui Hao Ư˳. The Northern Zhou and Northern Qi Dynasties were built 
on the foundation of Northern Wei. Therefore, the Northern Wei will be examined first, 
followed by a discussion of the Northern Zhou and Northern Qi.  
 
3.3.1 Early Succession Tradition 
 Before the establishment of Northern Wei and Tuoba Gui’s ȶҠ̓ enthronement 
at Pingcheng ǂĲ in 398 CE, the Tuoba Xianbei already had established their own polity, 
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238 Even though Shi Le made several arrangements, discussed above, for Shi Hong, Shi Hong still failed to 
succeed after Shi Le’s death. It could be mainly because Shi Hong was not a martial figure and not capable 
of leading the kingdom’s generals. According to his father, Shi Hong was not like a son from a martial 
family. Jinshu, juan 105, 2752.  
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which was initially interpreted as a tribal confederation and later became the Dai 
kingdom TĦ. Throughout that period, the Inner Asian tradition dominated the 
succession: a certain form of election was used during the peaceful or tanistric process 
with the result of lateral or patrilineal succession. In the records of this period in Weishu, 
the term “taizi ŃŤ,” however, appears several times; it refers to the eldest son of the 
ruler.239 In the first juan of the Weishu, it is recorded, 
 
In the 42nd year, [Emperor Shenyuan ΅] sent his son Emperor Wen 
to Wei, also to learn natural conditions and social customs. It was the 
second year of Jingyuan Reign (261 CE) of Wei.  
Emperor Wen’s name was Shamohan. He stayed in Luoyang as the 




In 261 CE, LiweiËǹ sent his son Shamohan (˞̌˖) to the Cao Wei (ʅ՚) as a 
hostage, and he stayed in Luoyang as the state crown prince (guo taizi ĦŃŤ). The 
reason that Shamohan was sent as a hostage was perhaps because he was the oldest son of 
Liwei. Thus he was recognized as the crown prince by the Wei court. He, however, did 
not have the title of crown prince given by the Xianbei ruler Liwei. It is also because the 
crown prince system did not yet exist among the Tuoba Xianbei people as yet. Later, 
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when Shamohan returned from the Wei capital, he was called “crown prince” by the 
chiefs (ŁK) but with the implication of eldest son (zhangzi ӾŤ).241 Shamohan 
apparently did not have privileges over his brothers, and was even disliked by the chiefs 
because he was influenced by the Han culture.242  
 The Tuoba Xianbei polity and the Cao Wei ʅ՚ dynasty had already tried to 
make peace through marriage in 258 CE.243 In this case of Shamohan, the Cao Wei court 
required a “unilateral hostage” 244 from the Tuoba Xianbei polity and initially might have 
asked for the crown prince as the hostage. The Xianbei could not meet this requirement 
as they had no system of a crown prince. Later, the Wei required the eldest son as 
someone who would be comparable to the crown prince in the Han system. As a hostage, 
Shamohan was treated as the crown prince by the Cao Wei government. This treatment 
created a negative impression about Shamohan among the Xianbei people once he was 
returned home. According to the historical record, the chiefs demanded that Shamohan be 
killed because they worried that Shamohan would exchange their customs for those of 
Han culture.245 But in fact, the chiefs worried that the support of the Jin court behind 
Shamohan might interfere with the Xianbei polity.246 The death of Shamohan shows that 
diplomatic communication through hostages giving did not successfully establish the 
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241 Tian  ͐lǌ, Tuoba shitan ȶҠĀɂ, Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2011, p.13. Taizi ŃŤ also has the 
meaning of the eldest son.  
242 Weishu, juan 1, 4-5. 
243 Weishu, juan 1, 3-4.  
244 Lien-sheng Yang, Hostages in Chinese History, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol.15, no.3/4 (Dec., 
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245 Weishu, juan 1, 4-5.  
246 While Shamohan staying in Luoyang, the dynasty in the Central Plain changed from the Cao Wei to the 
Western Jin, and he was still kept by the Jin court.  
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crown prince system in the Xianbei polity. On the contrary, the special treatment by the 
Wei might even have resulted in his death. Through this diplomatic relationship, the 
Tuoba Xianbei regime might have learned about the institution of crown prince but did 
not adopt it.247  
   
3.3.2 Seeking Change 
 In 398 CE after formally founding the Northern Wei Dynasty and Tuoba Gui’s ȶ
Ҡ̓ enthronement at Pingcheng ǂĲ, the succession of imperial power concerned 
Tuoba Gui, who wanted to change the succession tradition in his kingdom. Instead of 
creating a crown prince system based on the Han tradition, Tuoba Gui tried to kill his 
son’s mother as a way of appointing him as successor. In Weishu, it is recorded that, 
 
In the beginning, the emperor (Emperor Taizong, Tuoba Si ȶҠĠ)’s 
mother, Lady Liu was forced to commit suicide [by Emperor Taizu Ń
΄ (Tuoba Gui ȶҠ̓)]. Emperor Taizu told the emperor (Tuoba Si) 
that, “Once, Emperor Wu of Han intended to appoint his son [as heir 
apparent] and [therefore] put his mother to death. He did not [wish to] 
allow his consorts subsequently to interfere with state affairs and 
[thereby] cause outside families [i.e., distaff families] to create troubles. 
You ought to succeed to the throne. That is why I have farsightedly 
emulated Emperor Wu of the Han, and carried out this long-term 
plan.”248 
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This was Tuoba Gui’s first attempt to appoint his eldest son Tuoba Si as his heir 
apparent by killing the successor’s mother. Because of his mother’s death, the young 
Tuoba Si, who was eighteen at that time,250 remained inconsolable, which irritated his 
father. In the end, Tuoba Si had to flee the capital and failed to become Tuoba Gui’s heir 
apparent.251 Then, Emperor Taizu made his second attempt to make Qinghe ˺ˡ King, 
Tuoba Shao ȶҠϏ was his successor, so he also tried to kill Shao’s Ϗ mother, Lady He 
Ҕ. This time, Tuoba Gui was hesitant to kill Lady He,252 maybe because of the earlier 
case. He also had to consider the family background of Lady He; she was the younger 
sister of his mother and from the powerful Helan Ҕ unite (bu ӧ).253 Tuoba Gui’s 
hesitancy eventually caused his own death. Lady He asked her son to rescue her, and 
Tuoba Shao led several attendants and eunuchs into the palace and killed Emperor 
Taizu.254  
 Even though the tradition of appointing the heir apparent and killing his mother 
caused Tuoba Gui’s death, this tradition was kept and practiced throughout most of the 
Northern Wei dynasty. The origin of this practice still is controversial. Tuoba Gui himself 
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253 Li Ping ʚ¶, Beiwei Pingcheng shiqi Ú՚ǂĲɭʐ, Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000, 
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claimed that he adopted this practice from Emperor Wu of the Han, but some scholars 
argue that this practice was Tuoba Gui’s own invention or a relic of steppe culture.255 The 
origin of the practice may have been that  maternal relatives in the early Tuoba history 
were powerful and often interfered in the Tuoba succession. Even Tuoba Gui himself 
came to power because of the support from his maternal relatives.256 To prevent the 
interference of maternal relatives, Tuoba Gui also forcibly dispersed the Helan Ҕ and 
Dugu ̵ũ lineages (tribes) to weaken them. In this way, Tuoba Gui tried to eliminate 
the threats to himself and his descendants. Although Emperor Taizu never used the crown 
prince as a means of hand over power, he already had set up a political environment for 
using the heir apparent system of Han tradition in the future.  
 After Tuoba Gui’s death, the process of power transition shows the continuing 
dominance of Inner Asian tradition. The day after the death of Emperor Shizu, King 
Qinghe summoned all the officials (bailiao ͢) to the palace, and asked whom they 
wanted to rule them. This meeting can be understood based on the “election” tradition of 
Inner Asian succession. Here is the record from Weishu, 
 
The next day, the palace gate did not open till noon. [Tuoba] Shao 
announced the imperial edit, and summoned the officials facing the 
north in front of the Duan gate of the Western Palace. Shao talked to 
the officials between the door leaves, “I have a father, I also have an 
elder brother. Whom do you want to follow?” From the kings and 
dukes on, they were all surprised and frightened; nobody replied to him. 
After a while, Zhangsun Song as Duke Nanping said: “We wish to 
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follow your majesty.” The officials only then knew the passing away of 
the emperor but were unaware how the emperor had died. Only Yuan 
Lie as Duke Yinping left crying. So both the court and country were 
agitated, and people were all disloyal [to Shao]. He Hu as Marquis 
Feiru (ϱő) raised a beacon fire in the north of Anyang city, so the 
people of the Helan unite all went to join; the other old unites also led 









At that time, King Qinghe already had the palace under his control. During the 
meeting, King Qinghe did not come out of the palace to meet them, and but only opened 
the gate slightly, and asked the officials “I have a father, I also have an elder brother. 
Whom do you want to follow?” The father was referring to Tuoba Gui (Tuoba Shao’s 
father), and the elder brother was Tuoba Si, the one who ran away from his father.258 At 
that time, the officials and nobles did not know the emperor already had been killed. 
They thought there might have been a coup inside the palace, which was led by Tuoba 
Shao’s elder brother. So Tuoba Shao asked them to pick sides between Tuoba Gui and 
him, as to who would be their ruler. Then the officials were ignorant of the actual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
257 Weishu, juan 16, 390. 
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situation inside the palace, and which side should they pick. They were scared and 
remained silent. In the end, Zhangsun Song ӾŦƱ, whose opinion was valued since he 
was one of the Xianbei high rank nobles, came up and gave the absolute right answer, 
“We wish to follow your majesty.” That is because Tuoba Shao was the one asking the 
question, for the officials and nobles, Tuoba Shao should have the palace under his 
control or at least he was the one in charge of their safety. Through the meeting, Qinghe 
King received support from the nobles and officials. It is reasonable to argue that Tuoba 
Shao tried to legitimize his succession through an election at the meeting.  
 Besides the support from the meeting, He Hu Ҕȳ, who was from the Helan unit, 
summoned Helan people to gather in Anyang city. There were also other gatherings of 
the Helan people. They supposedly gathered to support King Qinghe, Tuoba Shao, 
because his mother was from the Helan tribe. King Qinghe, however, did not prepare for 
the guards inside the palace, who had followed Tuoba Gui for years, and eventually 
turned against him and seized him. Then, the nobles elected Tuoba Si as the next ruler.  
 The military played a role in the transition, but the election process was more 
significant. Tuoba Shao led several people to the palace. They killed the emperor. Tuoba 
Shao then attempted to make himself the lawful successor. Tuoba Shao asked the 
participants of the meeting to choose the new leader. He received the support of all the 
nobles participating in the meeting although some of them secretly were of another mind. 
Yuan Lie ̛ (Tuoba Lie ȶҠ̛), who had journeyed out of the capital and brought 
Emperor Taizong back to confront Yuan Shao. At that time, Emperor Taizong was not in 
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control of the major military power, and his success was brought about by the coup of 
some of his palace guards. Another consensus was reached right after that. The transition 
process is full of compromise, default and murder,259 and the decisive factor in the Inner 
Asian succession system was consensus rather than violence.260  
 
3.3.3 First Crown Prince and Inspector of the State 
 Maybe because of his own experience, Tuoba Si, Emperor Taizong of Wei, did 
not follow his father’s way of appointing the heir apparent by killing his mother.261 While 
facing the problem of succession, he secretly turned to Cui Hao Ư˳, a Han literatus, for 
advice. In Weishu, it is recorded that, 
Emperor Taizong constantly had indispositions, and unusual 
manifestations repeatedly appeared. So he secretly sent a eunuch to ask 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
259 This part is sometimes omitted by researchers. For instance, in Lin Hu ʣգ’s article about the 
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260 The participant was not punished because a consensus had been reached under the threat of King Qinghe. 
For instance, Zhangsun Song was not punished for his compromise by the next emperor Tuoba Si, but was 
even given a more important post after the emperor’s enthronement as one of the “Eight Dukes (bagong 
).” Weishu, juan 25, 643. 
261 Li Ping argues that Tuoba Tao’s biological mother died because he was appointed as heir apparent. But 
there was no direct textual evidence about his speculation. Also Tuoba Tao’s mother died in 420, and he 
was appointed in 422. In other words, Emperor Taizong did not decide if he should appoint Tuoba Tao as 
his successor in 420 when Tao’s mother died. Li Ping, 2000, 160–161.  
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Cui Hao, and said, “ …… I have been ill for years, yet treatment has 
not reduce my illness. I am afraid that if I suddenly died, all my sons 






Like his father and all the emperors mentioned in this chapter, Tuoba Si wanted one 
of his sons to succeed to his throne, but worried that it would not happen if he died 
suddenly. The reason given by Tuoba Si was that his sons were young. Apparently, 
Tuoba Si knew that the youthful and inexperienced candidate was not favored in the 
Inner Asian succession system, and other nobles in the Tuoba clan would covet the 
throne.  
Therefore, he tried to confront the Inner Asian succession tradition by turning to a 
Han literatus for suggestions without informing other members of the ruling family of his 
intentions. Cui Hao first assured the emperor that his health would not be affected by 
strange astronomical phenomena and then gave his suggestion on the succession. Cui 
Hao understood Emperor Taizong’s conflict about the succession issue. He first pointed 
out that, since the beginning of the dynasty, there was no established tradition for 
appointing the heir apparent. This had placed the regime in danger since the beginning of 
the Yongxing ˓ reign (the first reign of Emperor Taizong, 409–413 CE). He 
suggested that the Emperor appoint an heir apparent, and appoint some trustworthy 
nobles and officials as his tutors, assistants, guests and friends. Cui Hao emphasized the 
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benefit of the crown prince system for the emperor. The crown prince could deal with the 
civil and military issues, and control the supreme power for the emperor. The emperor 
could rebuild his heath by rest and taking medicine. Anyone who coveted the throne after 
the emperor’s death would desist because there was an already experienced lord as crown 
prince.263 After introducing the crown prince system, Cui Hao suggested how to choose 
the heir apparent, and who should be chosen, saying,  
Now the eldest prince Tao (Tuoba Tao) is almost one year old. He is 
wise and gentle, and is cared for by everybody. If he became the heir 
apparent at that time, it will be the fortune of all under heaven. 
Appointing the eldest one as the crown prince is the great principle of 
the ritual. If (your majesty) waits untill all the sons become grown-up 
and then picks from them, it would violate the heavenly ethic of (family 





Cui Hao suggested that Emperor Taizong appoints his eldest son, Tuoba Tao. A 
major characteristic of the Han crown prince institution was to appoint the crown prince 
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years to form a circle (shier sui er zhou Û>ƫϨē)” in Huainanzi, juan 3, 37. The context of this 
sentence is about  Jupiter orbiting the sun, and a circle is twelve years. So “zhou” here means a circle 
formed in twelve years by Jupiter, but there is another usage of “zhou ē,” which formed in 28 years by a 
different planet. So “zhou ē” implies different durations of time in Huainanzi. But both in Jinshu and 
Weishu, “yizhou ē” also appears several times, and often means “one year.” For instance, in Jinshu, 
juan 95, Du Buqian ʜȗ said someone needed one “zhou ē” to recovery from illness, and then that 
man was ill for one year. (Jinshu, juan 95, 2479). There are also other examples in Jinshu, juan 101, p.2644; 
Weishu, juan 11, 287. In all these examples, “yizhou ē” means one year. Therefore, the parallel case in 
Cui Hao’s statement should also mean one year. Li Ping, 2000, p.118.  
265 ƨԪİ¯ lüshuang jianbing, from Zhouyi, Kun diagram. “lüshuang” means stepping on the hoarfrost, 
jianbing means firm ice. It means from stepping on the hoarfrost foreseeing the forming of form ice. In the 




at an early age because of his birthright. Cui Hao specifically pointed out that the 
emperor should not wait until all his sons were grown and then choose among them, 
which might violate the heavenly ethical family relationship and be disastrous. The 
principle of “appointing the eldest one as heir apparent” introduced by Cui Hao, however, 
differs from the usual Han principle of choosing the empress’ eldest son as heir apparent. 
He adjusted this principle because, according to the historical records, there was no 
empress in the inner court of Empress Taizong.  
 Tuoba Si, however, did not accept Cui Hao’s suggestion immediately, but adopted 
part of it with some adjustment. First of all, he waited until his eldest son Tuoba Tao was 
fifteen, an age one was considered to be a grown man in ancient China,266 to appoint him 
as heir apparent. The decision probably was made without consulting Cui Hao, but rather 
with Zhangsun Song, a high-ranking Xianbei noble. In the Weishu, it is recorded that 
when Emperor Taizong turned to Zhangsun Song for advice, he was seriously ill, 
different from the indisposition that Taizong had mentioned earlier. He did not ask about 
his heir apparent but about his successor. Zhangsun Song recommended Tuoba Tao as the 
successor because he was the oldest and was virtuous according to both Song and the 
emperor.267 Then Tuoba Tao was appointed both as the crown prince268 and inspector of 
the state.  
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266 Generally speaking, in ancient China, people who are older than fifteen years old can be considered as 
grown men, although there are various standards about the age of grown men. Hu Fagui ϲôґ, Zhongguo 
gudai de chengren guannian #ĦýTͣȥKчȀ, Wenshi zhishi ɜĀ͸ѱ, 1995, no.1, 24–28.  
267 Weishu, juan 25, 644. 
268 In the biography of Emperor Taizong and Emperor Shizu (Tuoba Tao), it did not clearly state that Tuoba 
Tao was appointed as the crown prince, but only as an inspector of the state. Li Ping had discussed this 
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 The record in Weishu shows the heir apparent Tuoba Tao sat in the main hall 
dealing with state affairs with six assistant ministers. The emperor intentionally avoided 
the heir apparent in the court and was happy with Tuoba Tao’s capability. He told his 
attendants that with the crown prince in the court they could travel around the state and 
launch expeditions against his enemies.269 When the officials sometimes sent him 
problems in the court, he even replied, “I don’t know about it. It should be decided by the 
ruler of the state (guozhu Ħ').”270 It seems that the emperor passed all the state affairs 
on to the crown prince. Emperor Taizong still controlled the martial affairs and dealt with 
some major civil issues,271 and, apparently not affected by his heath condition, he 
travelled around the states and even launched several expeditions against his enemies.272 
Later, after Tuoba Tao’s enthronement, he also arranged that his crown prince Tuoba 
Huang ȶҠɶ play a similar role as inspector of the state for almost eight years.273   
 Cui Hao tried to use the Confucian classics to justify the crown prince’s role, and 
he named it the “inspector of the state.” It is clear that this “inspector of the state” was 
very different from the inspector of the state in Han tradition discussed earlier in this 
chapter. In the Han tradition, the crown prince only plays the temporary role of “inspector 
of the state (jianguo ͩĦ)” during the absence of the emperor from the capital. While 
Tuoba Tao dealt with state affairs as the inspector of the state, however, Emperor 
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issue in his book, and argued Tuoba Tao was appointed as crown prince based on records in Beishi and 
Zizhi tongjian. Li Ping, 2000, 83–87.  
269 Weishu, juan 35, 813.  
270 Ibid.  
271 Yoshifumi KubozoeΩ˹ȝɜ, Weijin Nanbeichao guanliaozhi yanjiu ՚ɸáÚʏŷÃͻΤ, Taipei: 
National Taiwan University Press, 2015, 184–191.  
272 Li Ping, 2000, 90–92.  
273 Yoshifumi Kubozoe, 2015, 184–191.  
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Taizong was often in the capital but intentionally avoided him. Through the role of 
“inspector of the state,” Emperor Taizong transferred, in advance, the supreme power to 
his crown prince while he maintained control of the military and some other key issues. 
In this sense, the inspector of the state in the Northern Wei dynasty essentially is similar 
to the role played by the crown princes, such as Shi Hong, Liu Can, Shi Sui and so forth. 
in the Sixteen Kingdoms period discussed above They all managed the state affairs for 
the emperors, and only the major military affairs and important sentences were decided 
by the emperors. Meanwhile, similar to the Sixteen Kingdoms period, a powerful crown 
prince could escape the emperor’s control and become a threat to the emperor. The 
inspector of the state, Tuoba Huang, crown prince of Emperor Shizu (Tuoba Tao), 
probably was sentenced to death by his father because of the conflicts between them.274 
After Emperor Shizu, the crown prince in the Northern Wei did not ever play the role of 
“inspector of the state” again.275  
 
3.3.4 The Distorted Crown Prince Institution 
 After the appointment of the first crown prince by Emperor Taizong in the 
Northern Wei dynasty, the next five emperors—Emperor Shizu Tuoba Tao, Emperor 
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274 Yoshiaki Kawamoto ƲʔЃɳ, Gi Shin Nanbokuchō jidai no minzoku mondai՚ɸáÚʏɵTˑɥ
ěԸ, Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin, 1998, 109–116.  
275 Later, Emperor Xianzu Tuoba Hong ȶҠǝ abdicated and handed over his crown to his heir apparent. 
The power structure after the retirement of the emperor was actually similar to the “inspector of the state” 
in some way. There are different interpretations for the retirement of emperorship. Andrew Eisenberg 
argues it is to ensure “the smooth ascension to the throne of the future Xiaowendi.” Li Mingren points out 
that Emperor Xianzu wanted to hand over his crown to his brother in the beginning  because he wanted to 
have a powerful emperor to confront the dowager empress. So his retirement was to avoid conflicting with 
the Dowager Empress Feng, but he was still killed by Feng after his retirement. Andrew Eisenberg, 2008, 
53; Li Mingren, 2013, 113.  
111!
!
Gaozong Tuoba Jun ȶҠ̓, Emperor Xianzu Tuoba Hong ȶҠǝ, Emperor Gaozu 
Tuoba Hong ȶҠŵ (later Yuan Hong ŵ), Emperor Shizong Yuan Ke (ȍ)— all 
appointed their own heirs apparent, six in total, and four of them successfully succeeded 
to the throne and became emperors. However, after the death of Emperor Suzong Yuan 
Xu Ѵ, and especially after Erzhu Rong ƛʖЎ controlled Luoyang, the supreme 
power was no longer held by the Tuoba imperial family. During that time, the succession, 
or literally changing of the emperors, came to be manipulated by the warlords, such as 
the Erzhu, Yuwen Űɜ and Gao Ֆ families, so an heir apparent usually was not 
appointed. Before that, it seems the crown prince institution played an important and 
effective role during the imperial succession. Compared to the Han tradition, the crown 
prince in Northern Wei, however, was distorted from the beginning and caused some 
unexpected results.  
 The distortion was caused mainly by the tradition of appointing the crown prince 
and killing his mother at the same time created by Tuoba Tao. While Tuoba Gui created 
this tradition, his intention was to assure that supreme power was in the hands of his 
successors and to exclude the maternal relatives. In the Han tradition, the crown prince 
was the eldest son of the empress, and the heir apparent was interlocked with the empress 
both biologically and politically. So the emperor was not able to remove one of them 
without doing the same to the other.276 In other words, the Han crown prince system 
severely restricted the emperor’s power in choosing and removing his successor. With the 
Northern Wei custom, the mothers of the heirs apparent usually were not empresses when 
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they gave birth, and they also were killed soon after their son was selected as  crown 
princes, usually the eldest son. In this circumstance, the role of crown prince was not 
interlocked with that of the empress; therefore he easily could be removed by a powerful 
emperor. Among the six crown princes, two, Tuoba Huang ȶҠɶ and Tuoba Xun ȶҠ
Ȉ (Yuan Xuan Ȉ) were not able to succeed the throne, but rather were removed by 
their powerful fathers, Emperors Shizu and Gaozu.  
 After his mother’s death, the crown prince was usually assigned to a wet nurse or 
stepmother, who usually came from regimes conquered by Northern Wei and had no 
political base in the court.277 The stepmother or wet nurse raised the crown prince and 
also provided protection for him.278 When the crown prince succeeded to the throne, she 
often was proclaimed as the dowager empress who took over the power of the inner court, 
such as Empress Dowager Chang ǀ. Later, however, the custom of killing the crown 
prince’s mother was manipulated by the dominant female in the inner court, especially 
Dowager Empress Feng ®. She insisted on applying this custom, so that she could then 
raise and control the heir apparent. Both Emperor Gaozu and Yuan Xun Ȉ were raised 
by her. The succession of Emperor Gaozu was also supported by her. While the emperor 
was young and under the protection of the dowager empress, the supreme power was not 
controlled by the emperor but by the dowager empress. Only when the emperor grew up 
and was powerful enough to confront the dowager empress, might he be able to take back 
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277 Jennifer Holmgren, “The Harem in Northern Wei Politics --- 398–498 AD,” Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 26, 1(1983): 71–95; Andrew Eisenberg, 2008, 50.  
278 In the biography of Emperor Gaozong’s wet nurse, Dowager Empress Chang ǀ was praised for her toil 
and protection. Weishu, juan 13, 327.  
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his power, such as happened with Emperor Gaozu. In some occasions, the emperor was 
killed and replaced by the dowager empress with a younger one who could be easily 
manipulated, such as how Dowager Empress Feng ® enthroned Emperor Xianzu.279 
Therefore, one may argue that the custom of killing the crown prince’s mother actually 
assured the role of the crown prince and his succession.  
 Later during Emperor Shizong’s reign, because of this custom, the imperial 
concubines did not want to give birth to boys. This may be why Shizong only had one 
son, Yuan Xu ј. 280 Dowager Empress Hu was the biological mother of Yuan Xu; she 
was not killed perhaps because of Emperor Shizong’s protection.281 While Yuan Xu 
succeeded to the throne, he was too young, so Dowager Empress Hu dealt with the state 
affairs as the regent. Not having a son, the adult Yuan Xu eventually was killed by his 
mother because of the conflict between them while the warlord Erzhu Rong threatened 
the court.282 The crown prince institution, therefore, was no longer applied in the 
Northern Wei.  
 Although the Northern Wei crown prince institution was differed from that of the 
Han tradition, the Northern Wei ruler still tried to immutate certain aspects of the Han 
tradition under the influence of the Han literati in the court, especially during Emperor 
Gaozu’s reign. Confucian literatus Li Biao ʚǪ suggested to Gaozu that the education of 
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279 Refer to footnote 139.  
280 Besides Yuan Xu, Emperor Shizong had another elder son Yuan Chang, who, however, died at the age 
of three.  
281 Li Ping, 2000, 171–172; Tian Yuqing, 2011, 48.  
282 Zhizhi tongjian, juan 152, 4738-4739.  
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the crown prince should be taken seriously for the sake of the state.283 Gaozu valued his 
opinion and assigned tutors to Yuan Xun Ȉ to make him study during the day.284 The 
education, however, was not successful. Yuan Xun did not like reading the classics, and 
even escaped from Luoyang to Pingcheng, which directly caused him to be stripped of 
his role as heir apparent.285 Emperor Gaozu also applied Han rituals to the crown prince, 
such as the capping ceremony (guanli «΀), to highlight Yuan Xun’s role. Yet the ritual 
also was applied wrongly.286  
 
3.3.5 Chaotic Succession Again: Northern Qi and Northern Zhou 
 The power structure of renewed military decentralization inside the ruling group 
of Northern Qi and Northern Zhou was similar to events in the Sixteen Kingdoms 
discussed above, which caused a similar development of the institution of crown prince. 
In the early stage of Northern Qi and Northern Zhou, the lateral succession was applied. 
The early emperors in Northern Zhou, Yuwen Jue Űɜъ and Yuwen Yu Űɜˌ, both 
failed to appoint successors. The early emperors in Northern Qi, Gao Yang Ֆ˪ and Gao 
Yan Ֆ̋, both appointed their successors; but their heirs apparent, Gao Yin Ֆˇ and 
Gao Bainian Ֆ͢ǃ, failed to succeed to the throne. The third emperors in Northern Qi 
and Northern Zhou, Gao Zhan Ֆ̃ and Yuwen Yong ŰɜӠ, respectively appointed 
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283 Weishu, juan 62, 1384-1385. 
284 It is recorded that Emperor Gaozu did not allow Yuan Xun to take a rest in the noon inside his palace at 
the suggestion of his officials. Weishu, juan 22, 589.  
285 Weishu, juan 22, 588.  
286 Weishu, juan 108, vol.4, 2810-2811.  
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their crown princes, Gao Wei Ֆϊ and Yuwen Yun Űɜҗ, who successfully succeeded 
to the throne. During Gao Wei’s reign, however, Northern Qi was conquered by Northern 
Zhou. After the death of Yuwen Yun, the supreme power of Northern Zhou was taken 
over by the assistant minister Yang Jian ʟİ, who later became Emperor Wen of Sui.  
 To secure their crown prince’s role as their successors, some emperors let their 
heirs apparent play the role of “inspector of the state” (jianguo),287 or even abdicated and 
handed over the throne to the heir apparent in advance to secure the process of the 
transition of power.288  
 
3.3.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
             After the establishment of Northern Wei, Tuoba Gui tried to appoint his 
successor by killing his son’s mother to exclude the maternal relatives’ intervention in the 
succession. This later was treated as a Xianbei custom in the inner court, and was 
manipulated by the female leaders of the inner court. During the Northern Wei dynasty, 
the custom of killing the crown prince’s mother served to distort the crown prince 
institution of Han tradition. On the other hand, however, it secured the succession of 
some crown princes because they were under the protection of the dowager empress. In 
the late period of Northern Wei, the imperial concubines did not want to give birth to 
sons because of this custom. This helped to cause its abolition in some way. After this 
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287 Gao Yang’s crown prince, Gao Yin, and Yuwen Yong’s heir apparent, Yunwen Yun, both played the 
role of inspector of the state.  
288 Both Gao Zhan and Yunwen Yun abdicated and handed over the throne to their crown prince to secure 
the process of power transition. Gao Zhan’s successor, Gao Wei, also did the same thing but it was because 
of the military pressure from Northern Zhou.  
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system was abolished, the Northern Wei also collapsed and a chaotic succession similar 
to the Sixteen Kingdoms period reappeared in Northern Qi and Northern Zhou.   
 
3.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
 The ideology behind the crown prince mode of succession as part of the Han 
enthronement package was a culture of ancestor worship.  As Li Biao argued in his 
memorial to the throne, “Yi (Book of Changes) says ‘Nobody but the eldest son can take 
charge of the sacrificial vessel.’ Zhuan (Commentary of Zuo) records ‘The crown prince 
should bear the vessel of millet in the great sacrifice.’289 If the sacrifice has no host, the 
imperial ancestral temple would enjoy no food; if the crown prince was removed, then 
the sacrificial vessel can be handed over to no one.”290 So the crown prince succession 
was the embodiment of this ancestral worship culture. Even for Inner Asian rulers, when 
someone seized the throne and claimed himselve the emperor, it was expected that he 
would follow the emperorship custom in the Han tradition; there were no other options. 
This was different from rulership in the Inner Asian tradition. All the states in the Sixteen 
Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties applied the crown prince system easily as part 
of the Han enthronement package. This was especially true for rulers in the Sixteen 
Kingdoms period who lived and studied in the Central Plain for a long time before 
becoming rulers, such as Liu Yuan and Shi Hu. The Tuoba Xianbei rulers, however, took 
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be a mistake for “¬΂.” The original text in Zuozhuan was “The crown prince should bear the vessels of 
millet for the state in the great sacrifices (ŁŤŉ¬΂΁Ξ.κͫ).” Chunqiu zuozhuan zhu, 1990, Second 
year of Duke Min, 268. 




two generations to adopt formally the crown prince institution since the establishment of 
Northern Wei. Perhaps this was because these rulers were not originally based in the 
Central Plain but in Inner Mongolia.  
 The research in this chapter shows that these Inner Asian rulers soon found that, 
unlike other Han institutions, it was almost impossible to successfully apply the crown 
prince system because the decentralization of military power among the ruling class 
brought potential powerful competitors to confront the heir apparent. Only six of the 
sixteen heirs apparent in the seven states during the Sixteen Kingdoms period succeeded 
to the throne and ruled for more than one year, although two of them were deposed about 
two years after their enthronement by imperial family members. The early emperors in 
Northern Wei, Northern Qi and Northern Zhou also faced similar problems. These 
difficulties can be interpreted in the Inner Asian tradition of the rulership and succession. 
The decentralization of military and political power among the ruling class determined 
the way of succession to some extent. So even when the emperor appointed his successor 
as the heir apparent, his heir apparent still had to face challenges from other powerful 
competitors among the ruling group.  
 During this period, emperors applied several measures to solve the problem. One 
of them was to appoint some of the powerful competitors as assistant ministers for the 
new emperors; they were the key military figures and needed during wartime. Meanwhile, 
when the crown prince was old enough, the emperor intentionally arranged for the heir 
apparent to manage state affairs, and sometimes even sent him to the front lines of war. In 
these ways, the heir apparent could accumulate experience and power in these affairs. 
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Some emperors even abdicated and handed over the throne to their heir apparent during 
their lifetime to secure the process of transition in advance.  
 In the Han tradition, the political status of the crown prince as the only legitimate 
successor and the importance of his proper education were both emphasized by Jia Yi, 
and applied in the Han political system. This description of the crown prince tradition left 
room in its actual application. For instance, should the crown prince participate in policy 
making, political administrative activity, and even military activity? How deeply should 
he be involved? Should the crown prince hold any other positions and titles, and even 
lead his own army? Divergent answers to these questions with justification from the 
classics is not necessarily a violation of the principles of the Han tradition of succession.  
Inner Asian rulers usually had different answers to these questions compared to 
the emperors from native dynasties, such as Han, Song and Ming.291 With the Inner Asian 
succession tradition, they worried more about the competence of the crown prince. Even 
when the crown prince had the title, he could still be challenged after the death of the 
ruler. Therefore, Inner Asian rulers applied those measures mentioned above to let their 
heirs apparent build up their political competence, military power and personal influence. 
These activities prepared them to compete with other nobles. Besides the Sixteen 
Kingdoms period and Northern dynasties, this practice also can be found in almost all the 
so-called conquest dynasties, such as Liao, Jin and Yuan and Qing.  
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(Donggong ſ) also played an important role. Along with the development of the dynasties, the role of 
the crown prince and his organization tend to become weaker and weaker. Fan Shuai Ћƹ, “Yanxi yu 




 These measures, however, did not essentially eliminate the threat to the heir 
apparent since the powerful competitors still existed. Also, a too powerful heir apparent 
sometimes became a severe threat to the emperor. With these measures, the crown prince 
was greatly empowered compared to both the Inner Asian and Han tradition, and actually 
became a bigger threat to the emperor himself, one comparable to the other nobles in the 
imperial lineage. Therefore, some emperors promoted another son to compete with the 
crown prince, or sometimes the heir apparent was removed.  
 Another more straightforward measure for successfully applying the crown prince 
system was to eliminate all potential competitors for the heir apparent and even the 
emperor. Removing or killing the powerful figures in the ruling group, which frequently 
happened during this period, altered the power structure; more specifically, the 
decentralization of military and political power among the ruling groups. This measure, 
however, could weaken the state in terms of military force, which was crucial during 
wartime. War was practically an ongoing event in the Sixteen Kingdoms period and 
Northern Dynasties.  
Part of the reason for the collapse of Former Zhao, Later Zhao, Former Yan and 
Northern Qi was this measure of eliminating the powerful military figures inside the elite. 
On the other hand, these measures also distorted the crown prince system. The Inner 
Asian rulers noticed that the power structure influenced the application of the crown 
prince system, but what they may not have realize was that in the Han tradition this 
application was actually also a restriction on the emperor’s power. The Han crown prince 
system aimed to stabilize the process of power transition. To achieve stability, an heir 
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apparent was appointed, based basically on birthright. The emperor usually could not 
violate this principle. When the Inner Asian rulers were able to break away from the 
restraints of a decentralized power structure, they also did not have the restrictions of the 
Han tradition. So many times they manipulated the crown prince system by choosing the 
heir apparent first, and then appointing his mother as the empress to follow the system, or 
even chose whomever they wanted. In doing this, one of the functions of the crown 
prince system in the Han tradition, which restricted the emperor’s power in choosing his 
successor, disappeared. To some extent, the emperor monopolized the power of choosing 
and appointing the crown prince. Therefore, through applying the crown prince system, 
the Inner Asian rulers achieved the centralization of authority, which was different from, 
and even more centralized, than the Han tradition.292  
 The succession problem, however, really was not solved till the end of the 
Northern Dynasties. In the Sui and early Tang, the succession struggles inside the ruling 






292 The typical example is the Qing dynasty. After Kangxi Emperor found the crown prince institute was 
faulted, this institute was not applied in the rest time of the dynasty. All the successors were secretly 
appointed by the emperors.  
293 Sanping Chen, Multicultural China in the early Middle Ages, Philadelphia : University of Pennsylvania 




CHAPTER 4 From “Tribe” to Village? 
 
 Unlike the succession system, which usually only directly involves the upper 
ruling members and is largely controlled by the central power structure, the local political 
structure has direct impact on a majority of the population. Because of the differences 
between the local political structures in Inner Asian tradition. and the tradition in the Han 
and Jin dynasties, after the migration of the Inner Asian groups into the Central Plain, 
their original local political structure was changed unavoidably either by them or by the 
Han style government.  
The first question about this change is to ask how they lived after the migration. 
Were they isolated from the Han people, or did they mix with them? Then, the second 
question is how were they organized after the migration? Was their local political 
structure changed? If not, why? If so, how? What was the dynamic behind the change? 
The final question for this transition is about its impact on the polity and the future 
dynasties. In this chapter, I will examine the transition of Inner Asian people from the 
perspective of local community and institution, and try to answer these questions.  
 




 Before reaching the transition of the Inner Asian people in the Central Plain, the 
local political structures in the Han and Inner Asian traditions must be compared to show 
their similarities and differences. The local political structure discussed here essentially is 
the administrative way government controlled the people. One of the main purposes of 
ancient government administration was to extract human and material resources from the 
people while maintaining social stability.294 Different local institutions were imposed on 
the people by the state to achieve this goal.   
 
4.1.1 Local Institution/Community in Han Tradition 
 Local communities can be formed on different principles. Without the 
intervention of the state, people can be organized based on bloodline; e.g., the village as a 
clan in modern Fujian Province in Southern China; or religious belief, e.g., a Buddhist 
monastery. In early Medieval China, local communities formed on different principles. 
Starting in 1936, Yang Lien-sheng studied the “magnate clans (haozu ҁɥ),” a powerful 
element in local and central government from the Han Dynasty to the Northern 
Dynasties.295 Meanwhile, the impact of Buddhism on local society during the Northern 
Dynasties has been examined by Hou Xudong, who also pointed out the difference 
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Stanford University Press, 1990), 173. 
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between the local communities as natural units, “villa hamlet (qiu , cun ʛ, ju Ϯ, 
chuan Ʋ, zhuang ǋ)” and as administrative units “village (li Ӯ)” in early Medieval 
China.296 Both types of units simultaneously existed in early Medieval China.297  
The natural unit hamlet refers to an inhabited plot of land. The households 
gathered in a hamlet might have kinship ties to each other. In early Medieval China, 
however, such gatherings of households were usually not a single clan, but with a 
combination of different clans (people with different family names).298 These hamlets as 
natural units arose mainly because of suitability of the environment. For instance, they 
might be located close to a water source, farmland, or were convenient for transportation. 
During this period the size of these units vary. Yūichi Ikeda showed that there were only 
a dozen households in one hamlet.299 Rrtifacts and recently excavated remains also 
indicate that the scale of population in a hamlet (cun ʛ or qiu ) was usually less than 
one hundred inhabitants.300   
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Northern Dynasties, or the administrative unit village dominated in the Han Dynasty unlike the later 
dynasties. This argument was influenced heavily by their theory of periodization, and they consider the 
appearance of “hamlet” as a sign of medieval period. Refer to Hou Xudong, 2005, 11–13.  
298 Hou Xudong, 2005, 60–66; Li Mingzhao, 2013, 279–367.  
299 Yūichi Ikeda, Chūgoku kodai no shūraku to chihō gyōsei (#ĦýTϮЖĮɢбɒ, Ancient 
Chinese rural community and local administration) (Tōkyō : Kyūko Shoin, 2002), 130–134.  
300 The hamlets’ population can be found in two types of materials. One is the official documents, such as 
the bamboo slips from Zoumalou ҘՒʰ, Changsha Ӿ˞. These documents are more accurate because 
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 Administrative unit villages group natural unit hamlets into larger or smaller units 
into order to extract human and material resources from the populace for the government. 
For effective administration of the administrative unit, census and population registration 
is necessary. With the information from the population registration, the village was then 
allotted a set number of households, usually one hundred, 301 but it was not associated 
directly with a plot of land like the hamlet. So individuals in one village could come from 
different hamlets, and people in the same hamlet could also belong to different 
villages.302 The head of the village, called lili (Ӯĉ, village official), was sent by the a 
higher authority, usually the county (xian ï).303 In Jinshu, it is recorded that, 
The county appoints a village official for every hundred households. If 
the land is vast but sparsely populated, let [the county] appoint the 
village officials according to circumstances, but they should not be less 




Under the village were smaller administrative units, “ten (shi L)” and “five (wu ]),” 
which consisted  of ten and five households. A village usually comprised a “ten.”305 The 
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these are household registration documents. See Li Mingzhao, 2013, 320–356. The other type of material 
having the information of population is the inscription from the Buddhist statues. See Hou Xudong, 2005, 
27–32.  
301 “Leader of the li (Likui Ӯՙ) is in charge of one li including one hundred household,” in Hou Hanshu, 
juan 118, 3625.  
302 Hou Xudong, 2005, 13.  
303 Yan Gengwang ϩʎ, Zhongguo difang xingzheng zhidu shi: Weijin Nanbeichao difang xingzheng 
zhidu (#ĦĮɢбɒÃǓĀ: ՚ɸáÚʏĮɢбɒÃǓ Chinese history of local political administrative 
institution: Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern Dynasties local political administrative institutions) (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji press, 2007), 347–349.  
304 Jinshu, juan 24, 746-747.  
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heads of “ten” and “five” usually were selected from one of the members inside the 
households. Above the village, there were also several layers of higher authorities 
including town (xiang 8), county (xian ï) and others towards the central 
government.306 The major officials in the town were sent by the county to collect taxes, 
conscript labor, and exercise jurisdiction, among other assignments.307  
  Besides maintaining social stability, one major purpose of these local 
administrative units was to use the population as needed for conscript labor (for armies 
and corvée) and taxation. The administrative units controlled the population, involved in 
agriculture, and strictly constrained the migration of population, which was also 
beneficial for social stability.  
 
4.1.2 Local Institute/Community in Inner Asian Tradition 
 How the pre-modern Inner Asian polity was organized is a question still under 
debate, especially as to the characteristics of the local community. The Xiongnu polity 
was no exception. The confrontational theories on the Xiongnu polity can be described as 
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305 Hou Hanshu, juan 118, 3625. 
306 In the “Table of Bureaucratic and Ministerial Posts (Baiguan gongqing biao, ͢ŷéз) of Hanshu, it 
is recorded that “ting H” was also an administrative unit above village, and it was comprised of ten 
villages. But ting usually is considered as an organization for public security (like tracking down and 
arresting thieves) subordinate to commandant in chief (duwei өƖ) instead of civil officials, and ting was 
in the same rank as town (xiang). Li Mingzhao, 2013, 122; Yūichi Ikeda, 2002, 140–143; Yan Gengwang, 
2007, 346–347.  
307 At the county level, there were so-called “three elders (sanlao Ϥ)” who were selected among the 
elders (usually older than fifty) inside the town, and they collaborated with the county officials to 
administer and educate the people. Li Mingzhao, 2013, 122–124; Yan Gengwang, 2007, 344–345.  
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“Stateless Empire” versus “Headless State.”308 By describing the Xiongnu empire as 
“Stateless Empire,” scholars such as Thomas Barfield and Nikolai N. Kradin argue that 
the Xiongnu polity was a supratribal confederation, in which the power of the Chanyu 
was limited by internal and indigenous tribal leaders whose power derived from his own 
people from the conical tribes basing on the principle of seniority.309 Here the tribe refers 
to “an extensive patrilineal kinship organization in which members of a common descent 
group were ranked and segmented along genealogical lines.”310 The tribal leaders largely 
retained autonomy at the local level partly because of the steppe ecology and pastoral 
lifestyle.311 The main reason that these autonomous tribes united and formed a centralized 
confederation is that they were confronting a common, centralized, powerful Han polity 
in the south. While confronting the Han Empire, the gifts from the Han court played a 
key role in supporting the supratribal confederation, since the extensive pastoral economy 
alone could not maintain it.312  
 In the “Headless State” argument, the Xiongnu polity was described as a system 
of territorial fiefs which were managed by the Xiongnu aristocratic family in a largely 
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308 The two terms were from the titles of two academic works on Xiognnu. David Sneath, The Headless 
State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Nikolai N. Kradin, “Stateless Empire: The Structure 
of the Xiongnu Nomadic Super-Complex Chiefdom,” in Xiongnu Archaeology: Multidisciplinary 
Perspectives of the First Steppe Empire in Inner Asia, edited by Ursula Brosseder, Bryan K. Miller (Vor- 
und Frühgeschichtliche Archäologie Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, 2011), 77–98.  
309 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 37–39; Nikolai Kradin, 
2011, 89–91.   
310 Thomas Barfield, 1989, 26.  
311 Wang Mingke argues that the vulnerability of the steppe ecology and nomadic pastoralism requires the 
local units to have the autonomy to adjust their activity swiftly. He describes the Xiongnu social structure 
as “segmentary structure.” Wang Mingke, Youmuzhe de jueze: miandui Handiguo de Bei Yayoumu buluo 
(̬̂Ϧͣȱȸ:ԭƐ˕ƽĦͣÚĈ̬ӧЖ; The nomad's choice: the first encounter between northern 
nomads and imperial China) (Nanning: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2008),142–147.  
312 Thomas Barfield, 1989, 36–60; Nikolai Kradin, 2011, 77–98. 
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autonomous manner.313 A military-civil decimal hierarchical official system was 
established to centralize the power on the aristocrat family. So, at the local level, the 
commoners or soldiers were not in the autonomous tribal unit or kin group, but rather 
under the rule of the aristocrats through a bureaucratic and military system. The local 
administrative units were organized in ten, hundred and thousand, and each level had its 
own head—“head of ten (shizhangLӽ),” “head of a hundred (baizhang ͢ӽ)” and 
“head of a thousand(qianzhangÜӽ),” who were appointed by the aristocrats.314 When 
appointing these local officials to maintain their authority over the local people, , the 
aristocrats might avoid the local kin group leader or clan head to break the bond between 
them, similar to the Han government’s attitude to the local magnate clans.315  
 For the two opposing theories on the Xiongnu polity, although it has already been 
pointed out that the “stateless empire” argument is heavily influenced by early 
anthropology,316 the “headless state” argument is also criticized by some scholars.317 
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313 David Sneath, The Headless State (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 3, 23; Nicola Di 
Cosmo, “Aristocratic Elites in the Xiongnu Empire as Seen from Historical and Archaeological Evidence,” 
in Nomad Aristocrats in a World of Empires, edited by Herausgegeben von Jürgen Paul (Dr. Ludwig 
Reichert Verlag: Wiesbaden, 2013), 23–54; Christopher Atwood, “Chapter 5: Early Nomads in Chinese 
and Greek Imperial Ethnography,” in Tribal Mirage (draft).  
314 Shiji, juan 110, 2891. “Each of these twenty-four chiefs also establishes on their own authority Chiefs of 
a Thousand, Chiefs of a Hundred, Chiefs of Ten, Supporting Lesser Kingsнƙ̾, Administrators of Fiefs, 
Commandants, Household Managers, Juqu ˾, and others.” 
315 Li Mingzhao, 2013, 179–180.  
316 Christopher Atwood, “Chapter 5: Early Nomads in Chinese and Greek Imperial Ethnography,” in Tribal 
Mirage (draft). David Sneath also discussed the influence of early anthropology and colonialism on the 
perception of Inner Asian peoples. But his discussion is more general and not limited on the Xiongnu polity. 
David Sneath, 2007, 39–92.  
317 The criticisms on the “headless state” theory, however, are in the overall argument of the book The 
Headless State by David Sneath, instead of focusing on the Xiongnu polity. Peter B. Golden, Review of 
The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepesentations of Nomadic Inner Asia by 
David Sneath, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 68, no.1 (Feb., 2009), 293–296. Nikolay N. Kradin, 
Review of The Headless State: Aristocratic Orders, Kinship Society, and Misrepesentations of Nomadic 
Inner Asia by David Sneath, Asian Perspectives, 51:1, 130–138.  
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Therefore, a discussion about this topic is necessary to illustrate my opinion on these 
theories. I will review both theories based on a close reading of the textual evidence 
related to the Xiongnu polity, and then give my conclusions about the characteristics of 
Xiongnu polity.  
 
4.1.2.1 The Political Structure of the Xiongnu Ruling group 
 First I examine the textual evidence related to the political structure in the ruling 
group of the Xiongnu polity. Here the political structure refers to how the power was 
distributed among the ruling class, and how Chanyu managed and centralized his power. 
The most important textual evidence for this is from the Biography of the Xiongnu in 
Shiji, it is said, 
 
They establish Worthy (xian ҋ) Kings (wang ̾) of the Left and Right, 
Guli (ѿЭ) Kings of the Left and Right, Grand Commanders (dajiang 
Łƕ) of the Left and Right, Grand Commandants (duwei өƖ) of the 
Left and Right, Grand Household Managers (da danghu Ł͙ȩ) of the 
Left and Right, and Gudu (Օө) Marquises (hou s) of the Left and 
Right. The Xiongnu call a worthy a tuqi (Ʀϧ). Therefore, they usually 
take the Heir-Apparent to be the Tuqi [i.e., the Worthy] King of the 
Left. From the likes of the Worthy Kings to the Left and Right down to 
the Household Managers, the great ones have ten thousand horsemen 
[and] the small ones have several thousand, all twenty-four leaders 
(zhang ӽ) are appointed with the title of “[Commander of] Ten 
Thousand Horsemen”. All great ministers Ł϶ have hereditary 
positions (shiguan ŷ). The three surnames of the Huyan lineage (shi 
ˏ), the Lan lineage, and later the Xubu lineage constitute their nobility 
(guizhong ҅Μ). All Kings and Commanders (jiang ƕ) of the Left 
direction reside in the Eastern region facing Shanggu and beyond, 
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border in the east on the Weimo and Chaoxian. The Kings and Leaders 
of the Right direction reside in the Western region facing Shangjun, 
border in the west on the Yuezhi, the Di and the Qiang. Chanyu’s court 
faces Dai and Yunzhong. Each of them has its own area, within which 
it migrates in search of water and grassland. As to the Worthy Kings to 
the Left and Right and the Guli Kings to the Left and Right, these are 












A similar reference can be found in the Hanshu.319 It is likely that all twenty-four 
leaders were from the four royal lineages—the Chanyu lineage Luandi (ȽԱ) and other 
three royal lineage Huyan, Lan and Xubu.320 Members of the three other lineages often 
intermarried with the Chanyu lineage.321 The Chanyu had his own territory in the north of 
Dai and Yunzhong with his court; all twenty-four leaders also had their own territories. 
The four kings’ kingdoms were bigger than the others. These kings and generals normally 
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318 Shiji, juan 110, 2890–2891. The translation is based on Nicola Di Cosmo’s translation in his paper with 
my own revision. Nicola Di Cosmo, 2013, 26. For instance, the 24 leaders (zhang Ӿ) was translated as 
“chief” by Di Cosmo.  
319 Hanshu, juan 94. 3751.  
320 Di Cosmo states there were only three royal lineages in the Xiongnnu polity based on Shiji (Di Cosmo, 
2013, 28–29). But the Chanyu’s surname, which was different from the three, was mentioned ahead of this 
paragraph of citation. Also in Hou Hanshu and Jinshu, the Chanyu’s lineage is also listed, and the others 
royal lineages are recorded as “different surnames (ǛŘ)” from the Chanyu lineage (Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 
2944-2945; Jinshu, juan 97, 2550).  
321 In Hou Hanshu, it is recorded that the four lineages as “famous lineage (mingzu ćɥ)” who often 
intermarried with the Chanyu. Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2944-2945.  
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remained in their own area with their own court. One exception was the Gudu [Օө] 
Marquises [hou s] of the Left and Right,322 who remained in the court instead in their 
own area because they assisted Chanyu in the court.  
Among the four titles of king listed in the cited text, the Worthy King of the Left as 
the heir apparent, was surely of the Chanyu Lineage, and so should have been the other 
three kings. In Hou Hanshu, it is recorded that the four kings, which were called “four 
corners (sijiao ģы),” are all from the Chanyu lineage.323 When a new Chanyu was 
elected, he usually appointed his own heir apparent and other kings to help him secure the 
central power. An example is Huhanye Chanyu who appointed his older brother as Left 
King of Guli.324 Besides the four kings, there are also other kings mentioned in Hanshu, 
such as King of Xiutu `Ʀ̾, King of Kunye ɮӢ̾, King of Rizhu ɨӌ̾ and King 
of Xiuxun `ɫ̾. The latter two were clearly also of Chanyu lineage according to the 
Hanshu.325  
Besides the kings, one Grand Commander of the Left was also of the Chanyu 
Lineage, and was even appointed as Chanyu later.326 Other key information, such as other 
titles of the twenty-four leaders or the existence of other lineages inside the Xiongnu 
polity, however, was not in the Shiji or Hanshu. Some of the missing information, 
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322 The court of the Right King of Guli (āѿЭǔ) is mentioned in Hanshu. Han shu, juan 94, 3786. 
323 Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2944. 
324 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.2, 3795. 
325 It is recorded that the Hulugu (̳դŗ) Chanyu once appointed the son of the Worthy King of the Left 
as the Rizhu King, and the Tuqi (Ʀϧ) Chanyu’s younger cousin was Xiuxun King, who later claimed 
himself as the Chanyu. In Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3778; juan 94, vol.2, 3796   
326 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3778. One of Qietihou Chanyu’s son was appointed as Grand Commander of the 
Left.   
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fortunately, was included in the biography of Southern Xiongnu in Hou Hanshu and the 
biography of Xiongnu in Jinshu. Although in the later period, there was more impact 
from the Central Plain on the political structure of the Xiongnu, especially after they 
migrated to the South and were close to the Han people, the Southern Xiongnu still 
maintained their independence from the Han court for a long time. Meanwhile, because 
of a closer relationship between the Xiongnu and Han court, the officials of the Eastern 
Han were able to obtain more accurate information about the Xiongnu polity. In Hou 
Hanshu, it is recorded that, 
The noblest ones among the great ministers are Worthy King of the 
Left, then the lower one Luli King of the Left, then Worthy King of the 
Right, then Luli King of the Right, who were collectively called four 
corners (sijiao ģы); then Rizhu (ɨӌ) King of the Left and Right, 
then Wenyudi (˿ΌԱ) King of the Left and Right, then Jianjiang (˼
Ɣ) King of the Left and Right, who were together called six corners 
(liujiao ы). These are all the descendants of the Chanyu family, and 
they could be Chanyu in sequence. The great ministers with different 
surnames were the Gudu Marquises of the Left and Right, then Shizhu 
Gudu Marquises of the Left and Right. The other official titles such as 
Rizhu, Qiequ (˾), and Household Manager were all ranked by their 
power and number of subordinates. The Chanyu’s surname is Xulianti 
(ФӄՁ). The lineages with different surnames are Huyan, Xubu, 
Qiulin and Lan, all of which were the famous lineages of the state and 
intermarried with the Chanyu. The Huyan lineage are the left, Lan and 
the Xubu lineages are the right. They hear and pass judgment on the 
cases, and decide the degree of the crimes. Then verbally report to 













In the Southern Xiongnu, the four kings recorded in Shiji  also were listed as “four 
corners (sijiao ģы).” Like the other six kings listed above as “six corners (liujiao ы), 
they were all of the Chanyu lineage (Chanyu zidi à?ŤǞ).  
Besides the three lineages mentioned in Shiji, another lineage recorded as Qiulin 
ʣ became part of the nobility in the Southern Xiongnu during the Eastern Han 
dynasty.328 These four lineages intermarried with the Chanyu lineage, and also served in 
the Chanyu court as judicial officers. Therefore, there was an expansion of both the 
Chanyu royal lineage and the bureaucratic system, which also is indicated in the 
biography of Xiongnu in Jinshu where sixteen kings are listed, and all of them are of the 
Chanyu lineage.329  
 Based on the description of the central political structure of the Chanyu polity in 
Shiji and Hou Hanshu, all 24 leaders (zhang Ӿ), most of who were from the Chanyu 
lineage, were appointed by the Chanyu. Each of these leaders had his own territory ruled 
by his court. At least the authority of the Chanyu lineage members among the 24 leaders 
was from the top instead of from the bottom, which is the so-called local “autonomous 
tribal units.” In Thomas Barfield’s argument, he considers the 24 leaders as tribal leaders, 
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327 Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2944. The translation is by the author.  
328 Qiulin ʣ is recorded as Qiao 2 in Jinshu. Jinshu, juan 97, 2550.  
329 Jinshu, juan 97, 2550.  
133!
!
who can command loyalty  from their own tribal people.330 This argument is not in 
accordance with the textual evidence. Barfield’s argument, however, does correctly note 
the loose control of the Chanyu over the fief-holders.  
 Despite the fact that a large number of the leaders in the Xiongnu ruling group 
were from the Chanyu lineage, which indicates the power structure of “feudalism,” there 
were still other kings in the historical record. It is unclear if these kings were also from 
the Chanyu lineage or were local leader integrated into the Xiongnu polity. Barfield 
argues that the King of Xiutu `Ʀ, King of Kunye ɮӢ and King of Aojian Ō԰ were 
all local tribal leaders, who led people and easily walked away from the Chanyu’s rule.331 
The King of Xiutu’s and King of Kunye’s case happened during the reign of Emperor 
Wu ʾ of Han. After they were defeated by the Han army, it is recorded that, 
The Chanyu was angry at the King of Xiutu and King of Hunye, who 
lived in the western part of his domain, because they allowed the Han 
to capture or kill twenty or thirty thousand of their men; he wanted to 
send them a summons, intending to execute them. The Hunye and 
Xiutu kings, terrified, planned to surrender to the Han. The Han 
dispatched General Piaoqi to go and meet them, but on the way the 
Hunye king murdered the Xiutu king and combined the latter’s forces 
with his own.  
ĝ?ȂɮӢ̾`Ʀ̾ ƣпɢ̍̚ȬˈЦɛЕKʹþљ.ɮ




330 Thomas Barfield, 1989, 40–41.  
331 Thomas Barfield, 1989, 40–41. 
332 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3769. The translation is based on Thomas Barfield’s translation with my 
revision. Thomas Barfield, 1989, 40–41. 
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 Because of their military failure, which irritated the Chanyu, the Xiutu and Hunye 
kings wanted to break away from the control of the Chanyu. After surrendering to the 
Han, the Hunye king resettled inside Han territory with 40,000 of his people. The Han 
Emperor bestowed the title of Luoyin Marquis ̎ԋs on Hunye.333 One of the sons of 
the Xiutu king, Midi ɨͿ, later became a significant official in the Han court; Emperor 
Wu of Han gave him the surname of Jin ӱ.334 Although they lived under the control of 
and served the Han court, there is no record showing that the Hunye or Xiutu king’s 
family were of the Chanyu lineage.  
The case of the Aojian king happened during Woyanquti Chanyu’s rule. It is 
recorded that, 
The next year, the Chanyu also killed two younger brothers of 
Xianxianshan. Wushanmu remonstrated, but was not accepted. Then he 
became angry. Later, the Left King of Aojian died, and Chanyu 
appointed his own young son as the King of Aojian, who was retained 
in the Chanyu’s court. The Aojian nobles all elected the son of the 
deceased King of Aojian as the new king, and migrated to the east with 
him. The Chanyu sent the Right Prime Minister to attack them with ten 









333 Shiji, juan 111, 2933.  
334 It is recorded that he was bestowed with the surname Jin because the custom of Xiutu King of using 
Bronze Statue (jinren ӱK) to do sacrifice. Hanshu, juan 68, 2967.  
335 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3790.  
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 In this case, after the death of the Left King of Aojian, the Chanyu wanted to 
expand his power over the local populace by appointing his own son as the Aojian king, 
who would remain in the Chanyu court. The Aojian nobles, however, rejected this 
proposal and instead elected the son of the deceased Aojian King as their next king;  then 
they migrated to the east. The Chanyu tried to attack them for their disobedience, but was 
defeated. In both cases, the local kings chose not to obey the order of the Chanyu and 
severed their ties with him. As with the other kings, there was no evidence showing that 
they were of Chanyu lineage.  
What was the origin of these kings in the Xiongnu polity? The case of Mushanmu 
might shed some light on this question. In the biography of Xiongnu in Hanshu, 
Wushanmu, as a name of the small state and its leader, was recorded.  
Wushanmu originally was a small state between Wusun and Kangqu ǖ
ƣ, and was often invaded and looted. He led his a few thousand people 
to surrender to the Xiongnu. The Hulugu ϲդŗ Chanyu married him 
to the elder sister of the Rizhu King, and had him lead his people, 





After the invasion of the powerful neighboring states, Wushanmu decided to surrender 
voluntarily to the Xiongnu, a dominant group in the area. After placing his people under 
the protection of the Xiongnu polity, Wushanmu still was able to be a relatively 
independent leader of his own people; he also married members of his family into the 
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336 Ibid.  
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Chanyu lineage. He himself wed the elder sister of Rizhu King and married his daughter 
to the son of XulüquanquХԃʶ˾ Chanyu, Jihoushan Πs̴.337   
The Aojian king, Xiutu king and Kunye king also were group leaders who 
submitted to the Chanyu voluntarily or forcibly, and were integrated into the Xiongnu 
polity. Although they joined the Xiongnu and lived inside the Xiongnu territory, they too 
still led their own people and could be given the title of “king” by the Chanyu.  
 Besides the groups and their leaders inside the Xiongnu territory, there were other 
polities along the Xiongnu border who were controlled by the Xiongnu polities. This was 
true of the states in the Western Regions before falling under the influence of the Han 
court. In the beginning of the Biography of Western Region in Hanshu, it says, 
The various kingdoms of the Western Regions are mostly sedentary, 
and have cities, villages, cultivated fields and domestic animals. The 
inhabitants differ in their customs from the Xiongnu and Wu-sun 
people. They all used to be enslaved by the Xiongnu. The Rizhu King, 
on the western border of the Xiongnu territory, appointed a 
Commandant of Boy Servants (putong duwei) to rule the Western 
regions, and he always dwelt between Yanqi (Karasahr), Weixu and 






According to Hanshu, in the early period of the Western Han Dynasty, the Western 
Region states, including Wusun and Kangqu,339 were all controlled and “enslaved” by the 
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337 Ibid.  
338 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.1, 3872. 
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Xiongnu through the instructions of the Rizhu king. They had to pay “taxes” to the 
Xiongnu. Later, along with the rising Han military power, however, the states in the 
Western Regions had to start dealing with both Han and Xiongnu, and gradually changed 
their attitude toward the Xiongnu. When the Han court wanted to unite the Wusun to 
fight against the Xiongnu, in the beginning the Wusun ruler showed his interest by 
marrying a Han princess. At the same time, however, he also married a Xiongnu 
princess.340  
A similar situation happened in the Loulan state, which sent princes to both Han 
and Xiongnu as hostages.341 Under pressure from both the Han and Xiongnu, the Western 
Regions states usually chose to cooperate with both sides, but also kept a distance from 
the two powers to maintain their security. During the Western Han Dynasty, one of the 
Han commanders of the Western Regions (Xiyu duhu пĳөȳ), Guo Xun, mentioned 
above, in his memorial to the throne said, “When the Xiongnu was powerful, it did not 
annex the Wusun and Kangqu in the first place. When the Xiongnu submitted to us, it 
also did not lose the two states because of this.”342 The Eastern Han historian Ban Gu 
also discussed the relationship between the Western Region states and Xiongnu, saying,  
The states in the Western Regions all have their own rulers. Their 
troops were divided and weak, and not unified. Although they 
submitted to the Xiongnu, there is no mutual attachment. The Xiongnu 
could get their horses and cattle, felts, and rugs from them, but the 
Xiongnu couldn’t lead them to attack or withdraw.    
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339 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.1, 3891-3893; vol.2, 3901.  
340 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3903.  
341 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.1, 3877.  






Both statements describe the loose control over the Western Regions by the Xiongnu. 
Although the Xiongnu received “tax” from the Western Regions, their control easily 
could have been overthrown by another power, largely because these were small 
scattered states with a sedentary populace and far from the Xiongnu court.  
 Three different groups inside the Xiongnu ruling group have been discussed to 
show its political structure. In the first group, the core of the Xiongnu ruling group is the 
Chanyu and the other three or four lineages. The Kings in major positions at the 
Chanyu’s court were all from these lineages, which were appointed by the Chanyu. In the 
second group, there were other group leaders around the core group, such as the Xiutu 
King and Wushanmu, who submitted to the Xiongnu polity forcibly or voluntarily and 
stayed inside the Xiongnu territory. Besides these two groups, outside the Xiongnu 
territory were leaders associated with the Xiongnu polity. The earlier discussion of the 
three groups shows that the Chanyu had limited control over them, and the relationship 
between the Chanyu court and the three groups was fragile. Whether the kings in the 
ruling group were from the Chanyu lineage or not, they could decide to sever ties with 
the Chanyu court if they were dissatisfied with decisions made by Chanyu, or with the 
Chanyu himself.  
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 The core of the Xiongnu ruling group, such as the Chanyu lineage members, 
usually chose to break away from the control of the Chanyu’s court during the process of 
succession. In the Xiongnu succession institution, all the Chanyu lineage members could 
participate in the competition for the position of Chanyu. When they were considering the 
selection of the new Chanyu, a candidate could decide to break ties with the Chanyu 
court if he or his chosen candidate were deemed unworthy to serve as the Chanyu. This 
demonstrates the interaction between the central political structure and the succession 
tradition of Inner Asia, in which the successor should be competent and able to unite all 
the leaders within the polity. If the new Chanyu were able to do that, the central authority 
would be reestablished.  
So the central power structure (core) of the Xiongnu ruling group can be defined 
as “authoritative feudalism,” in which in the maintenance of the feudalistic centralization 
is largely decided by the authoritativeness of Chanyu. The other kings or group leaders 
from the second group had more reasons to leave the Chanyu’s court. 
 In the case of the Aojian king, the Aojian nobles decided to migrate to the east 
because the Chanyu wanted to appoint his own son as the Aojian king instead of letting 
the descendant of the Aojian King succeed, since “all great ministers Ł϶ have 
hereditary positions [shiguan ŷ].”344 When the Chanyu broke the rule and caused an 
imbalance of power between the Chanyu and the local kings, the kings could decide to 
detach from the polity.  
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The Hunye king and Xiutu king decided to break their connections with the 
Chanyu court because they were defeated by the Han army. Because they realized the 
strong military power of the Han, they decided to switch sides in the battle between Han 
and Xiongnu. 345 As for the other polity leaders not inside the Xiongnu territory but 
controlled by the Xiongnu, such as the Western Region states, they could be more easily 
separated from the Xiongnu polity by another power. So the relationship between the 
other two groups and the Chanyu court can be defined as “authoritative dependency.”  
The discussions on the three groups show the significance of the authority of the 
Chanyu to maintain the Xiongnu polity. An authoritative Chanyu can not only unite the 
core of the ruling group, but also maintain the stability of the whole ruling mandate of the 
Chanyu. How did the Chanyu control the other members of the ruling group with his 
authority? This question will be discussed in the next section.  
 
4.1.2.2. Authoritative Institutions in the Xiongnu Ruling Group  
 Since all the leaders usually stayed in their own territory and had their own court, 
yet the three ruling classes accepted the authority of the Chanyu, how could he efficiently 
control these ruling members? Although the historical records did not directly discuss this 
question, some hints can be found. For instance, the use of intermarriage and hostages 
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345 The weak control of the Chanyu over his local kings was shown more clearly in the Southern Xiongnu 
polity. In the Biography of Southern Xiongnu in Hou Hanshu, there are several cases showing the Chanyu 
was arrested, killed or even forcibly committed suicide because he was not able to control his local kings. 
Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2939-2971. 
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giving, regular meetings of the Chanyu with other elites, and the imposition of taxes. All 
these institutions, however, could only be effective under the authority of Chanyu. 
  Using intermarriage was a very common way to build blood relationships 
between the Chanyu lineage and other lineages. As the nobles of the Xiongnu polity, the 
other three lineages inside the core of the Xiongnu ruling group usually intermarried with 
the Chanyu himself.346 For the nobles from the second group, the Chanyu could marry 
them with one of the female or male members of his lineage. After Wushanmu 
surrendered to the Xiongnu, the Hulugu Chanyu married him to the elder sister of Rizhu 
King, and one of his daughters married Jihoushan Πs̴, son of Xulüquanqu (Фԉʙ˾) 
Chanyu.347 As for the third Xiongnu ruling group, there are records about their 
intermarriage relationship with the Xiongnu, specifically the Jushi (Үƺ) king and 
Wusun.348 It is, however, unclear which lineage from the Xiongnu polity had the 
intermarriage relationship with the third ruling group members.  
 Compared to intermarriage, which was used by all the three groups, the Chanyu, 
based on historical documentation, seemed to only require the crown prince as a hostage 
from the third class to assure its loyalty. During Emperor Zhao ɳ of Han’s reign, 
because the Jushi Kingdom built diplomatic relationship with the Han, the Xiongnu 
summoned the crown prince of the Jushi Kingdom as a hostage to the Xiongnu court. The 
crown prince, however, refused to act as a hostage and escaped.349 Certain states 
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346 Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2945.  
347 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3790.  
348 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3903, 3922.  
349 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3922.  
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sometimes sent hostages to both the Han and Xiongnu, which shows the struggle between 
the two powers to control the Western Regions.350 The hostage would remain friendly to 
the court where he once lived as a hostage, and they would support him in his quest to 
attain power on his return home. This would help to solidify the relationship between the 
Xiongnu and these satellites kingdoms.  
 Regular meetings with all the elite affiliates in the Chanyu court was another way 
to secure effective rule. In Hanshu and Hou Hanshu, it is recorded that, 
In the first month of each year, all the leaders have a small meeting in 
the Chanyu court, and offer sacrifice. In the fifth month, [they] have a 
mass meeting in Longcheng (ծĲ Dragon City),351 offer sacrifice to 
their ancestors, heaven and earth, spirits and gods. In the autumn, when 
the horses are sleek, [they] have another mass meeting in Dailin (Ңʣ) 
[the place for sacrifice by going around the tree], then examine and 




In the Xiongnu custom, there were three yearly sacrifices. Usually, 
these sacrifices to the heavenly deity were on the wu (ȣ) day of the 
first, fifth and ninth months of each year.353 Since the Southern Chanyu 
submitted [to the authority of Han], they also offer sacrifice to the Han 
emperor. During the meeting, Chanyu meets all the groups to discuss 
the state affairs, and they all enjoy themselves by galloping on 
horseback or camel.   
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350 For instance, the Loulan Kingdom. See note 341.  
351 Here the “Dragon City” should not be a city with permanent residence but a gathering of tents. Wang 
Mingke, 2008, 124.   
352 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3752.  
353 Wu day refers to the days with the terms combining with the heavenly stem wu ȣ in the Chinese 






It is recorded that there were three meetings per year; they usually convened in 
the first, fifth and ninth month. The autumn (ninth month) meeting was the largest.355 
During the these meetings, besides offering sacrifice to the ancestors and deities, the 
participants discussed important state affairs  (guoshi Ħ=), such as war or peace with 
the Han. At the autumn meeting, the population and the number of cattle were calculated 
and checked. Although it is mentioned that the attendees at these meetings were “all the 
leaders (zhuzhang ѷӾ)” from “all the units (zhubu ѷӧ),” it is unclear who they were 
and which groups they represented.  
Among the three groups of the Xiongnu ruling members, the core definitely 
attended these meetings. In the Hanshu, there are two cases in which the appanage-
holders from the core of the Xiongnu group, decided to not participate in the meetings. 
This was to demonstrate their disobedience to the Chanyu. Both events happened during 
the process of the Chanyu’s succession, and they were not willing to accept the authority 
of the new Chanyu.356.  
As for the other two groups, it seems that attending the meetings was necessary to 
confirm their submission and loyalty to the Chanyu. In the biography of the Western 
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354 Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2944. 
355 Wang Mingke pointed out the time of the three meetings was associated with the pastoral way of life in 
the steppe. Wang Mingke, 2008, 122–125.  
356 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.1, 3781-3782. In Hou Hanshu, there is another case showing the significance of 
the meetings. Hou Hanshu, juan 89, 2954. 
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Regions, it is recorded that, along with the rise of Wusun power, the king decided not to 
attend the meeting at the Xiongnu court,357 which implies the second and third ruling 
groups also regularly attended the meetings.   
 It is usually argued that the financial system of the Xiongnu polity heavily relied 
on the exploitation of surrounding agrarian societies, such as the Han Dynasty. It is 
questionable if a taxation system existed inside the Xiongnu polity. In the biography of 
Xiongnu in Shiji, Sima Qian recorded the story of Zhonghang Yue #бѶ, who was a 
defector from the Han to the Xiongnu. He reminded the Laoshang Chanyu that, for the 
Xiongnu people to maintain their strength, they should keep their own customs, which 
were suited to their terrain and lifestyle, and refuse the temptations of Han luxuries. Then 
it is recorded that he “taught the Chanyu’s assistants writing and recording, to record and 
examine the populace and the cattle (ɣɴѝɖĝ?Ƶā͛ёVяџ Kʹ͖̭),”358 
as was done during the autumn meeting. This record indicates that the Xiongnu court was 
taught to calculate and record their properties. But it is still questionable if a taxation 
system was developed since no more specific documentation exists.  
 Nevertheless, it is recorded that the Xiongnu court imposed a “tax” on the third 
ruling group, such as the Western Regions kingdoms and Wuhuan. The reason the term 
“tax” was used  is because the character “shui Ι” appeared in the records regarding the 
imposition of tax by the Xiongnu. As quoted above, the Rizhu king of the Xiongnu 
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357 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3901.  
358 Shiji, juan 110, 2899. Here “Vяџ Kʹ͖̭” also can be translated as “examine the popular and the 
cattle basing on the amount.” Here I translate “Ѹ” as “examine”, although it also has other meanings, such 




appointed a Commandant of Boy Servants (putong O) to levy the “tax” (shui Ι) on 
the kingdoms in the Western Regions, and he took the wealth from them. 359 But what are 
the “taxes”? Later in Ban Gu’s discussion, he states that the Xiongnu received “the horses 
and cattle, felt and rugs” from these kingdoms. 360 So these probably were the “taxes” 
paid by the Western Region kingdoms to the Xiongnu.  
There is another record in the Hanshu regarding the “tax” imposed by the 
Xiongnu on the Wuhuan /ʫ people. It is recorded that the Han court asked the Wuhuan 
to no longer pay “leather and cloth tax (pibushui ͧƸΙ)” to the Xiongnu.361 Despite this, 
the Xiongnu still sent an envoy to the Wuhuan to require the “tax” because it was an 
established practice (gushi ɓ=).362 The Wuhuan refused to pay, which angered the 
Xiongnu envoy. The envoy punished the Wuhuan leader, which also enraged the leader’s 
brothers. They killed the Xiongnu envoy and other people along with him. Eventually, 
the Xiongnu received their tax of horses, cattle, leathers and cloth from the Wuhuan by 
waging war against them.363  
In both cases, the Xiongnu court only sent their envoy (commandant and envoy) 
to collect the “tax” from the Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan. In other words, the 
Xiongnu court did not build a taxation system inside the Western Region kingdoms and 
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359 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.1, 3827. 
360 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3930. 
361 One reason that leather and cloth were taken as “tax” by the Xiongnu court is that they are easy to 
preserve in the arid weather of Mongolia. Perhaps because a large amount of leathers (pi ͧ) was 
transported to and preserved in the Xiongnu court as tribute by the surrounding states, it is recorded that 
Xiongnu leather (Xiongnu pi ØŐͧ) was seized by the Xianbei people when they attacked and defeated 
the Northern Xiongnu in 87 CE.  Hou Hanshu, juan 98, 2951.  
362 Hanshu, juan 94, vol.2, 3820.  
363 ibid.  
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Wuhuan. The rulers of the Western region kingdoms and Wuhuan belonged to the third 
group of ruling members, and their relationship with the Chanyu court was precarious. 
Therefore, the “tax” paid by the Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan to the Xiongnu 
was more like tribute instead of tax. The Hanshu used the term “tax (shui Ι) because the 
Western Region kingdoms and Wuhuan already had a taxation system within their states. 
These kingdoms and Wuhuan had to pay part of the government income to the Xiongnu. 
The third ruling group paid tribute for their dependency to the Xiongnu polity, and the 
Chanyu then would provide “protection” for them, which is another means of 
exploitation.  
  
4.1.2.3 “Non-Uniform” Institutional Complexity of the Xiongnu Polity 
 In the last two sections, three different groups of the Xiongnu ruling members, 
and how they were controlled by the Chanyu court have been discussed. As the core of 
the Xiongnu ruling class, the first group refers to the Chanyu and the other three or four 
lineages, which were the nobles and famous lineage (ćɥ) inside Xiongnu. The majority 
of the Kings and high ranking officials of the Chanyu polity were all from these lineages. 
The distribution of power among the first group is defined as “authoritative feudalism.” 
The second group was composed of the leaders who submitted to the Xiongnu polity 
forcibly or voluntarily, and stayed inside the Xiongnu territory, keeping their autonomy. 
Besides the two groups, outside the Xiongnu territory, there were polity leaders 
associated with the Xiongnu polity. The latter two groups’ relationship with the Chanyu 
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is described as “authoritative dependency.” As research shows, the control over the three 
ruling groups by the Chanyu, however, was limited. The intermarriage with the Chanyu 
lineage, sending hostages to the Chanyu court and regular meetings were the three major 
institutional measures to link and control the three ruling groups. The limited means of 
control over the ruling groups indicates the significance of the Chanyu’s authority for 
maintaining the stability of the Xiongnu polity.  
 Neither the “stateless empire” nor “headless state” theories can explain fully the 
political complexity of the Xiongnu polity. The “stateless empire” theory overlooked the 
“authoritative feudalism” inside the core group of the Xiongnu polity. It is possible that 
part of the Xiongnu ruling group derived their power from conical tribes instead of the 
Chanyu. As the earlier discussion shows, the authority of the Chanyu still played a 
significant role in incorporating them into the Xiongnu polity. As for the “headless state” 
theory, it also downplayed the Chanyu’s authority inside the Xiongnu polity.  
Meanwhile, although the military-civil hierarchical official system might be 
applied to centralize the power, it is questionable how widely the system was applied. 
According to Sima Qian, at least inside the core ruling group, the decimal hierarchical 
official system existed.364 Whether the system was applied by the second and third ruling 
groups is hard to answer because of a lack of evidence. For instance, in the third ruling 
group, it is recorded that there were similar official titles in the Western Region states,365 
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364 Shiji, juan 110, 2891.  
365 Hanshu, juan 96, vol.2, 3928.  
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which might be imposed by or adopted from Xiongnu. Among the Wuhuan people, the 
political system was more close to the conical tribal system.366  
As for the second ruling group, after they were included in the Xiongnu polity, 
their original political institutions still remained and could be the decimal administrative 
system or tribal system. Although some scholars argue that in the Xiongnu polity the 
decimal administrative system was developed based on the tribal system,367 it is still 
reasonable to speculate that both institutional systems existed in the Xiongnu polity. 
Therefore, the political structure of the Xiongnu polity can be defined as an authoritative 
system with non-uniform institutional complexity.368 With the authority of the Chanyu, 
this system can incorporate the groups with different complexities into the Xiongnu 
polity. Characteristic of the Xiongnu polity will be helpful understanding the discussion 
of the transition of the local institution of the Inner Asian peoples below.   
 
4.2 Local Institutions of Inner Asian peoples in the Central Plain during the Sixteen 
Kingdoms Period 
 
 Beginning with the discussion on the accommodation of the Inner Asian peoples 
by the Han and Jin government, this section examines the influence of the way of 
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366 Houhanshu, juan 90, 2979; Ma Changshou, Wuhuan yu Xianbei (Wuhuan and Xianbei), Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1962, 119–130.  
367 Xie Jian, “Xiongnu zhengzhi zhidu de yanjiu (Research on the Xiongnu political system),” in Lishi 
yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, vol.41, 1970, 231–237; Lin Gan, Xiongnu Tongshi, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 
1986, 8–9, 127.  
368 I borrowed this term, “non-uniform institutional complexity,” from Michael D. Frachetti, “Multiregional 
emergence of mobile pastoralism and nonuniform institutional complexity across Eurasia,” Current 
Anthropology, Vol. 53, No. 1 (February 2012). 
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accommodation in the Sixteen Kingdoms Period, and how the Inner Asian tradition of 
local organization changed during that time.  
 
4.2.1 Accommodating of the “Barbarians” 
 For the Han and Jin government, accommodating the Inner Asian groups, who 
submitted to the Han and Jin court for various reasons, was a common task. These groups 
not only included the Xiongnu people, who confronted the Han for a long time, but also 
the Qiang ϝ, Wuhuan and other groups living along the northern border of the Han. 
After they submitted to the Han or Jin governments, the leaders were given different titles 
depending on the size of their groups, and they were assigned certain areas for living. 
Meanwhile, the Han and Jin governments also needed to supervise these groups by 
putting them under the supervision of officials inside the civil or martial administrative 
system.  
 After submitting to the Han and Jin court, different titles were bestowed on the 
leaders of the Inner Asian groups by the court ranked according to their original titles and 
the sizes of their groups. The titles included four ranks: king (wang ̾), marquis (hou s), 
lord (junČ) and chief (zhang Ӿ).369 The difference between the latter two was the size 
of the groups they led.370 For the assigned living area, the Inner Asian peoples can be 
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369 Hou Hanshu, juan 118, 3632. 
370 According to the Biography of State Officials in Hou Hanshu, when the amount of the households in a 
county (xian ï) was more than 10,000, the head of the county was called ling (U). Otherwise, he was 
called zhang (Ӿ). Bestowing the titles of jun and zhang for the Inner Asian group might not have required 
the same number of households. But their difference should still mainly be the size of their groups. Hou 
Hanshu, juan 118, 3623.  
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assigned inside or outside the borders of the Han Dynasty. For instance, during the reign 
of Emperor Wu ʾƽ of Han, the Wuhuan people were moved to a contiguous area of the 
northeastern border in order to spy on the Xiongnu, and also to stop them allying with the 
Xiongnu.371 To manage the Inner Asian peoples more effectively, the most common way 
was to move them inside the territory of the Han Dynasty. The Inner Asian groups were 
administered depending on the number in their group. If the size was big, they could be 
divided into smaller groups settled in different areas and enjoying autonomy. For 
example, the group of more than 10,000 people led by the Hunye king that surrendered to 
the Han court were divided into five groups and became five “affiliated states (shuguo ƥ
Ħ)” of the Han Empire.  
 To supervise these Inner Asian groups, the Han or Jin government usually placed 
them under the supervision of the officials from the civil or martial administrative system. 
The civil administrative system refers to the local governments of the counties and 
prefectures. The groups placed under the civil administrative system were usually small. 
Thus, they could not become a threat to the local government. For instance, after the 
Yuezhi people surrendered during the Emperor Wu of Han’s reign, they lived with the 
Han people and were controlled by the local county officials.372 If the group was 
originally large, it would be divided into smaller groups, which were separately governed 
by local counties or prefectures. After the Southern Xiongnu led by the Huhanye Chanyu 
surrendered to the Han, although Huhanye still held the title of Chanyu and was treated as 
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371 Hou Hanshu, juan 90, 2981. The Wuhuan people migrated outside the border of Shanggu, Yuyang, 
Right Beiping, Liaoxi and Liaodong prefectures.  
372 Hou Hanshu, juan 87, 2899.  
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a nobleman, his people lived in the counties or prefectures and were administrated by the 
head of local governments. They “were almost the same as the registered households, but 
did not pay tax [to the local government] ”(ϼσȩŁĆϨҪ҄Ҍ)373 When the 
original group surrendering to the Han was small, they were usually also under the 
administration of the local government. A martial administrative system was sometimes 
created refering to the local military institutions. For instance, for the Wuhuan people, the 
Han and Jin government both set up the position of Protector Commandant of the 
Wuhuan (Hu wuhuan xiaowei ѫ̜ʫʦƖ).374 Under the lead of the military officials, 
these groups usually were required to provide military service for the Han and Jin 
government.  
 With the officials appointed by the Han or Jin court after the move inside the Han 
border, did the Inner Asian group still keep its autonomy within the original local 
political structure? In other words, did they became registered households organized the 
same as the Han local administrative way? This answer is clear from the number of  
registered households in the prefectures at the north and northwest borders of the Western 
Han and Eastern Han Dynasties. Compared to the Western Han, the number of registered 
households in Sili ȃԝ, Bingzhou ǄƳ, Liangzhou ³Ƴ and Youzhou ǈƳ 
administrative units during the Eastern Han Dynasty decreased dramatically and was less 
than half of the number in the Western Han.375 The dramatic decrease of registered 
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373 Jinshu, juan 97, 2548.  
374 Hou Hanshu, juan 118, 3626. There were other officials appointed to administer the Xiongnu and Qiang 
peoples.  
375 Liao Boyuan, “Lun Handai xizhi bianjiang neiqian minzu yu sainei zhi zhengce (On the policy of 
migrating the peoples in the frontier area inside the border during Han Dynasty),” in 1~6 shiji Zhongguo 
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household is best explained by the resettlement of the Inner Asian group into this area, 
which caused the original residents to move away from there. The Inner Asian groups, 
such as the Southern Xiongnu, “did not pay tax (bushu gongfu ҶҎҖ)” for each 
registered household, so they were not part of the registration system of the Han 
government.376 If the Han government did not enroll the Inner Asian units into the 
household registration system, then the original local political structure should have 
remained after their migration.  
Meanwhile, the maintainance of some form of seperate local political structure 
was shown by the large number of titles given to the local Inner Asian leaders by the Han 
and Jin government. These titles were not the same as the Han domestic official titles in 
the administrative bureaucratic system. This type of title usually started with “Han” or 
“Jin;” followed by the group name, like Xiongnu or Qiang ϝ; and ended with “chief 
(zhang Ӿ)” or “lord (jun Č),” which signified the rank of their leaders. In the Jin 
Dynasty, there were different ranks inside the “zhang Ӿ” title, which were marked with a 
number “hundred (bai o)” and “thousand (qianS).” This could also indicate the 
existence of the decimal administrative system inside the Inner Asian groups. In front of 
the “zhang” or “jun,” there usually was a decorative term to praise the local leaders, such 
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beifang bianjiang, minzu, shehui guoji xueshu yantaohui lunwenji (Collected Papers from the Conference 
on the Chinese Northern Frontier, Ethnic Groups and Society during 1st to 6th Century), Beijing: Science 
Press, 2008, 68–75.  
376 It is necessary to point out that although the Inner Asian groups did not have to pay tax to the Han and 
Jin government; they usually provided the military service for the Han and Jin government. See Liao 
Boyuan, 2008, 83–85. Meanwhile, Ma Changshou pointed out that in the Western Jin, there were Di people 
in the household registration system based on two records in the works by Pan Yue (̐Ƭ). In Pan’s works, 
both records are about the revolt of Di people. It is likely that the revolt was because the Jin government 
applied the household registration system on the Di people.  
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as qinhan J˕(Pro-Han), shuaishan ̼Ĝ (Leading to Goodness); or to mark their 
achievement including military deeds, such as polu ͼТ (Destroy the Enemy).377  
These titles have been found not only in historical records but also on many seals 
unearthed in Northern China. These seals usually were found in the tombs of the local 
leaders. Unlike the noble titles (king or duke) bestowed on the high ranking members of 
the ruling class of the Inner Asian groups, who also enjoyed privileges but were isolated 
from the populace after migrating to the Han and Jin territory, bestowing this type of title 
Implied that these local leaders remained in power. The Han and Jin government needed 
them to oversee their Inner Asian subjects since the high ranking members were not in 
charge, and county and prefecture governments were unable to intervene very much in 
the affairs of local non-Han. Meanwhile, accepting the titles and keeping the seals even 
after death demonstrated that the local leaders of the Inner Asian groups tried to 
emphasize that their authority derived from the Han and Jin government, which replaced 
the original status of the authority of Chanyu.  
 In sum, for the Han and Jin governments, after the Inner Asian group migrated 
within the Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups 
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or they became “affiliated states” after 
being divided and were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin governments. 
In both cases, the local political structure was largely kept intact. The local leaders were 
given titles by the Han and Jin governments, which helped them to continue to manage 
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377 Huang Shengzhang, “Xiongnu guanyin zonglun (Research on the Xiongnu official seals),” Shehui kexue 
zhanxian, no.3, 1987, 136–147.  
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their people. The existence of a large group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin 
borders was the foundation of the Inner Asian polities in the Central Plain during the 
Sixteen Kingdoms period.    
  
4.2.2 Local Organization of the Inner Asian Peoples during the Sixteen Kingdoms Period 
 The intact local political structure of the Inner Asian groups greatly accelerated 
the process of the establishing a constellation of polities in the Central Plain. The Jin 
officials, such as Guo Qin ӨӸ and Jiang Tong ˘ϒ, already noticed the threat from the 
Inner Asian groups to the Jin court before its collapse. They suggested to the emperor that 
the Inner Asian groups be moved far from the capital or even outside the border.378 The 
Inner Asian groups living in the Central Plain were not controlled directly by the Jin 
government, and they easily could have been convinced to turn against the Jin. The 
history of the Sixteen Kingdoms verified Guo and Jiang’s forebodings, and several Inner 
Asian groups built their own polities. In these polities, the Inner Asian groups, either as 
the core ruling group or as a dependency group, still maintained their political 
organization at the local level.  
 The founding of the Former Han relied on the five units of Xiongnu (Wubu 
Xiongnu BӧØŐ) who lived in the Southern Shanxi ƪп area at that time.379 After the 
establishment of the regime during Liu Cong’s reign, he divided the core group—five 
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378 Jinshu, juan 97, 2549; juan 56, 1529.  
379 Jinshu, juan 97, 2548. Because of the growing population, Cao Cao (ʅɌ) divided the Southern 
Xiongnu into “five groups.” The five groups of Xiongnu were managed by the “aristocrats (guizhe ґϦ)” 
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units of Xiongnu into seventeen subunits stationed in different locations. Each subunits 
had 2,000 soldiers and was led by Liu Cong’s lineage members as generals. Besides the 
Xiongnu people, he separated the population inside the original household registration 
system from the Inner Asian groups. For the population inside the household registration 
system, Liu Cong appointed an official called clerk (neishi (Ā) for 10,000 registered 
households; there were 43 clerks in total. On top of the clers, two Metropolitan 
Commandants (sili ăԞ) were appointed to manage the two groups of more than 20,000 
people. For the people who were not inside the household registration system and were 
usually called “yi ņ,” Liu Cong kept and used the Inner Asian administrative system to 
manage them. A Chanyu, who was not Liu Cong himself but his crown prince Liu Yi, 
was appointed to oversee them. 
 For these Inner Asian groups, every 10,000 tents (luo Ж) had a commandant 
(duwei өƖ) appointed, and two assistants of the Chanyu were over the commandants. 
Each assistant was in charge of 100,000 people.380 This was usually called the “Hu-Han 
(ϲ-˕)” dual ruling system.381 This system, in which the “Chanyu” was the “Hu” and the 
“emperor” was the “Han”, however, did not accurately describe the political structure of 
the Former Han. The main reason is that the five groups of Xiongnu people were not part 
of either the “Hu” or “Han” system. Here, the concept of the Inner Asian authoritative 
system with non-uniform institutional complexity fits in the context better. There were 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
380 Jinshu, juan 102, 2665.  
381 Chen Yong, Hanzhaoshi lungao – Xiongnu Tuge jianguo de zhengzhishi kaocha (Collected works on the 
Hanzhao history: Research on the political history of the state founding by the Xiongnu Tuge), Beijing: 
Shangwu yinshuguan, 2009, 145–162.  
156!
!
three major groups inside the Former Han: five groups of Xiongnu as the core group, the 
group originally inside the Jin household registration system, and the Inner Asian group 
“six yi ņ” except for the Xiongnu. The political structure inside the core group, which 
was divided into small subgroups that were led by the Liu lineage members, was similar 
to the “authoritative feudalism”. Under the ruling of the core group, five groups of 
Xiongnu, both the Inner Asian groups of “six yi” and the population inside the household 
registration system, were integrated into the polity, keeping their original institutional 
complexity, which here refers to the local political structure. In other words, the Inner 
Asian tradition of the local political structure remained in the Inner Asian groups of the 
Former Zhao.  
 This system with non-uniform institutional complexity also can be found in other 
succeeding kingdoms. In the Former Qin, after conquering Luoyang, Fu Jian divided the 
core group, the Di (ː) people of 150,000 households, and sent the subgroups into 
different major cities to be stationed.382 In the Later Zhao, the “six yi” were also under the 
lead of Shi Le’s crown prince, Shi Hong.383 Besides the commandant (duwei) from the 
Former Han, there was another title for the commander of the Inner Asian groups, 
Military Protector (Hujun ȳª).384 The Inner Asian groups under the lead of Hujun was 
sometimes called miscellaneous households (zahu ʘȪ), which were comprised of 
miscellaneous Hu (zahu ʘϲ). For instance, in the inscription from the hall stele of 
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Grand Commandant Deng (Deng taiwei ci bei ӟŃƖΆͽ), it is recorded that under the 
Protector of Army in Fengyi (®ϡ) were 7,000 miscellaneous households including 
twelve kinds of Yi (ņ), such as the Sogdian, Qiang, etc..385 Although because of war, the 
defeated groups were often divided or exiled to other places, the original local political 
structure was retained. For instance, after Fu Jian pacified a mutiny of Xiongnu people 
led by Cao Gu ʅҬ, he moved more than 6,000 households of the Xiongnu elites to 
Chang’an. The majority of the Xiongnu, however, still remained in their original places. 
After Cao’s death they were divided into only two groups, which still were led by Cao’s 
sons.386 In 391 CE, after He Ne (҇ђ) was defeated by Murong Chui’s army, he even 
sent the captured groups back to He Ne.387  
  
4.2.3 Transition to Household Registration System (bianhu ϖȪ)? 
 As discussed above, during the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the Inner Asian groups 
in the Central Plain kept maintained some form of distinctive local political structure with 
non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the Inner Asian groups usually were 
excluded from the household registration system of the central government. Based on the 
inscription from the stele of Grand Commandant Deng (Deng taiwei ci bei), Ma 
Changshou argued that in the Former Qin Qiang people were inside the household 
registration system. The major evidence is the recorded Qiang names attached to place 
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names (cities and towns). Because these Qiang people were associated with an 
administrative unit of the government, they were registered as household (bianhu ϖȪ) 
members.388 This argument, however, is not convincing because since the Han Dynasty, 
some of the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain were administrated by the head of the 
local prefectures or counties and still were not inside the household registration system. 
Were the Inner Asian groups then always excluded from the household registration 
system? There were two cases, which are worth discussing.  
 In 394 CE, after Yao Xing defeated Fu Deng, he “dissolved Deng’s troops, who 
went back to agricultural work.” (ɗ ӧʹ˂Ǹҹʯ)389 It is argued by scholars that 
since Fu Deng’s troops were mostly Di, Yao Xing reorganized the Di people and 
incorporated them into the household registration system to practice agriculture.390 There 
was, however, one flaw in this argument. Because these people went “back” to the 
agricultural work, it means they originally belonged to an agricultural population. At this 
time, it is reasonable to speculate that the majority of Fu Deng’s troops were from the 
agricultural population. It could be because some Di started to practice agriculture after 
they migrated into the Central Plain, or were levied from the registered households.  
 The other example concerned the Former Qin and Dai (T) Kingdom. After Fu 
Jian defeated the Dai Kingdom in 376 CE, he dissolved the Dai people in southern Inner 
Mongolia, “appointed military officers and supervisors to deal with them, and officers to 
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lead and restrain them.”391 These people were taxed on their income and levied based on 
household size. He also gave them land tax exemptions for three years to encourage them 
to practice agriculture. Meanwhile, he required the local chiefs (qushuai ˾ƹ) among 
them to send tribute at the end of every year and restricted their social interaction with 
others.392 This case clearly shows that Fu Jian changed the local political structure of the 
Xianbei by incorporating them into the household registration system.393 The Xianbei of 
the Dai Kingdom were administrated by the officials appointed by Fu Jian, and their 
original local leaders were removed from power. Although they might still enjoy some 
privileges, they had lost control over their people. The requirement for them to send 
tribute to the capital was a way to monitor them. Meanwhile, the tax and levy on the 
Xianbei also indicates the application of a household registration system.  
 Both cases imply that there were Inner Asian groups incorporated into the 
household registration system in the Sixteen Kingdoms period. Both instances happened 
after the leaders of these groups were defeated, and they were the core groups of both 
polities. They were dissolved by the winning side and became registered household 
members to control them more effectively inside the household registration system, 
especially when the Former Qin and Dai Kingdom were the strong enemies, such as  Yao 
Xing and Fu Jian. To increase the revenue of the government was the other reason.  
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4.2.4 Conclusion and Discussion 
 Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group moved inside the 
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups which were 
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or, after being divided became “affiliated 
states”, which were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin government. In 
both cases, the local political structure was largely kept intact. The existence of the large 
group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin borders with their autonomous local 
political structure greatly accelerated the process of polity building by the Inner Asian 
rulers in the Central Plain. These polities can be described as the Inner Asian authority 
system with non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the majority of the Inner 
Asian groups still kept some form of autonomous local political structure, and were not 
incorporated into the household registration system. A few cases show some Inner Asian 
groups as the core ruling group, however, who were incorporated into the system after the 
polity collapsed following their military defeat. They were dissolved by the winning side 
and became registered household members.  
 
4.3 Local Institutions of Inner Asian Peoples in the Central Plain during the 
Northern Dynasties 
 
 This section examines the policies regarding the local institution towards the 
Inner Asian people in the Central Plain and the changes throughout the Northern 
Dynasties. Beginning with the discussion on the “scattering the buzu (lisan buzu ԥɗӧ
ɥ)” polity by Tuoba Gui, Emperor Taizu of Northern Wei, this section continues 
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discussing the accommodating of the Inner Asian groups by the Northern Wei 
government. Then, this section examines the transition of the local institution of the Inner 
Asian groups during the Northern Dynasties.  
 
4.3.1 “Scattering the units (lisan zhubu ԥɗѷӧ)” 
 The specific content of scattering the units applied by Emperor Taizu of Northern 
Wei has always been debated, and the major controversial issue is whether the 
“scattering” reached the local level; in other words, if the people in the units were 
incorporated into the household registration system during the application of the 
policy.394 The implication of “units” should be examined first. The literal translation of 
“bu” could be “tribe” if the “bu” were understood as “buluo ӧЖ (tribe)”. As Christopher 
Atwood’s research shows, however, the polities along the border of China would not be 
the primary tribes but the “secondary tribes,” which were created by the strong political 
powers in both China and Mongolia.395 
Meanwhile, one major buzu, which was scattered by Emperor Taizu, was the 
Helan ҇Р. According to the Weishu, the Helan ancestors used to be rulers with more 
than ten units (bu ӧ) under their control.396 It indicates the buzu is not a kin-based 
primary tribe but rather refers to all the armed units under the lead of the group leader. In 
Helan’s case, it was He Ne (҇ђ). In his biography, it records that as the eldest brother 
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of the empress, He Ne was highly respected but without commanding any groups until 
his death;397 this was because of the policy of scattering the units.  
 There are only three historical records that refer directly to the policy of scattering 
the units by Emperor Taizu, and the most important one was in the biography of He Ne. 
After pacifying the Central Plain with Emperor Taizu, He Ne was given the title of 
Anyuan (ŲӃ Settling the Distant) General. Later, Emperor Taizu started to “scatter the 
units, settling them in assigned area, and not allowing them to migrate. The leaders and 
Great Men (daren ŁK) were the same as registered household members ( ǳԥɗѤ
ӧ¸ĬŸƣϰӘǶ ČӽŁKͤĆσȩ).”398 A similar description also can 
be found in the biography of state officials in Weishu, it says, “Early in the Dengguo era, 
Emperor Taizu scattered the units,399 and they first started to become the same as 
registered household members. (͟ĩ¾Ń΄ɗѤӧЖŖĆ̚σˑ)”400 Because of 
these records, even with a different interpretation of “bu/buluo” in this article, scholars 
like Tang Zhangru and Tian Yuqing argue that all the members inside the units were 
incorporated into the registered household system of the Northern Wei, and the original 
local political structure was removed because of the change.401 Hou Xudong further 
supports this argument with evidence from a stele inscription, which records two people 
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with the surname Helan who lived with other people and had their own farmland.402 
Some scholars disagree with this point because they find some “units” still existed during 
and after Emperor Taizu’s reign; the most famous example is the Erzhu Rong ̩ʖʲ 
case.403 The grandfather of Erzhu Rong had led his own unit since Emperor Taizu’s reign; 
Erzhu Rong’s father inherited the title and unit, and then passed it down to his son.404 
Therefore, they argue that the “scattering the units,” policy only broke up the stronger 
units, and the local-level structure of these units remained. These Inner Asian unit 
members were not incorporated into the household registration system. Then how can the 
conflicting evidence be explained? 
 It is very likely that the policy of scattering the units only targeted the units from 
the core ruling groups. These two units became members of the eight lineages for the 
meritorious generals (xunchen Ó϶).405 Meanwhile, the Helan and Dugu lineages had an 
intermarriage relationship with the Tuoba lineage. The maternal relative in the early 
Tuoba history was powerful and always interfered with the Tuoba succession. Even 
Tuoba Gui himself succeeded because of the support from his maternal relatives.406 So 
the purpose of this policy was to eliminate the competing rivals inside the ruling group 
for Tuoba lineage. For this purpose, in the Northern Wei, Emperor Taizu also started the 
practice of appointing the heir apparent and killing his mother at the same time. By doing 
this, Emperor Taizu tried to eliminate the threats to himself and his descendants. So it is 
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plausible to assume that the policy of scattering the units only targeted the powerful units 
that potentially threated the authority of the Tuoba lineage.  
Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the household 
registration system to weaken and control them. Even though these unit members were 
organized as “eight states (baguo ĩ)” inside the Xianbei polity,407 within the 
household registration system, they still were separate from the commoners who were 
managed by the local prefectures and counties. 408 The eight states indicated a higher 
status for their seperation. Meanwhile, Emperor Taizu did not scatter the remaining Inner 
Asian units. Therefore, the conflicting part in the historical records mentioned earlier can 
be explained. If there were Inner Asian units that still remained intact in the local level 
inside the Northern Wei, how were they administrated by the Northern Wei government? 
This question will be discussed below.  
 
4.3.2 Accommodation of the Inner Asian Groups in the Northern Dynasties 
 Scholars already have indicated that there were Inner Asian groups that remained 
as “units” inside the Tuoba Xianbei polity.409 The most obvious case is the High Carts 
(Gaoche ՖҮ) people. It is recorded that “During Taizu’s reign, he scattered the units. 
Only the Gaoche, because of their rough and unmanageable character, were permitted to 
separately remain as a group. (Ń΄ɵ¸ɗѤӧĚՖҤVԺι̺[pǭɓ
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
407 Kubozoe Yoshifumi, Gi Shin Nanbokuchō kanryōsei kenkyū, trans by Zhao Lixin, Tu Zongcheng and 
Hu Yunwei, Taipei: Guo li Taiwan da xue chu ban zhong xin, 2015, 29–31.  
408 ibid.  
409 Zhou Yiliang, Weijin nanbeichao shi lunji, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963, 177–198; Yoshiaki 
Kawamoto, 1998, 143–166.  
165!
!
ǵ¿̚ӧЖ)” in the Weishu.410 This description by the Weishu compiler is not accurate, 
however, because the Gaoche was not the only group that remained as a unit in Northern 
Wei. The case of Erzhu Rong, discussed above, was another major example.  
Besides the two, there were still many other Inner Asian groups that remained; 
this is evident from the appearance of the unit leader titles in both historical records and 
stele inscriptions. The titles include qiuzhangӬӾ, qiuhaoӬҁ, qiudaӬŁ, qiushuai 
Ӭƹ, buda ӧŁ,411 which indicate that these leaders were originally from the local 
group leaders and were given these titles after being incorporated into the Xianbei polity. 
But how were these groups administrated by the Northern Wei government? Were they 
managed by following the Han and Jin traditions?  
 In the early period of Northern Wei, the method of managing the submitted 
groups was recorded in the Biography of State Officials in Weishu, it says,  
The miscellaneous peoples who came from everywherein submission, 
were called “Wuwan (̜$)”. Their leader was called “chieftains 
(qiuzhang Ӭ)” or “militia leaders (shuzhang Ǖӽ)” based on the sizes 
of the groups. They were divided into southern and northern groups, 
which were managed by the appointed Great Men (daren ŁK) of the 
two units. At that time, the younger brother of the emperor Gu (ь) 
administrated the northern group, and the son Shijun (ƊČ) managed 
the southern group. With managing the peoples by dividing them, the 
two were like the two earls (bo e) of antiquity.412 In the first year of 
the Dengguo Reign of Emperor Taizu, he followed it without any 
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adjustment. The Great Men were still appointed for the south and north 







According to this record, in the early period of Northern Wei after the groups had 
submitted to the Tuoba polity, their leaders were assigned titles based on the size of their 
groups. All the people were divided into two big group: southern and northern, which 
were administrated by the “Big Men.” The big men were usually from the core ruling 
group, especially the Tuoba lineage. They were not only the Tuoba lineage, however. 
There were Big Men also from the other major lineages that had an intermarriage 
relationship with the Tuoba lineage. For instance, Liu Luochen (ÊϛҸ, also known as 
Dugu Luochen), who was the elder brother of Empress Xuanmu (Ž΢), was once the 
southern unit big man. His father also had been the northern unit big man.  
Later, along with the increasing number of the subordinate Inner Asian groups, 
other Big Men appeared with similar titles, such as “Central Great Man (Zhongbu daren 
#ӧŁK) and “Heaven Great Man (Tianbu daren łӧŁK).414 In year 417, the groups 
for administering them expanded into six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western, Southern 
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and Northern —and every group had a Great Man as a leader.415 In the year 444, 5000 
tents of the Northern Group (beibu Úӧ) revolted and tried to escape the control of 
Northern Wei by migrating to the north.416 This incident shows that the people in the six 
groups all remained in the units of the Inner Asian local institution.  
 Later, along with the conquest of Northern China, the Northern Wei started to 
adopt the institutions and official titles from the conquered states. One of them, the 
Military Protector (hujun ȳª), was inherited from Later Yan around 396 CE.417 As 
mentioned above, the Protector of the Army usually was appointed to supervise the Inner 
Asian groups in certain areas. Initially, the Protectors of the Army could be under the 
lead of the Big Men. In 401 CE, Emperor Taizu moved all the Protectors of Army under 
the control of the Great General (Dajiangjun ŁƔª).418 The Great General was the 
highest rank in the military administrative system, and Tuoba Tao obtained this title when 
he was the crown prince.419 Moving all the Protectors of Army to be under the lead of the 
Great General indicates that Emperor Taizu intended to centralize the power . Meanwhile, 
the military town (junzhen ªӼ) system was also gradually developed to coordinate the 
ruling of Protectors of the Army. For instance, the Tujing (ĊG, roughly today’s Shilou 
County of Shanxi Province) Town was established in 434 after the Tujing Protector of the 
Army already had existed for several years. The establishment of the Protector of the 
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Army and the military town suggests the existence of a military administrative system for 
the Inner Asian groups in the beginning of Northern Wei Dynasty. Under the Protector of 
the Army and the military town, the Inner Asian local institution remained, and the 
people were not incorporated into the household registration system.420  
 Because the groups organized within the Inner Asian local institution were not 
incorporated into the household registration system, it was doubly important for them had 
to serve the Northern Wei government militarily. For the groups regulated inside the 
military administrative system, providing military service for the Northern Wei was a 
common obligation. It is recorded in several cases that the High Cart people under the 
military town tried to escape from the military obligation by rebelling or migrating.421 
Besides providing military service for the Northern Wei,422 the Six Groups (liubu ӧ) 
people also had to pay tax to the government. In 421, Emperor Taizong imposed a 
property tax on the Six Bu people, who had to pay one war-horse to the government if 
they owned 100 sheep.423 This tax also indicates that the Six Groups people still kept 
their pastoral way of life.  
 
4.3.3 Transition to Household Registration System 
 The policy of scattering the units by Emperor Taizu targeted the powerful units to 
eliminate the competing powers inside the core-ruling group for the Tuoba lineage. With 
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this policy, Emperor Taizu broke up the Inner Asian local institutions among these units 
and incorporated the members of these units into the household registration system to 
weaken and control them. These unit members still were separated from the commoners, 
who were managed by the local prefectures and counties, but they were organized as 
“eight states (baguo Ħ)” inside the Xianbei polity.424 Meanwhile, as discussed above, 
there were other groups that kept the Inner Asian local institution inside Northern Wei, 
such as the Six Group people and people under the administration of the military town. 
These groups, however, also could be scattered and the people incorporated into the 
household registration system of the local civil administration. This happened when these 
groups tried to break away from the control of the Northern Wei, which was 
demonstrated by several cases recorded in Weishu.  
 For the Six Groups, there were at least three cases of rebellion recorded, and two 
of them were successful. In 471 and 472, the High Cart people in the Western Group and 
Eastern Group revolted and successfully broke away from the control of the Northern 
Wei.425 It was mainly because their settlements were in the borderland of the Northern 
Wei. The revolt by the Northern Group people did not end well. In 444, 5,000 tents of the 
Northern Group (beibu Úӧ) revolted and tried to escape from the control of Northern 
Wei by migrating to the north. The group leader was executed, and the captured people 
were moved to the Ji (¥), Xiang (ͯ) and Ding (Ÿ) prefectures as members of camp 
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households (yinghu ГȪ).426 The camp households in the Sixteen Kingdom period and 
early Northern Wei refer to the military households managed by the military 
administrative system who provided military service hereditarily. In 427, to weaken the 
military leaders, Emperor Shizu removed all the miscellaneous and camp households and 
placed them under the lead of the local counties and prefectures.427 Therefore, the 
captured people of the Northern Groups were put in camp households managed by the Ji, 
Xiang and Ding prefectures. Meanwhile, moving them into the interior of the Northern 
Wei territory made it more difficult for them to break away again.  
 The military town had the same problem of groups trying to escape. One early 
case happened in 429. The Xiutu (`Ʀ) leader Jin Ya (ӱư) rebelled because of a 
conflict with a military town general and the head of the local prefecture. After Jin’s 
death in 433, however, the group still remained and continued being led by Jin’s younger 
cousin.428 Later, in 471, the High Carts people were managed by the military town of 
Woye (˛Ӱ) and Tongwan (ϒ) in the borderland rebelled. They were defeated by the 
Northern Wei army, and more than 30,000 people were executed. The rest were also 
moved to the Ji, Xiang and Ding prefectures as camp households.  
 Another similar case regarding the High Cart people happened the next year.429 
As the Weishu states, “because of their rough and unmanageable character,” the High 
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Cart “separately remained as group.”430 When they were regulated by the local prefecture, 
because the camp household still belonged to the military household, the original local 
institution of the High Cart people still remained, even though the prefectures and 
counties should have intervened in the local administration of these groups in some way. 
In 445, when the revolt of Tujing Town was pacified, the revolutionaries were moved out 
of the military town and allocated to the local prefectures and counties.431 The goal was 
to weaken them and more effectively control them. It is, however, unclear if these 
revolting people were incorporated into the household registration system of the local 
government instead of still remaining as a military household.  
 Along with and after the unification of Northern China, there was a transition of 
the military administrative system into the civil administrative system inside the Northern 
Wei government. During peace time, the large number of military households was not 
necessary, and it was also a threat when the Inner Asian groups stayed as a military 
power inside the Northern Wei polity. Also, the Northern Wei government was able to 
recruit troops from the registered households.432 Meanwhile, a military household did not 
enjoy much privilege anymore when they had to stay in the military administrative 
system and were not able to enjoy the booty from the Central Plain, but instead had to 
face the ferocious enemy from the northern steppe. So the Inner Asian people, like the 
High Cart, revolted because of their refusal to participate in the military service for the 
Northern Wei. Therefore, it is recorded that in 457, all the protectors of the army (hujun 
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430 Weishu, juan 103, 2309. Here, I continue translating “buluo” as “groups” with consulting Atwood’s 
research. Christopher Atwood, “Chapter 5: Early Nomads in Chinese and Greek Imperial Ethnography,” in 
Tribal Mirage (draft). 
431 Weishu, juan 4, vol.2, 98. 
432 Gao Min, 2000, 316–317.  
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ѫҥ), who regulated the Inner Asian groups were changed into prefecture chiefs (taishou 
Ńű).433 This change indicates the establishment of the civil administrative system, 
mainly the household registration system, inside the Inner Asian groups.  
Later, in 524, Emperor Suzong of Northern Wei switched the military households 
under the regulation of prefectures, such as the camp households and military towns, into 
civil households, which were regulated by the household registration system.434 
Meanwhile, the military towns also were changed into prefectures.435 This policy 
incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, which used to be in the 
military administrative system, into the civil administration of household registration 
system. This policy also was largely followed by the Northern Zhou. The Di (ː) and 
Jihu (Πϲ) peoples inside the Northern Zhou polity were  regulated under the prefectures 
and counties as members of registered households.436  
  
4.3.3 Conclusion 
 In the early stage of Northern Wei, around 398 CE, Emperor Taizu applied the 
policy of scattering the units, thus targeting only the powerful units to eliminate the 
competing powers inside the ruling group of the Tuoba lineage. With this policy, 
Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the household 
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433 Weishu, juan 113, 2975.  
434 The members of the registered households still were required to provide labor service, including military 
service, and the number of people in one household who should provide the military service was dependent 
on the size of the households. Weishu, juan 9, 236-237. 
435 Weishu, juan 9, 236-237.  
436 Zhoushu, juan 49, 896-897.  
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registration system to weaken and control them. The people from these powerful units, 
however, were still separated from the commoners who were managed by the local 
prefectures and counties, but organized as “eight states (baguo Ħ)” inside the Xianbei 
polity. The eight states still indicated the possible higher status of their members, which 
makes them different from the local prefectures and counties.  
 Meanwhile, Inner Asian units existed inside the Northern Wei polity since its 
establishment and had not been scattered by Emperor Taizu. These people were 
organized as “Southern” and “Northern” Groups initially. Later, along with the increasing 
number of subordinate Inner Asian groups, the group number grew bigger. In 417, the 
groups for administrating them expanded into six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western, 
Southern and Northern— and every group had a Great Man as leader. The Northern Wei 
government also fashioned a military administrative system, such as the protector of an 
army and military town, to manage the Inner Asian peoples inside Northern Wei territory. 
In this system, the Inner Asian local institution of these groups still remained.  
 Because of the frequent revolt of the Inner Asian groups regulated in the military 
administrative system of Northern Wei, a certain number of the groups were moved out 
from the military town or “Six Groups,” and regulated by the prefectures and counties as 
military households. Along with the transition of the military administrative system into 
the civil administrative system inside the Northern Wei government, the military 
households, regulated either by the military town or prefectures and counties, all 
transferred into registered households, and many military towns also became prefectures. 
This process incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, that used 
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to be in the military administrative system, into the civil administration of household 
registration system. 
 
4.4 Conclusion and Discussion  
 
 Concerning the tradition of the local institution in the Han and Jin Dynasties, the 
gatherings of households were usually not a single clan but combined with different 
clans.437 As natural units, the hamlets were generated mainly because of suitability of the 
territories’ environment for peoples’ life. As an administrative unit of the government, 
with the application of the household registration system, the village normally was 
associated with a certain number of households, usually 100, instead of directly being 
associated with a plot of land like the hamlet. So individuals in one village could be from 
different hamlets, and people in the same hamlet could also belong to different 
villages.438  
There were several layers of authorities in the local institution of early medieval 
China. The heads of the lowest “ten” and “five” were usually assigned to one of the 
members inside the households. Above the village, there were also several layers of 
higher authorities including town (xiang 8), county (xian ï) and others around the 
central government. These administrative units all tended to maintain the population 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
437 Hou Xudong, 2005, 60–66; Li Mingzhao, 2013, 279–367.  
438 Hou Xudong, 2005, 13.  
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attached to the farmland to practice agriculture, and strictly limited the migration of 
people, to weaken and control them. 
 To understand the local institution of Inner Asian tradition, I examined the 
political complexity of the Xiongnu polity first. In the Xiongnu polity, there were three 
different groups within the Xiongnu ruling class. As the core of the Xiongnu ruling class, 
the first group refers to the Chanyu and another three or four lineages, which are the 
nobles and renowned lineage (mingzu ćɥ) inside the Xiongnu. The power distribution 
among the first group is defined as “authoritative feudalism.” The second group was the 
group leaders who submitted to the Xiongnu polity either forcibly or voluntarily, and 
stayed inside the Xiongnu territory while keeping their autonomy. Besides the two groups, 
outside the Xiongnu territory, there were polity leaders associated with the Xiongnu 
polity. The latter two groups’ relationship with the Chanyu is described as “authoritative 
dependency.”  
Control over the three ruling groups by the Chanyu was limited. The 
intermarriage with the Chanyu lineage, sending hostages to the Chanyu court and regular 
meetings were the three major institutional measures to link and control the three ruling 
groups. The limited ways of control over the ruling groups indicate the significance of the 
Chanyu’s authority for maintaining the stability of Xiongnu polity. Based on the 
complexity of the Xiongnu polity, I define the political structure of the Xiongnu polity as 
an authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. With the authority of 
the Chanyu, this system could incorporate the groups with different complexities into the 
Xiongnu polity. Therefore, in the local level, both the decimal hierarchical administrative 
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system and conical tribal system existed in different groups of the Xiongnu polity. The 
decimal hierarchical official system existed inside the core ruling group. Whether the 
system was applied by the second and third ruling groups is hard to answer because of 
lack of evidence. Among the Wuhuan people, the political system was closer to the 
conical tribal system.  
 Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group migrated inside the 
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups which were 
administrated by the local county or prefecture, or became “affiliated states” after being 
divided, which were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin government. In 
both cases, the local political structure of these groups was largely kept intact. The 
existence of the large group of Inner Asian people inside the Han and Jin borders with 
their intact local political structure greatly accelerated the process of polity building by 
the Inner Asian rulers in the Central Plain. These polities can be described as Inner Asian 
authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. In the system, the 
majority of the Inner Asian groups still kept their original local political structure and 
were not incorporated into the household registration system. A few cases show some 
Inner Asian groups as the core ruling group; they were incorporated into the system after 
the polity collapsed because of their military defeat. They were dissolved by the winning 
side and became registered household members mainly because they could be controlled 
more effectively inside the household registration system since they were the major threat 
of their old polity. 
177!
!
 As for the Northern Dynasties, early in the Northern Wei, around 398 CE, 
Emperor Taizu applied the policy of scattering the units; he only targeted the powerful 
units to eliminate the competing powers inside the ruling group for the Tuoba lineage. 
With this policy, Emperor Taizu tried to incorporate the members of these units into the 
household registration system to weaken and control them. The people from these 
powerful units, however, still were separated from the commoners managed by the local 
prefectures and counties, but organized as “eight states (baguo Ħ)” inside the Xianbei 
polity. The eight states could mark the possible higher status of their members, which 
made them different from the local prefectures and counties.  
 Meanwhile, Inner Asian units existed inside the Northern Wei polity since its 
establishment and were not scatted by Emperor Taizu. These people were organized as 
Southern and Northern groups initially. Later, along with the increasing number of the 
subordinate Inner Asian groups, the group number grew bigger. In 417, the groups for 
administering them expanded to six—Heaven, Earth, Eastern, Western, Southern and 
Northern— and every group had a Great Man as its leader. The Northern Wei 
government also adopted the military administrative system, such as the protector of an 
army and military town, to manage the Inner Asian groups inside Northern Wei territory. 
In this system, the Inner Asian local institution of these groups still remained.  
 Because of the frequent revolt of the Inner Asian groups regulated in the military 
administrative system of Northern Wei, a certain number of the groups were moved out 
from the military town or Six Groups, and regulated by the prefectures and counties as 
military households. Along with the transition of the military administrative system into 
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the civil administrative system inside the Northern Wei government, the military 
households were regulated either by the military town, or prefectures and counties. and 
transferred into registered households; many military towns also became prefectures. 
This process incorporated a large number of people from the Inner Asian units, which 
used to be in the military administrative system, into the civil administration of household 
registration system. 
 In general, the separation between the Inner Asian groups on the Central Plain and 
the domestic groups, which were managed with the household registration system, 
existed both in Han-style dynasties and in the polities mainly built by the Inner Asian 
groups. The existence of the Inner Asian units in the Central Plain both threatened the 
safety of the Han and Jin polities, and the polities in the Sixteen Kingdoms and Northern 
Dynasties. When facing the threat, the suggestions given by the officials during the Wei 
and Jin dynasties, like Jiang Tong, usually were further separation. According to them, 
the Inner Asian people should be removed to the borderland or even outside the border 
because the separation between the Hua and Yi should be maintained. Even when they 
lived in and around the Central Plain, they still could not be trusted. The Jin government 
was not able to handle the migration of the Inner Asian group because of the constant 
internal turmoil, and also they needed the military services from them. Therefore, these 
suggestions were not adopted in the Jin Dynasty.  
 The polities of the Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties largely 
followed the Inner Asian political tradition and the Inner Asian groups remained as units 
inside the polities. The military service provided by these groups played a significant role 
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in these policies. The imposition of the household registration system on some of the 
Inner Asian groups happened when these groups were too powerful, especially when 
these groups were led by the core ruling group members.  
 On the other hand, in the Northern Wei, when the military service provided by 
these Inner Asian groups was no longer as significant as before, the military 
administrative system gradually transferred into the civil administrative system. In this 
process, the household registration system was imposed and three layers of authorities 
were built in the local level of these Inner Asian groups to monitor and regulate them.439 
The Inner Asian groups, however, did not disappear after this process. There were still a 
certain number that remained.440 Once the peaceful situation was broken, they would be 
ready to engage militarily. After all, the one who caused the decline and even collapse of 









439 The three layers of authorities refers to the “three heads (sanzhang Ӿ)” system, which included the 
neighborhood head (linzhang ӫӽ) controlling five households as a neighbourhood (lin ӫ), the village 
head (lizhang Ӯӽ) supervising five neighborhoods, and the dang heads (dangzhang թӽ) overseeing five 
villages with 125 households. Weishu, juan 110, 2855.  
440 In 536, the Xianbei and High Cart group leaders still were listed separately as a military power. Weishu, 




CHAPTER 5 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 This dissertation began with an examination of the evolution of the Sinicization 
(Hanhua ÞÙ) theory. The research shows this theory in different contexts and 
interpretations to engage in some criticism of the theory. Since the 1920s, the Sinicization 
theory in the context of Chinese nationality has flourished in China. Later it re-appeared 
in the West through the works of Jing-shen Tao and Ping-ti Ho. The basic conclusion of 
Hanhua theory, that the Chinese absorbed the non-Chinese regardless of their status as 
rulers, a belief that already was held by the early European Sinologists, received both 
acceptance and criticism in Western academic writing. Scholars noted the broad and 
vague content covered by Hanhua, so they tried to divide it and create distinct terms for 
different parts of Hanhua’s content. For instance, the Hanhua in the context of Chinese 
nationality covered many topics so that it failed to distinguish between different aspects, 
such as politics and customs, inside the transition of the non-Chinese people. So as 
Dardess and Bol suggested, the Hanhua theory in the context of Chinese nationality had 
problematic analytic value, and should be applied with caution and clear restriction on its 
content.  
 As discussed in the first chapter, the Hanhua theory has been adopted in the 
construction of the history of Chinese Nationality since the early 20th century rather than 
Han ethnicity in uniting all the peoples inside China. Therefore, the Hanhua in the 
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context of Chinese Nationality tried to be inclusive and flexible, and to connect different 
peoples with different cultural backgrounds inside Chinese territory. As Ping-ti Ho 
suggested, culturalism behind the Hanhua theory would not “obliterate” the other patterns 
of culture and forms of identity inside the Chinese Nationality.   
 Although the Hanhua theory plays an important role in the concept of Chinese 
Nationality, it is of limited and problematic analytic value. By applying the Sinicization 
or Hanhua theory to every dynasty, the historical interpretation becomes a deterministic 
narrative. As a reaction to the flourishing of Hanhua theory in China and its adoption by 
some Western scholars, with misinterpretations and criticism about the Hanhua, the 
ethnicity of the non-Chinese peoples in Chinese history is emphasized more and more in 
the works of Western scholars as represented by the New Qing historians. This research, 
however, does not explain why and how the non-Chinese peoples adopted Chinese 
culture after entering the Central Plain. Meanwhile, the Hanhua theory often makes 
scholars focus on the result of the transition of the non-Chinese people and neglect the 
process of that transition. Therefore, in the second and third chapters, I present two case 
studies to explore the process of the transition of non-Chinese.  
 These case studies are about the transition of the institutions of the central and 
local government during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. The 
example for the central government is the succession system, and that for the local 
government is the local administrative system.  
182!
!
In the first case study, I point out that there were diverse institutional traditions on 
the succession system in the Inner Asia and the Central Plain. The institution of the 
crown prince in the succession of the Han imperial family was the embodiment of this 
ancestral worship culture. Meanwhile, the Inner Asian succession tradition usually 
required a selection to legitimize the ruler’s leadership through a peaceful or tanistric 
process, and the successor had to prove himself as the best-qualified candidate. The 
qualification of the candidate can be enhanced by the designation of the former ruler, and 
sometimes the former ruler appointed him to this high position. .  
 For the Inner Asian rulers, when they took  the throne and claimed themselves as 
emperor, it was expected that they would follow the emperorship in the Han although it 
was different from the rulership in the Inner Asian tradition. All the states in the Sixteen 
Kingdoms Period discussed in the second chapter and Northern Dynasties 
unexceptionally applied the crown prince system that was attached to the emperorship.  
The research shows that these Inner Asian rulers soon found that it was almost 
impossible to successfully apply the crown prince system. The problem was that the 
decentralization of military power among the ruling group brought potential powerful 
competitors to the heir apparent. These difficulties can be attributed to the Inner Asian 
tradition of rulership and succession. The decentralization of military and political power 
among the ruling group determined the method of succession to some extent. The Inner 
Asian rulers noticed that the power structure influenced the application of the crown 
prince institution, so they applied different measures to let their heirs apparent acquire 
political and military power and personal influence, and make them able to compete with 
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other nobles. These measures sometimes even distorted the crown prince system. What 
may not have been obvious, however, was that the crown prince institution in the Han 
tradition was actually also restricted the emperor’s power.  
The Han crown prince system aimed to stabilize the process of the transition of 
supreme power. When the Inner Asian rulers were able to break out from the restraints of 
the decentralized power structure, they also had no restrictions from the Han tradition. 
One of the functions of the crown prince system in the Han tradition, which restricted the 
emperor’s power in choosing his successor, had disappeared. To some extent, the 
emperor monopolized the power of choosing and appointing the crown prince. Therefore, 
through applying the crown prince system, the Inner Asian rulers attained a centralized 
authority, which was different from and more centralized than the Han tradition. The 
succession problem, however, really was not resolved until the end of the Northern 
Dynasties. In the Sui and early Tang, the succession struggles inside the ruling group 
were still one of the main issues regarding the stability of the regimes. 
  In the second case study in the third chapter, the transition of the local institution 
of the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain has been discussed. In the Han and Jin 
Dynasties, the local administration was based on the application of a household 
registration system. There were several layers of authorities in the local institution. These 
administrative units were intended to maintain the population, attaching them to the 
farmland to practice agriculture, and to constrain the migration of people/ Both these 
were factors promoting social stability. As for the Inner Asian tradition, based on the 
complexity of the Xiongnu polity, I define the political structure of the Xiongnu polity as 
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an authoritative system with non-uniform institutional complexity. With the authority of 
the Chanyu, this system could incorporate  groups with different complexities into the 
Xiongnu polity. Therefore, at the local level, both the decimal hierarchical administrative 
system and conical tribal system existed in different groups of the Xiongnu polity. The 
decimal hierarchical official system existed inside the core ruling group. Whether the 
system was applied by the second and third ruling groups is hard to answer because of 
lack of evidence. 
 Since the Han and Jin Dynasties, after the Inner Asian group migrated within the 
Han and Jin borders, they were either divided into smaller groups that were administered 
by the local county or prefecture; or became “affiliated states” after being divided, which 
were supervised by the officials sent by the Han and Jin governments. In both instances, 
the local political structure of these groups largely was kept intact. The polities of the 
Sixteen Kingdoms Period and Northern Dynasties mainly followed the Inner Asian 
political tradition, and the Inner Asian groups also remained as units inside the polities. 
The military service provided by these groups played a significant role in these polities. 
The imposition of the household registration system on some of the Inner Asian groups 
happened when these groups became too powerful, especially when they were led by the 
core ruling group members.  
Meanwhile, in the Northern Wei, when the military service provided by these 
Inner Asian groups was no longer as significant as before, the military administrative 
system gradually transferred into the civil administrative system. In this process, the 
household registration system was imposed, and three layers of authorities were built in 
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the local level of these Inner Asian groups to monitor and regulate them. The Inner Asian 
groups, however, did not disappear after this process. There were still a certain number of 
them that remained. Once the peaceful situation was disrupted, they were prepared to 
engage militarily. After all, the one who caused the decline and even collapse of the 
Northern Wei, Erzhu Rong, was one of them.   
 The two case studies show the transition of the institutions of the Inner Asian 
polity in the Central Plain. The transition is neither a one-way change from Inner Asian 
institutions to Han and Jin institutions nor a simple hybrid. For different institutions, here 
the succession system in the central government and the administrative system in the 
local level, the dynamics for the transition were not the same. The power centralization 
can be considered as one shared dynamic in both cases. As an important part of the 
emperorship package from the Central Plain, the crown prince institution was associated 
directly with the legitimacy of the ruling house and also labeled as the “Han-style” 
institution.  
 Compared to the crown prince system, the local institutions—including the civil 
and military administrative system—did not have a strong ideological package bound 
with them. Therefore, unlike the succession institution case, in which the Inner Asian 
rulers adopted the crown prince system when they started to practice emperorship in the 
Han tradition, the Inner Asian rulers did not impose the household registration system on 
the Inner Asian groups in the Central Plain right after the establishment of their polities. 
The adoption of the household registration system as the local administrative system was 
mainly for the practical purposes instead of ideological purposes along the transition from 
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the military administrative system to civil administrative system. The household 
registration system and the multiple layer of authority in the civil administrative system 
maintained control more effectively over the population. At the same time, the Inner 
Asian tradition of the succession institution and local administrative system never 
disappeared in polities during the Sixteen Kingdoms period and Northern Dynasties. The 
two cases show that the Inner Asian tradition was organically integrated into the 
transitional process, imbedded into polities, and led to different and unexpected outcomes 
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